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natural configurations. Under magnification, fractal shapes like
clouds or mountains reveal a "self-similarity" whereby a small
sample displays the structural characteristics of the whole. This
concept gives rise to the hope, perhaps vain but sought to be
realized in this Article, that there are identifiable fractal qualities in
the shards of federal civil rights jurisprudence under 42 U.S.c.
§ 19832 that may be recomposed to construct a coherent whole.
Two broad propositions, dependent upon the identity of the
defendant, could lend such coherence through an asymmetrical
approach to liability. First, when the agent of a government entity
acts under the principal's express, implied, or apparent authority
and causes a person to be deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, the entity should bear
civil liability for damages regardless of the agent's state of mind,
status in the entity's hierarchy, or role in the formulation of its
policies. Second, and in contrast, wrongful state of mind should be
the sole determinative factor in assessing the liability of the
individual government agent. The agent should share the entity's
damage exposure if, and only if, she acts with intent to harm or
knows with substantial certainty that her conduct will injure the
plaintiff.
4
These premises are derived from the late Justice Harlan's
observation thirty years ago in the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape:
5
the deprivation of a federally guaranteed right by government
action is uniquely damaging and therefore demands remedies of
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. The statute was originally passed as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871), and titled "An Act to enforce the Provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
Purposes."
TSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 7-8 (1957); infra notes 312-13 and
accompanying text.
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); infra notes 355-59 and
accompanying text.
- 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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potent deterrent impact.6  In fact, the scheme suggested goes
further, serving the additional purposes of assuring a generally
available make-whole compensatory remedy and permitting the
dynamic evolution of American constitutional law, without chilling
the discretion necessary to the conduct of well-intentioned, vigorous
government actors.
Section 1983 as interpreted today takes a strikingly different,
though equally asymmetrical, shape. The statute' text simply
provides for the liability of defendants who "cause [a plaintiff] to be
subjected" 7 to the loss of a federally secured right. In adumbrating
this causation requirement, however, the Supreme Court places an
additional obstacle in the path of a plaintiff who sues the govern-
ment. An entity's liability is restricted to conduct of its agents that
implements entity "policy," defined as "a deliberate choice to follow
a course of action ... from among various alternatives."8 In the
typical case, the agent who inflicts the injury does not act pursuant
to a formal ordinance or written administrative directive; yet,
satisfying this requirement demands a showing that an official with
"final" discretionary authority under positive state law specifically
authorized or ratified the agent's injury-producing act.9 Alterna-
tively, the policy element may be met by evidence that the agent's
act was consistent with a settled entity custom, 10  Last, if injury
results from an agent's omission, policy may be found in the entity's
"deliberate indifference" to a frequently recurring circumstance.
11
Still, if the plaintiff can satisfy any of these formidable policy
hurdles, she recovers from an entity defendant even if the federal
right violated had not been judicially recognized before the incident
that caused the harm.12 The case against the entity can therefore
still serve as a staging ground for dialogue about the creation of
new constitutional protections.
Measured against the statute's overriding purpose of restraining
federally unlawful conduct "under color of ... State" law,
13
6 See id. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the complete text of the statute, see supra note 2.
' Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion).
9 See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion).
Praprotnik commanded a majority of the Court inJett v. Dallas Independent School
District, 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 (1989).
10 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
I See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 194-200 & 228-33.
" Here we point to the language of the statute and the systemic congressional
purposes identified by Justice Douglas in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74
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current entity defendant doctrine makes formal sense but in
practice falls short of its animating ideal. In the abstract, the
Court's reaffirmation of the statute's federal lawmaking potential
has intuitive appeal. If, as the Court has acknowledged, "the public
as a whole has an interest" that is served by government conduct in
conformity with federal law, 14 and if constraining local govern-
ment conduct within federal norms is the statute's signal aim, then
preserving entity litigation as a crucible for the vindication of
evolving constitutional standards seems appropriate and necessary.
In the concrete world of litigation, however, the "policy" barrier has
proven overly protective of local government and its fisc.
By contrast, the prima facie case against a government official
is far less exacting. Whenever an individual agent causes a
recognized constitutional harm, she is prima facie liable even if the
entity approved her conduct and she had a blameless state of
mind. 15 Nevertheless, the Court, prompted by concerns about
litigation floodgates, federalism, and judicial interference with
discretionary government decisions, 16 has crafted an expansive
affirmative defense that more than offsets the laxity of the prima
facie requirements. Government agents, including those whose
positions make them most likely to inflict injury on ordinary
citizens, escape liability for damages by grace of qualified immunity
(1961), overruled on a different issue by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978). See also Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and
the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. RFV. 277, 280 (1965) (determining that legislative
history reveals the intent to create a federal remedy where state remedies are
unavailable or inadequate).
" Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 n.4 (1983) (Brennan,J., concurring in.
part and dissenting in part).
15 Monroe is still good law on this point. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330-31 (1986) (overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), to the extent that
Parratt held that negligence was sufficient to state a claim for a state-caused
"deprivation," but otherwise leaving undisturbed the conclusion that § 1983 contains
no independent state-of-mind requirement).
16 Beginning in 1976, the Court began to take seriously its concern that absent
significant restraints § 1983 would become "a font of tort law." Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641,646-47 (1987) (arguing that the
Court's efforts to curb procedural due process litigation are rooted in a desire to
stem a flood of litigation). Eisenberg and Schwab conclude, however, that the growth
in civil rights litigation has not been as explosive as commonly assumed. See id. at
693-95. Paul also evinces the fear that § 1983 litigation will become a mechanism for
federal trenching on state prerogatives. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 700-01; see also infra text
accompanying notes 209-14 (discussing Paul).
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unless the right violated was previously recognized by judicial
precedent of unmistakable application and clarity.
17
One consequence of this broad immunity for government agents
is a distinctly diluted role for claims against individual defendants;
in contrast to the situation for entity actions, § 1983's potential for
dynamic lawmaking in actions against individuals is virtually
nonexistent.18 A second, counterintuitive consequence is that the
vicious official who intends to harm a citizen is usually absolved of
any § 1983 liability. This happens either if the right the plaintiff
asserts is not judicially recognized to the requisite degree of
specificity, or if, despite the settled nature of the right, the
factfinder concludes that the defendant could not reasonably have
realized that her contemplated conduct would violate it.
There is some foundation for the Court's oft-stated concern
about chilling the initiative of individual government agents by
saddling them With damage liability when they are guilty only of
failing to predict the vagaries of constitutional doctrine.19 Addi-
tionally, it is unfair for that individual to face liability, as she does
under the Court's regime, when she acts without some degree of
certainty that her conduct may cause harm or when she attempts,
however clumsily, to serve the best interests of her employer. Thus
17 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1982).
18 Except for absolute legislative immunity, which extends beyond damages to
declaratory and injunctive relief, see Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446
U.S. 719, 730-34 (1980), other immunities, qualified or absolute, ordinarily insulate
only against damages. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-44 (1984) (holding that
judges, absolutely immune from damages, are subject to injunctive relief and
attorneys' fees). We suspect, however, that relatively few plaintiffs other than
institutional civil rights litigants will sue individual government officials for
prospective relief alone. Those who do are likely to encounter such obstacles as
standing, abstention, or comity-driven nonintervention doctrines that might preclude
litigation in federal court. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)
(holding that an individual had no standing to request injunctive relief from police
use of chokeholds because he was not in immediate danger of sustaining another
direct injury); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 (1976) (stating that individuals
had no standing to request an injunction compelling the police to adopt new
procedures where their alleged injury was too speculative to satisfy Article III's "case
or controversy" requirement); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,49, 54 (1971) (holding
that federal court in § 1983 action may not enjoin pending state criminal proceeding
in which the federal issue could be raised as a defense, and should dismiss); Railroad
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,501 (1941) (holding that federal court
§ 1983 action for injunction against state-sanctioned conduct should be stayed to
enable a state tribunal to interpret unsettled state law if a narrowing interpretation
might obviate the need to decide a federal question).
19 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
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the Court's immunity doctrines, first announced at a time when only
the individual agent was a cognizable "person" subject to § 1983
damage liability, are at once too generous and too stingy. If the
agent acts with intent to harm, the deterrence and compensation
goals of § 1983 are ill-served by letting her escape liability merely
because a court later concludes that the particular federal right at
issue was only dimly established at the time of the violation. If, in
contrast, an individual agent acting without an intent to harm
impairs a right that has been "recognized" to the Court's satisfaction
there is little need to use the agent as an incremental source of
remedy. The goals of facilitating government restraint, deterrence,
compensation, and dynamic lawmaking are better served on balance
by restricting liability to the government unit.
In the pages that follow we state the case for a new asymmetry.
Part I sketches a justification for dynamically reconstructing a
statute that the Court itself has radically reconstructed beginning
with its landmark 1961 decision in Monroe. As it stands today,
§ 1983 is almost entirely a judicial construct. Its open-textured
language is as immune to self-definition as that of the Fourteenth
Amendment, whose enforcement it was passed to ensure.20 We
suggest borrowing from contemporary tort law to flesh out not only
ancillary procedural and remedial gaps but also the statute's most
basic standards of liability and defense.
In Parts II and III we turn to the substance of the judicially
constructed doctrine in the individual and entity cases, respectively.
After the Court's most recent ministrations, this historic statute of
sweeping potential application yields an odd and desiccated residue.
On the one hand, there are yawning gaps in both entity and
individual defendant liability. Only in a formal sense does the entity
suit serve the original Reconstructors' goal of bringing local
governments to heel; in practice, the difficulty of demonstrating
"policy" or "custom" provides the entity an expansive exemption
from liability. At the same time, the individual defendant's
qualified immunity absolves him from liability for an intentionally
inflicted constitutional harm not clearly foreshadowed by a prior
decision. On the other hand, the Court has shown a remarkable
willingness of late to expand the scope of § 1983 to redress the
deprivation of rights created by federal statute.2 1 This stands as
20 The title to the original Klan Act went beyond enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment to include "other Purposes." See supra note 2.
21 See Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA,
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a pointed and puzzling contrast to the Court's crabbed approach to
the definition and enforcement of the fundamental constitutional
rights that lie at § 1983's core.
Part IV considers the consequences of the Court's asymmetry
and the concerns that have animated its development. The Court's
intuition in treating the entity case as a vessel for the development
of constitutional law is consonant with history and apparent
congressional purpose. But the particularized rules it has devised
to govern those actions erode § 1983's force as a bulwark against
state-sponsored conduct that lacks the formal approval of law. The
current asymmetry, we conclude, cannot be explained either as a
device to achieve mirror-image parity between entity and individual
actions or as an expedient crafted to reduce federal calendar
congestion.
Part V explores new liability configurations for actions involving
each type of defendant. We begin by assaying scholarly proposals
that posit the unitary legislative goals of compensation or deter-
rence. We then advance our own multiple premises about statutory
purpose as the foundation of a competing proposal. Our sugges-
tions are designed principally to foster entity accountability and to
further the subsidiary goals of compensating victims and facilitating
the dynamic declaration of federal rights.
In pursuit of these ends, we argue for a modified species of
respondeat superior to govern the liability of local government
entities. Acknowledging that this part of the proposal creates
liability without fault, we defend it against the criticism that money
damages for constitutional violations should be confined to the
restrictive, Aristotelian concept of "corrective justice." This fault-
based approach unduly sacrifices entity accountability, particularly
given existing limits on standing to secure injunctive relief.
By contrast, we propose having fault control on the liability of
§ 1983 individual defendants. In our design, an individual defen-
dant would be liable for all federally unlawful conduct undertaken
with intent to harm, provided she acted with the express, implied,
or apparent authorization of the governing entity. Thus the entity
would be liable when the individual is, and also, frequently, when
the individual is not. In theory, this aspect of the proposal cuts
back on the open-ended amenability of individual officials that was
approved by Monroe. We are thus forced to respond to the criticism
91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1991).
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that allowing individuals to avoid liability for "faultless" unlawful
conduct authorized by their entities affronts the Nuremberg
principle. Our chief reply, apart from observing that the conduct
at issue in most nonintentional § 1983 situations would seldom be
morally reprehensible, is that our refashioned scheme of entity
liability would work its own indirect but powerful deterrence of
individual misbehavior.
Finally, we stress that in each of the new liability configurations,
pertaining to entities and individuals alike, the settledness of the
constitutional right on the eve of injury, currently the key to
qualified immunity for the individual, would be irrelevant.
22
Shining through the reshaped asymmetry, then, are at least two, and
in practical terms three,23 fractal roles for § 1983: a guarantor of
local government restraint respecting all federally unlawful conduct,
whatever the vintage of the violation; a reliable source of victim
compensation; and a vehicle for dynamism in the declaration of
federal rights.
I. JUDICIAL DYNAMISM AND SECTION 1983
A preliminary word about the judicial tradition of fleshing out
the contours of § 1983 is in order. In recent years other commen-
tators have proposed fundamental alterations to the statute's
liability standards in a search for coherence.24 Like ours, their
prescriptions are largely dictated by a particular premise about some
overriding statutory goal.25 All such commentary, including ours,
22 As we explain later in the Article, the status of the right maybe relevant to the
amount of damages. See infra note 372.
23 It could be argued that victim compensation is not an invariable fractal element
in our scheme, since we would relieve individuals of liability for defined, unintention-
al federal law violations under some circumstances that would deny the plaintiff
remedy from the entity as well. Such circumstances would be extremely rare,
however, and would be more than counterbalanced in aggregate compensatory terms
by the vastly increased range of entity liability. See in.fra text accompanying notes 310-
26.
24 See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity
Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 625, 630 (arguing that a model of liability
focusing on the conduct of the municipal agent would best serve the compensatory
aims of § 1983); Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section
1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 272 (suggesting that a
negligence standard should govern determinations of municipal liability for "bad faith
acts"); Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should
Pay?, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 935, 1003 (1989) (proposing entity liability for constitutional
violations "when[ever] a citizen is harmed by the wrongful exercise of government").
25 See infra text accompanying notes 272-86 (discussing the deterrence rationale
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is fairly critiqued as illegitimate social engineering unless the federal
courts have some warrant for realigning the terms of liability.
Whether they do depends on the degree to which more sure-footed
answers are supplied by statutory text, legislative history, or the
Court's own recent refashioning of § 1983.
The text and legislative history are remarkably opaque on the
standards governing the critical liability and defense issues with
which the Court has grappled during the last thirty years. History
generally fails to provide answers on most adjudicated issues that
matter; it is not an instrumental device.26 Despite the Court's
fondness for historical answers to questions about § 1983's new
applications, the statute is fairly characterized as impervious to
determinate historical analysis.27  The question we have asked,
therefore, is not whether the legislative history demands one or
another approach, but whether is forecloses an approach.
A tepid defense of our own suggestions is that they are not
manifestly unfaithful to legislative intent. Although these proposals
are unapologetically put forward as present-oriented,28 they are
firmly rooted in the phrase "under color of... State" law. Unable
to find legislative support for any concrete application of those
words, we revert to a more abstract level of intention. As Professor
Alexander observes, there is no good reason, when concrete and
abstract intentions diverge, for choosing one level of abstraction
over another.29 Conceding a priori the desirability of subscribing
to the drafters' intent given some semblance of agreement as to its
of Kramer and Sykes); infra text accompanying notes 289-95 (discussing the
compensation rationale of Brown).26 See generally Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law and
History, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 537 (1990).27 Se, e.g., PETER W. Low &JOHN C.JEFFRIES,JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 940 (2d ed. 1989) ("[T]he legislative history reveals no
occasion for.., focused and collective consideration of the issue. Instead, inferences
must be drawn from scattered statements of individual legislators . . . ."); Gene R.
Shreve, Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism, and Will, 66
IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1990) ("Evidence from congressional debates preceding the enactment
of § 1983 reveals little or no interest in the subject of state liability."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
394, 396-97 (1982) ("[A]Ithough courts and commentators have devoted much
attention to the legislative history of section 1983, there remains considerable dispute
about the intended scope of that provision." (footnotes omitted)).
28 See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv. 104, 115 (1989)
(condemning present-oriented interpretation as mindless and unfaithful to framers'
intent).
29 See Larry Alexander, Of Two Minds About Law and Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2444,
2447 (1990).
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content,3 0 when the coalescence of text and legislative history yield
no confident resolution, abstract intention is all that remains.
Finally, as will appear more clearly in this Article, one cannot
reconcile the Court's contemporary reworkings of § 1983 liability
standards and defenses with trarisparent legislative history or some
static notion of the common law. Despite occasional protestations
to the contrary,3 1 the Court has regularly resorted to a dynamic
lawmaking methodology in devising the qualified immunity
doctrine, the major limitation on the liability of individuals.3 2 In
the most general terms, the Court tells us that § 1983 should be
"read against the background of tort liability."33  If the Court
means that the 1871 Congress intended to freeze in place the then-
prevailing common law rules, we could not account for its most
recent expansion of official qualified immunity.3 4  The Court
30 See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1249
(1990) (explaining that the judicial role demands that courts act as "faithful agents of
the legislature whenever possible").
31 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 265 nn.62-63 (citing cases).
32 Although the Court has stated flatly that "[t]here is no federal general common
law," Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938), and that it would create common
law in suits between individuals only when there existed "a significant conflict
between some federal policy ... and the use of state law," Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (refusing to resolve a contract dispute
between claimants subject to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 by recourse to federal
common law), in fact the Court has at times created federal common law, and done
so in statutory actions sounding in tort. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S.
359, 361 (1952) (holding that the validity of a release under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act was a question of federal law); see also Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24,
at 265-67 (citing other cases in which the Court betrayed its willingness to make
federal common law).
33 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on a different issue by Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 258 n.13 (1978) (noting that the Court has employed tort law principles "in
constructing immunities under § 1983"); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418
(1976) (explaining that "§ 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of
tort immunities and defenses"). See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and
the 'Background' of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 32 (1974) (arguing that general tort
principles are relevant "by analogy" but not determinative in § 1983 cases); Charles A.
Rothfeld, Comment, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat
Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 955-62 (1979) (suggesting that common law tort
concepts support a theory of respondeat superior liability for municipalities under
§ 1983); Peter M. Van Zante, Comment, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494, 507-08 (1970) (indicating that the language from Monroe has been
construed to enable courts to fashion a federal common law of § 1983 liability based
on various sources of tort law), cited in Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 257 n.30.
M Laura Oren has traced the Court's recent departures from the nineteenth
century common law of government officials' qualified immunity. She also notes how
the Court, on the entity-defendant side of the equation, has overlooked the evolving
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launched that effort without even purporting to locate the new rules
in the common law tradition, fashioning them instead out of whole
cloth in order to relieve discretion-wielding officials of the burdens
of discovery and trial.35
Similarly, neither the language nor legislative history of § 1983
support the Court's "policy" barrier to the liability of local entities.
Rather, the requirement has its origin in a raw ipse dixit announced
in dictum, seemingly a product of bench politics.36 At a mini-
mum, it is difficult to understand the cramped "policy" prerequisite
as an application of common law; in the decision that announced
the requirement, the justices divided sharply on the existence and
nature of the nineteenth century understanding about the amenabil-
ity of those entities on any terms.3
7
The Court has explicitly rejected the notion that it is locked into
the century old common law conception. When, in Smith v.
Wade,38 the Court was forced to fill a gap in text, it expressly
disclaimed that the common law of 1871 "is absolutely controlling,
or that current law is irrelevant. On the contrary, if the prevailing
view on some point of general tort law had changed substantially in
the intervening century... we might be highly reluctant to assume
that Congress intended to perpetuate now-obsolete doctrine."
3 9
The Court specifically rejected the idea "that Congress necessarily
intended to freeze into permanent law whatever principles were
current in 1871, rather than to incorporate applicable general legal
principles as they evolve."
40
The proponents of the statute were apparently content to
establish a general federal remedy for injuries resulting from the
denial of federally protected.rights under color of state law.
41
relaxation in the twentieth century of state sovereign immunity doctrine. See Oren,
supra note 24, at 947-62. David Rudovsky reminds us that the Court has several times
asserted that only the common law as it stood in 1871, when § 1983's forerunner was
enacted, should guide the interpretation of the statute. See David Rudovsky, The
Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction
of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36-37 (1989) (citing cases). Among
other occasions the Court made this point in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 635-37 (1980),just two years before it undertook wholesale revisions of common
law qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
s See infra text accompanying notes 107-21.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 142-57.
s7 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
38 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
3 9 Id. at 34 n.2.
4 0 id.
41 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 257-59.
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Congress conferred on the federal courts the power not only to
develop such interstitial procedural matters as prerequisites to
suit,42 limitations, 43 and remedies, 44 but also to fence off the
basic boundaries of individual and entity liability.45 The statute
was passed during the heyday of Swift v. Tyson,46 when "the
existence of an evolving common law and of federal judicial power
to share in its development was a given. "47 The strident disagree-
ment among today's Justices about the scope of entity liability, even
as they enlarge beyond recognition the common law immunity of
individual officials, offers powerful testimony that on these
fundamental issues the common law of 1871 provides no real
guidance.
48
The only sound alternative is to "turn to the policies underlying
§ 1983 to determine which rule best accords" with them.
49
Indeed, even when the Court has examined the common law and
discovered a reasonably determinate answer, it has sometimes asked
the further question "whether considerations of public policy dictate
a [result] contrary" to the original common law.50 Such a question
would be superfluous unless the Court had reserved for itself the
power to shape rules of liability and defense as a matter of federal
common law.
5 1
42 See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (holding that state court may
not apply state notice of claim requirement in a § 1983 action); Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (holding that no mandatory exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is required).
43 See, e.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-51 (1989) (selecting an applicable
statute of limitations).
44 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (stating that "the court, in its discretion, may
allow ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs"); Smith, 461 U.S. at 56
(approving punitive damages against a state officer); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (disapproving punitive damages against municipalities
absent highly unusual circumstances); infra text accompanying note 325.
45 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 264-65.
46 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
47 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 264.
48 See id. at 266. See generally Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section
1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989) (arguing that
when the Court purports to use the common law of 1871, it typically uses modern
principles of tort law and effectively creates new federal common law).
4 Smith, 461 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,266 (1981); see also Kramer
& Sykes, supra note 24, at 266 (characterizing the Court's questioning as "whether the
considerations supporting the common law rule likewise warrant immunity under
§ 1983").
51 If we are wrong about this-if, for example, entity liability must be shaped as
the common law had it in 1871-our argument for respondeat superior is seriously
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That the statutory text and legislative history are at best
impenetrable, and that the Court has at times claimed the authority
to redraw § 1983 by dipping into the palette of an evolving common
law, are descriptive matters that leave unanswered the basic
normative question about the desirability of a dynamic interpreta-
tion. Professor Eskridge has observed that recourse to "evolutive"
interpretation makes the most sense when statutory text is unclear
and "original legislative expectations have been overtaken by
subsequent changes in society and law."5 2 Under those conditions,
courts asked to interpret a statute frequently have little other
choice, notwithstanding rhetorical professions of fidelity to text.
Section 1983 fits Eskridge's description. The judicial evolution
of the statute underscores the societal transformations that have
necessitated the dynamic tradition. In 1978, for example, in Monell
v. Department of Social Services,53 the Court, in declaring that § 1983
reaches governmient entities, 54 sustained an equal protection
challenge to a municipal employment rule requiring pregnant
women to take a predetermined period of pregnancy leave.55 The
Slaughter-House Cases,56 decided in 1873, two years after the Klan
Act was passed, illustrates by contrast the sea change in constitu-
tional thinking that occurred during the intervening years. The
Court then "doubt[ed] very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes... [would]
ever be held to come within the purview" of the Equal Protection
Clause.
57
undermined. Although the doctrine was then current and applied to municipal
corporations, courts carved out a notable exception for the corporation's "govern-
mental," as distinct from "proprietary," functions. The "vast majority of § 1983
claims" concern functions of a type that courts then considered "governmental."
Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 262-63 (citing Ronald M. Levin, The Section 1983
Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483, 1521 n.156 (1977)).
52 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1484 (1987).
53 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
54 The Monell requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff who sues an entity defendant
must prove the existence of a "policy" that caused the deprivation is discussed infra
part III.
55 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
56 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
5 7 See id. at 81.
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Roe v. Wade,58 brought in part under § 1983,59 illustrates the
problem more distinctly. The very constitutional right the action
was brought to enforce, the newly emerging right of privacy, was
one of which the Fourteenth Amendment's framers could scarcely
have conceived. Similarly, Maine v. Thiboutot,60 which held that
the statute's "and laws" language6 permits actions for the unlawful
denial of federal statutory entitlements, arose in a welfare state
society that the framers would not even recognize.
These and countless other legal and social transformations of
comparable magnitude suggest the necessity of an evolutive
interpretation of the statute in order to afford any meaningful
enforcement of underlying federal guarantees. On a canon of
construction no more exotic than the imperative to give every
statute some operative meaning, the Court has had no genuine
alternative to dynamism.
Our proposed restructuring of § 1983 borrows from developing
tort law.62 We think this sensible for two reasons, each implied by
the Court. 63 First, there are few other substantive sources to
consult for guidance about noncontractual civil interactions between
government and its citizens. Second, the contemporary common
law of torts "reflects the accumulated wisdom of incremental judicial
doctrine-building in a related field."64 The selective infusion of
contemporary common tort law into § 1983 doctrine can therefore
be defended not only as a necessary default, but also because tort
law brings with it a valuable tradition born of the same necessities
that impel dynamic interpretation.
58 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59 See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd inpart and
rev'd in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
61 For the full statute, see supra note 2 (stating that the statute provides redress
for the loss of rights guaranteed by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States).
62 See infra part V.C.
63 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (stating that where there -is no
legislative history concerning damages recoverable under § 1983 the Court will
modify or adapt existing common law of torts).
6' Eskridge, supra note 52, at 1488; see also Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in
Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 611
(1985) (noting that the Supreme Court has used modern common law in § 1983
interpretations).
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II. THE CASE AGAINST INDIVIDUAL STATE ACTORS
We turn now to the residue of the Court's dynamism, the
asymmetric shape of § 1983 actions against individuals and entities.
In the past thirty years, the jurisprudence of this statute in its
historic sphere-the redress of constitutional violations-has been
molded by an almost self-canceling dialectic: bursts of expansion in
scope, followed by equally striking doctrinal contractions.
A. The Prima Facie Case
By its terms, § 1983 liability attaches to "[e]very person" who
causes the loss of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Thus an individual state actor is unexceptionably
within the statute's reach. It is not altogether surprising, therefore,
that the Court in Monroe v. Pape65 would carve out an expansive
prima facie case in actions against such defendants.
The invasion of the Monroes' home by Chicago's finest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and the laws of Illinois
furnished the occasion for the Court to construe the § 1983
requirement that the defendant inflict the injury "under color of"
state law.66 The Court linked this requirement of the statute to
the long-settled interpretation of state action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment,67 which § 1983 was passed to enforce.
68
6 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on a diferent issue by Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
.66 Section 1983 creates an action at law or suit in equity against (1) every "person"
who (2) "under color of" state legislation, custom, or usage (3) "subjects, or causes
[another] to be subjected" (4) to the deprivation of rights secured by the federal
"Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).67 See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 287-94 (1913). The
municipal defendant argued in Home Tel. that a claim alleging it had imposed
confiscatory telephone rates in violation of due process failed for want of state action
because no state court had yet sustained the rate under the state's own due process
clause. Only when a state court so ruled, defendant's counsel urged, would state
authorization occur, and only then would there be the state action requisite for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. See id. at 282; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (restricting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to acts under state
authority). The Court held to the contrary that the Fourteenth Amendment could
be violated either when the state in its sovereign capacity commits acts that conflict
with the amendment, or simply when "state powers [are] abused by those who
possessed them." Home Tel., 227 U.S. at 288. It is now settled that Fourteenth
Amendment constructions of "state action" are authoritative of§ 1983's "under color
of" language as well. See Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982).
68 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (holding that the purpose of the statute is, as its
title states, "to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court concluded that § 1983
reaches federally unlawful conduct carried out by individual
defendants under the badge of or clothed in state authority,
irrespective of state approval. 69 The Court reached this result
despite indications that state law could provide relief at least as
complete as federal law and absent any allegation that the state had
discriminatorily denied such relief on other occasions. 70  The
special nature of the violation also had implications for remedy and
forum. "It is no answer," Justice Douglas wrote, "that the State has
a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."7 1
The apparent availability of a remedy under Illinois law,
however, casts doubt on whether any of the purposes of § 1983
identified by the majority supports the Monroe result. Justice
Douglas wrote that the legislation had "three main aims": to
override certain state laws; to provide a federal remedy not
provided by state law; and to provide such a remedy "where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."72 None of these purposes would have been advanced by
upholding the legal sufficiency of Monroe's claim. Accordingly, on
these facts, the ratio decidendi with greater explanatory power is the
conclusion of Justice Harlan's concurrence, drawn from the "flavor
of the legislative history." He wrote that Congress sought to
provide a supplementary remedy because "deprivation of a
constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious
than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different
remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort
and the deprivation of a constitutional right."
73
Justice Harlan, an ardent proponent of federalism, viewed the
State and its law as the dominant regulators of "primary private
69 See id. at 183-85.
70 Justice Frankfurter pointed out that Illinois decisions had found similar police
intrusions unlawful and that the complaint lacked concrete allegations of Illinois's
unwillingness to enforce those decisions. See id. at 224-25 & nn.33-34 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 183. The Court found support for its decision in two opinions that had
examined the criminal counterpart to § 1983. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 108 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326-27 & n.10 (1941). In both
cases, individuals were held criminally liable for conduct that violated not only federal
law, but state law as well.
72 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
73 Id. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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activity."74 He fervently believed that state courts are ordinarily
as competent and trustworthy as federal courts to uphold federally
guaranteed constitutional rights.75  Moreover, he located the
support for this claim directly in the Constitution.76 Nevertheless,
he would not subscribe to the view of dissentingJustice Frankfurter
that conduct could be considered under color of state law only upon
proof that the state authorized or approved its agent's act.77 For
Justice Harlan, the mere allegation that a federal right was violated
created an entitlement to a federal remedy in a federal court.
78
7" Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan began his Monroe concurrence by noting that the issue was "very close
indeed," but that he felt constrained, in part, by precedent construing § 1983's
criminal counterpart statute. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71 For example,Justice Harlan did not insist on an independent federal forum if
providing one threatened to undermine the state's ability to enforce its criminal laws.
In his dissent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), Harlan argued that no
independent federal forum is necessary if a § 1983 plaintiff can raise a claim as a
defendant in an ongoing state criminal proceeding. See id. at 498-99 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). By joining justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 54-56 (1971), rather than subscribing to Justice Black's far broader
opinion for the majority, Justice Harlan in effect reiterated that his support for a
judicially crafted ban on federal injunctive interference with state judicial proceedings
was limited to the case of criminal prosecutions. In Justice Stewart's words, the
offense to state interests arising from a federal injunction "is likely-to be less in acivil '
proceeding." Id. at 55 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).76 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474-75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the Court
had already "recognized that the scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation
... between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal
judiciary can make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of
congressional legislative powers").
T7 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 193-94 (Harlan,J., concurring). Frankfurter questioned
whether the enacting Congress had intended to replace state tort law whenever a state
actor committed a tort. See id. at 238-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally
Melvin R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Vaiying the Remedy to Save
the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723, 736 (1979) (noting that Justice Frankfurter used
federalism principles as a guide to congressional intent). Support for the Frankfurter
position is provided by Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed
Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985). But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 985 (1987) (concluding
that § 1983 was intended to be a highly intrusive remedy for violations of limited
scope).
78 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 194-98 (Harlan, J., concurring). According to Justice
Frankfurter, if the state actor's behavior was authorized by the state a § 1983 action
would lie; if unauthorized, a remedy lay in state law or not at all. As interpreted by
Justice Frankfurter, the state approval requirement was a device for allocating
jurisdiction between federal and state trial courts. See id. at 236-37 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Although he could hypothesize two legislative reasons to supportJustice
Frankfurter's interpretation of the statute's state action requirement,Justice Harlan
found the hypotheticals unpersuasive. See id. at 193-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Justice Harlan's reminder that government-perpetrated harms
are different is central, not only to the Monroe result but also
conceptually. Organic theories describing the formation and
maintenance of government characteristically posit mutual defense
and protection as bedrock moving causes.79 Laying aside the
contemporary events that inspired the original Klan Act,8 0 citizens
have the right to expect and demand that the entity to which they
turn for defense will not itself become the perpetrator of harm.
Constraining government actors who violate that basic understand-
ing, and providing meaningful redress for the victims of such
activity, vindicate the very purpose of government, symbolically
1
The first rested on Congress's fear that state courts would be unwilling to find
that a state official had state authority to violate an individual's constitutional rights.
Justice Harlan found no support in the legislative history, however, for "congressional
concern about the burdens of litigation placed upon the victims of 'authorized' ...
contrasted to the victims of unauthorized violations." Id. at 195-96.
A second hypothesis fared no better. Justice Harlan suggested that the
Reconstruction Congress might have concluded that state approved violations of
constitutional rights were more offensive than unauthorized violations. See id. at 198.
This potential explanation failed for a number of reasons. Perhaps most important,
virtually no deprivation of due process could ever receive ultimate state approval
because all states had their own due process clauses. One Senator speaking in the
debates "indicated a complete overlap in every State." Id. (quoting Senator
Trumbull). Justice Harlan found it impossible to believe that Congress would enact
§ 1983, given self-executing Fourteenth Amendment protections, but then limit its
availability when states had constitutional counterparts similar to the amendment.
One could imagine, he continued, that despite the state law counterpart, state
courts would still find the conduct unauthorized, see id. at 198-99, thus funneling the
case into state court underJustice Frankfurter's reading. Such speculation created
its own anomaly. If the state actor is denied a federal forum for defense through
removal because the 'state court would find his conduct unauthorized, thereby
undermining the need for a federal § 1983 forum altogether, "it is difficult to
contend that it is the added harmfulness of state approval that justifies a different
remedy for authorized than for unauthorized actions of state officers." Id. at 199.
The states could be counted on to redress constitutional rights without the need for
§ 1983 relief, In the end, there was no legislative history to support this potential
explanation. See id.
7 9 See e.g.,JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (Thomas P.
Peordon ed., 1952) (1690); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (Gertrude
Himmelfarb ed., 1982) (1859); MICHAELJ. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 97-
98 (1988).
80 See supra note 2.
81 On the symbolic importance of a federal remedy, see Christina Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 21-25 (1980). Justice Harlan's recognition of
this symbolism is also evident from his concurring opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a context analogous to
§ 1983 where the defendants are federal agents. See infra note 107. There he wrote
that it would be "at least anomalous" to conclude that the federal judiciary was
"powerless to accord a damages remedy to vindicate social policies which, by virtue
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as well as in practice. Complaints that § 1983 actions intrude too
often or too deeply into local government decision-making ring
rather hollow if the statute's purpose is to assure that such entities
abide by the organic law. As the Supreme Court has sometimes
recalled, the Union did not fight the Civil War to vindicate state
sovereignty.
82
The Monroe Court's willingness to expose individual defendants
to federal damages liability for conduct punishable under state law
is all the more remarkable because § 1983 claims then lay only
against individual state actors, not against their employing entities.
The amenability of states to damages at that time was merely
assumed, and not yet decided;83 in Monroe itself, the Court reject-
ed the imposition of liability on municipalities, 84 a holding later
understood to shield other local government entities as well.85
Furthermore, excepting those cases in which the defendant was a
legislative or judicial official,86 individual defendants then enjoyed
only the most general form of common law qualified immunity,
of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the
Government as an instrument of the popular will." Id. at 403-04 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Accordingly, he found no impediment to the Court's implying a private
right of action against federal agents for constitutional violations despite Congress's
silence on the subject, a silence sharply contrasting with its express § 1983 remedy
for similar violations under color of state law. See id. at 405.
82Jus&C Stewart had this point firmly within his grasp when he wrote for a
majority of the Court that § 1983 was an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). Following a discussion of changes in
American society wrought by the Civil War, he wrote:
Section 1983 was ... a product of a vast transformation from the
concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the
anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people ... to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44 (1971) (cautioning against undue interference "with the legitimate activities of the
state" by the federal government even when the federal government seeks to
"vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests"); supra notes 18 & 75
(discussing Younger).
83 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that
the state qua state is not a "person" for purposes of civil liability under § 1983).
84 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
85 See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710 (1973) (exempting
counties from the scope of § 1983); Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n,
435 F. Supp. 546,557 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (exempting state, county, and local civil service
commissions from § 1983jurisdiction as departments of the sponsoring government).
86 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (granting absolute
immunity to state legislative activities).
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defeasible either by objectively unreasonable conduct or malicious
intent.87  Restraint of government misconduct was therefore
achieved entirely through the liability of individual state actors,
whom the Court placed substantially at risk for acts their govern-
ment principals had authorized or ordained. Yet individual liability
seemed to a majority of the Monroe Court the necessary price of
effectuating Justice Harlan's insight: constitutional violations are
qualitatively different.
8 8
B. Individual Defendant Immunity
8 9
Not long after Monroe's expansive statement of individual
liability, the Court began to embrace an immunity doctrine
calculated to counter its generous prima facie case. The early
history of immunity reflects the Court's effort to apply a transplant-
ed common law doctrine to the particular circumstances of varied
§ 1983 defendants. This approach found support in the language
of 42 U.S.C. § 1988,90 which counsels courts to fill § 1983 cracks
with spackle from state common law.91 The Court's early grapp-
lings with qualified immunity for individual defendants-Tenney v.
87 See infra text accompanying notes 91-98.
8 This is not to suggest that the Court, then or since, has ever fully realized
Justice Harlan's companion suggestion that § 1983 violations warrant not just an
alternative forum but also more generous remedies than a state affords at common
law. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196 n.5. (Harlan, J., concurring); see also infra text
accompanying note 221 (discussing Harlan's position, and the Court's failure to
adhere to it).
89 A comprehensive history of § 1983 immunities is well beyond the scope of this
Article. As a starting point, see PETER H. ScHucK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 89-93, 203-05 (1983).
go 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
91 Section 1988 directs in part that state common law, to the extent that it is not
inconsistent with federal law, shall apply "in all cases [for the protection of civil
rights] where [federal laws] are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies." Id. Some of the interpretive
difficulties with this provision are explored by Beermann, supra note 48, at 58-75. He
also concludes that the common law to which § 1988 directs the courts is not the
common law the courts have followed. See id. at 61-63.
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Brandhove,92 Pierson v. Ray,93 Imbler v. Pachtman,94 and Scheuer
v. Rhodes' -were obedient to this task of infusing an open-textured
liability standard with common law learning.
96
In Scheuer, for example, the Court relied on two customary
rationales for executive immunity: the injustice of holding an
official liable in the absence of bad faith (which we term "fairness"),
and the fear of deterring and interfering with the functions of state
government ("federalism"). 97  Objective "reasonableness" and
subjective "good faith" elements of qualified immunity were to be
measured by the totality of the circumstances confronting the
official at the time of the challenged conduct, considered in light of
the scope of the officer's discretion.98 A year later, however, in
Wood v. Strickland,9 the Court departed from this traditional
approach, the first step on a march to the avowedly policy-based test
it ultimately announced in Harlow v. Fitzgeraldx°0 and Anderson v.
Creighton.101
92 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (creating absolute immunity for state legislators'
activity).
93 386 U.S. 547,554,557 (1967) (establishing a "qualified" defense of "good faith
and probable cause" for police officers and absolute immunity forjudicial officers).
A brief survey of the history ofjudicial immunityis contained in Peter H. Schuck, The
,Civil Liability ofJudges in the United States, 37 AM. J:'COMP. L. 655,'662-65 (1989).
94 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (declaring absolute immunity for prosecutorial
activity).
'5 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974) (containing ChiefJustice Burger's full explanation
of the "reasonable grounds" and "good-faith belief" version of qualified immunity for
executive officers); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers:
Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 14-21 (1978)
(providing a useful overview of executive immunity and its rationales).
96 See Mashaw, supra note 95, at 14-16 (arguing that executive immunity, as
distinguished from sovereign and probablyjudicial immunity, is a relatively recent
development).
97 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
98 See id. at 247-48. While the Court did not purport to premise its search for the
existence of immunities on § 1988, it clearly did rest its finding on common law
understandings. See id. at 238-48 & n.4. Moreover, the Court's result was consistent
with contemporary common law understanding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895D (1979).
99 420 U.S. 308 (1975), overruled by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
100 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that discovery should notbe permitted until
the court answers the threshold question "whether [the] law was clearly established
at the time an action occurred").
101 483 U.S. 635, 639-41 (1987) (applying the qualified immunity doctrine to the
execution of a search warrant, and holding that Harlow eliminated an inquiry into the
subjective intent of the official and that the trial court should test the "objective legal
reasonableness" of the challenged conduct against "clearly established" law). This
departure from the immunity formula received from the common law rested "solely
19921
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Wood 102 introduced a new variable into the qualified immunity
calculus by specifying that the "objective" prong of immunity
identified in Scheuer required the defendant to demonstrate the
reasonableness of her conduct in relation to the content of "settled,
indisputable law." Immunity attached only if defendants proved two
conditions: (1) that the act was objectively reasonable in light of
settled law and (2) that the conduct was motivated by subjective
good faith.
103
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, two of the four dissenters from
this part of the opinion, would later take leading roles in forging
more generous immunities. They referred to the majority's
description of the objective branch as a "harsh standard, requiring
[defendants to have] knowledge of what is characterized as 'settled,
indisputable law' [and accordingly leaving] little substance to the
doctrine of qualified immunity."104 That standard, they argued,
would impose damage liability even if the administrator, acting in
good faith, was ignorant of the law. Under such conditions, liability
would rest on "an unwarranted assumption as to what school
on the basis of policy considerations such as whether liability would have an undue
chilling effect on decisionmaking." Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 266. But cf.
John C.Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of
Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82,86 n.22 (1989) (suggesting that there maybe some vitality
left in the subjective prong if plaintiff "makes concrete and detailed allegations fairly
suggestive of official bad faith"). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognizes such a remnant of the subjective test. It permits the plaintiff to defeat
immunity by pleading malice with specificity and offering noncircumstantial lroof of
that state of mind. See Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 800-02 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(finding that "the invalidating motivation [must be] pleaded with the offer of
noncircumstantial proof required to satisfy our heightened pleading standard"), aFd
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
102 The case arose when school board members expelled several high school
students, arguably without sufficient procedural safeguards. Although acknowledging
that under existing precedent some process was required before school children could
be expelled, see Wood, 420 U.S. at 323 n.15, the Court did not reach the procedural
due process question because it had not been decided by the Court of Appeals. See
id. at 323. Thus, the cause was remanded. Cf id. at 327 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that a second school board hearing may have
cured defects at a prior hearing). On this point there was unanimity. See id.
The more difficult issue was whether the school board members were entitled
to some form of immunity. Justice White treated the general question of immunity
for school administrators as one of first impression. He began by noting the split in
the lower courts concerning the proper standard for the context, see id. at 315 & n.7,
and then surveyed Tenney v. Brandhove, Pierson v. Ray, and Scheuer v. Rhodes, see id. at
316-18, before resolving the issue in favor of qualified, good faith immunity for
school board members from liability for damages in § 1983 actions, see id. at 318-22.
1o3 See id. at 321-22.
104 Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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officials know or can know about the law and constitutional
rights."105  The problem, Justice Powell predicted, was that
"[t]hese officials [would] now act at the peril of some judge or jury
subsequently finding that a good-faith belief as to the applicable law
was mistaken."
10 6
105 Id.
"'6 Id. Justice Powell rightly doubted that school officials would have knowledge
of any but the most settled constitutional law. As a predictor of the future
development of the immunity defense, however, he proved wrong in two respects.
First, it was uncertain in 1975 that doctrinal "settledness" or the reasonableness
of the official's conduct would be questions for a jury. Not until Harlow and
Anderson, respectively, were these questions addressed, and they were held generally
to be questions for the Court. Second, asJustice Powell later realized, requiring the
defendant to have knowledge of "settled, indisputable law" before subjecting her to
liability in practice imposes a litigation hardship on the plaintiff rather than the
defendant. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
Proving that law is indisputably settled appears to be a formidable task. In Wood
itself, for example, the district court had made a specific finding, unchallenged on
appeal, that the officials bore no ill will toward the students. See Wood, 420 U.S. at
314. Accordingly, defendants surmounted the subjective prong of the new test. The
debate centered on the objective prong of the test and whether it was fair to charge
the defendants with knowledge of the local status of the right to process before
expulsion, or with knowledge of what constituted "settledness." The right to process
as a necessary procedural incident to a ten-daysuspension from public school had been
decided in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), earlier in the same term. In arguing
against the majority's "standard of required knowledge" in Wood, Justice Powell
questioned whether school administrators could be expected to know that Goss was
settled law. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
, Justice Powell's doubt, in the specific context, is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, the Wood majority did not purport to decide whether the law was
"settled," but simply remanded. Because it was not then clear whether the
asettledness" issue raised a legal or factual question, the dissent's concern was
somewhat premature. Second, despite Powell's claim that "most lawyers would have
thought, prior to [Goss], that the law to the contrary was settled, indisputable and
unquestioned," id., the majority noted that the courts of appeals had uniformly held
that process was due before dismissal from public school. See id. at 323 n.15.
Perhaps more important, in Goss itself the Court listed ten lower court cases that had
required process before expulsion and dozens of others requiring process before
dismissals. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576-78 n.8. Included within that list were district and
appellate court decisions from the Eighth Circuit, which decided Wood.
Moreover,Justice Powell's lament was somewhat disingenuous. He dissented in
Goss, but he went to great lengths in that opinion to distinguish the need for
procedural safeguards that would accompany an expulsion-the situation in Wood-
from the absence of need in the context of a relatively short suspension-the context
of Goss. See id. at 585, 589, 590, 591, 595 (Powell, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
between relatively "routine" forms of discipline and more severe forms of school
dismissals and punishment). He specifically noted that both historically and under
the laws of the state where Goss arose, a hearing was required for the "incomparably
more serious matter" of expulsion. Id. at 585 n.2; see also id. at 595 & n.14
(suggesting that the Court should not and need not interfere with traditional
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His prediction proved ironic in Harlow10 7 when those same
dissenters, now joining a majority, confined the inquiry to the factor
they had once found illegitimate, the state of constitutional
precedent on the eve of the challenged conduct.108 The new
majority discarded the subjective prong and in the process effected
a dramatic expansion of the affirmative defense. By declaring the
new immunity forfeitable solely by reference to the state of the law,
the Court turned its back on the common law tradition that tied
immunity to lack of culpability and, in turn, deterrability. Instead,
Harlow's majority justified abandoning the good faith requirement
largely as a response to the practical litigation burdens encountered
by government officials accused of federal law violations when they
attempted to establish their immunity.
10 9
The new majority must have realized on reflection that, from the
defendant's perspective, the troublesome aspect of common law
qualified immunity was the subjective prong, which entailed "broad-
ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including
an official's professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be
peculiarly disruptive of effective government." 110 To avoid such
disciplinary schemes used in public schools, which included no hearing for "routine"
suspensions). Finally, he agreed with the majority's suggestion that any "'fair-minded
school principal'" would impose upon himself some minimum procedural safeguards
prior to expulsion. Id. at 596 n.15 (quoting majority opinion). In short, there was
clear legal and historical precedent for the majority's position; it was "indisputably
settled" in this context, and there was no "harshness" involved.
107 Harlow and its successor, Anderson v. Creighton, were not under § 1983 but
actions against federal agents that arose directly under the Constitution. See Bivens
v. Six Unknown Unnamed Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The Court has held, however, that § 1983 and Bivens immunities are interchangeable.
See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-504
(1978). In Butz, this interchangeability worked to narrow the federal officials'
immunity from the absolute immunity they were then afforded against ordinary,
nonconstitutional torts under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), to the modest
version of common law qualified immunity then prevalent under § 1983. See Oren,
supra note 24, at 970-72. By contrast, in Harlow, the Court's reliance on the Butz
interchangeability notion served to extend the generous qualified immunity the Court
had granted federal officials in Bivens actions to § 1983 defendants as well.
108 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (holding that objective reasonableness of an
official's conduct is to be "measured by reference to clearly established law.., at the
time an action occurred").
109 See id. at 806, 814-19. The new test was foreshadowed by the Court's decision
in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 564 & n.11 (1978) (requiring a closeness
between precedent and the right asserted). See also Oren, supra note 24, at 980-81 &
n.195 (discussing Procunier and the fine distinctions that could make a precedent
inadequate to establish an asserted right).
110 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 (footnotes omitted).
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disruptions, the Court simply jettisoned the subjective standard,
relying entirely on an inquiry into the official defendant's "presump-
tive knowledge of and respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitution-
al rights.' 111 If, as a matter of law, the official could not have
known about the existence of the right allegedly infringed, he
escaped accountability. "Democracy in the jury box"112 was
abandoned. Concomitantly, the individual defendant action lost its
utility as a medium for expounding new constitutional rights,
because only rights well settled by earlier decisions would be
actionable.
Anderson extended Harlow's immunity standard to a lower-level
official and expanded it in substance by conferring immunity unless
the alleged federal law violation was established in a highly
"particularized" way. Under this formulation, a right is clearly
established only. if it was announced in circumstances so closely
analogous that a reasonable official in the defendant's position
should realize the applicability of the settled precedent.
Anderson, an FBI agent, participated in an illegal search of the
Creightons' home in an effort to find Mrs. Creighton's brother, a
bank robbery suspect. The agents, pleading qualified immunity,
admitted knowing that warrantless searches generally violated the
Fourth Amendment but asserted that they could not have realized
the illegality of their conduct on the facts in question.113 Justice
1 Id. at 815 (quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 322).
112 The phrase is borrowed from Aviam Soifer, MoralAmbition, Formalism, and the
"Free World' of DeShaney, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1513, 1528 (1989).113 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-41. The Fourth Amendment setting brings to
mind the Court's refusal to apply "new rules" of law in most federal habeas cases,
further stifling the development of constitutional law in the realm of criminal
procedure. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 330 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the plurality's "formidable new barrier to relief" in cases in which "a
federal habeas petitioner's claim, if successful, would result in the announcement of
a new rule of law"); Rudovsky, supra note 34, at 56 ("[T]he court has placed
significant limits on the power of a federal habeas corpus court to articulate new
constitutional law."). Professor Arkin believes that the potential of Teague to restrict
the development of new rules may be overstated, principally because the majority of
such claims already faced one or more of the procedural bars to habeas that the
Court had erected in earlier decisions. See Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma:
Life In the Lower Federal Courts AfterTeague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371,392 & n.166
(1991). Professor Rudovsky argues further that another potential arena for the
development of criminal constitutional law, suppression hearings, has been largely
dosed off because the unlawful police conduct does not eventuate in arrest and
prosecution or because of the operation of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. See Rudovsky, supra note 34, at 55-56 (citing United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
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Scalia, speaking for the majority, ruled that an officer could not be
said to have unreasonably disregarded "clearly established" law
unless authoritative constitutional precedent closely on point existed
at the time of the alleged violation. 114 This standard subtly shifts
the settledness concept enunciated in Harlow. That opinion
stripped the official of immunity whenever a court determines by an
objective test that he should have been aware of the law declaring
the plaintiffs right. 115 Anderson, however, accords the immunity
even on an official to whom awareness of the right-declaring law
may fairly be imputed unless he also should reasonably understand
that "what he is doing violates that right."
116
The Courtjustified this more lenient version of Harlow immuni-
ty as necessary to ward off the disruptiveness attendant upon
litigation; Harlow would not sufficiently enable individual defen-
dants to escape discovery unless the trial court applied the new
doctrine with reference to a narrowly drawn conception of analo-
gous precedent.117 Chief Justice Burger's common law approach
in Scheuer-positing that the scope of the qualified immunity
available to executive officers should vary with the "scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances
as they reasonably appeared . .. at the time and in light of all the
circumstances"' 18-was overridden by the desire of the emerging
Rehnquist Court to relieve public officials of the burden of
litigation.
114 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
115 Government officials "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
116 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Thus the immunity is not forfeited unless it is
"apparent" that "an official action" is unlawful when measured against pre-existing
law. See id.
117 See id. at 638-41; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)
(authorizing immediate appeals from denials of qualified immunity and stating that
Harlow is designed to enable defendants who meet its minimum requirements to be
dismissed from the action "before the commencement of discovery").
118 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); see also Gary S. Gildin,
Immunizing Intentional Violations of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation:
The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald To Section 1983 Actions, 38 Emory L.J. 369, 374-
79 (1989) (describing the traditional common law approach to qualified immunity and
criticizing the Harlow Court's departure from it because "[a]fter Harlow, even if a
federal officer intended to harm the plaintiff, he is immune if the constitutional
interest in issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation"). This
assertion may be slightly overstated. See supra note 101.
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The resolution of the "settledness" question, which the Court
advertises as part of an objective test, is in fact dependent at the
threshold119 on a subjective120 characterization of law by trial
and appellate judges. Indeed, when Harlow/Anderson immunity is
timely pleaded, the § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate at a minimum
the same probandum demanded in a criminal civil rights prosecu-
tion: the deprivation of a "federal right made definite by decision
or other rule of law."121 As this element was applied by the
119 Recent decisions reflect the federal courts' renewed determination to afford
defendants an early resolution of that defense. See Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789,
1793 (1991) (holding on immediate "collateral order" appeal that "whether the
constitutional right asserted is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted"
should be decided before plaintiff is permitted to conduct discovery of the underlying
claim); Gaines v. Davis, 928 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding on immediate
"collateral order" appeal that district court's order was overly broad because it failed
to limit the scope of depositions to the issue of qualified immunity). The lower
courts have been moving to this position, treating the issue of qualified immunity as
a threshold issue to be resolved in the early stages of a case. See, e.g., Finnegan v.
Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 820 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that the application of qualified
immunity is a question of law for the court and not the jury to decide); Bennett v.
Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that, when "faced with a motion
for summaryjudgment based on a defense of qualified immunity, the district courts
should first focus on whether the plaintiff has established a constitutional violation
before determining whether material issuesof fact are present"); K.ause.y. Bennett,
887 F.2d 362,369 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that when qualified immunity can be shown
as a matter of law, defendants motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
should be granted); Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 895 (2d Cir. 1988) (remanding
case to district court to rule on claims of qualified immunity that were not considered
when ruling on motion for summary judgment).
120 We label the initial characterization process "subjective" for the following
reason. The FBI agent who committed the alleged violation in Anderson knew that the
provision in question, the Fourth Amendment, demanded a warrant. See Anderson,
483 U.S. at 641. The right was not clearly established, however, because the Court
concluded that a question remained as to whether a reasonable police officer, despite
the lack of probable cause, could have believed probable cause existed. See id. This
determination, in turn, required the trial court to make an appraisal of existing
precedent on the eve of the alleged injury to determine its "closeness" to the facts
that faced the defendant. See id. at 646 n.6. The last step in the trial or reviewing
court's determination, like the initial decision made by the police, is inherently
subjective because ascertaining closeness requires subjective appraisal of the
relationship between the conduct under scrutiny and the conduct described in prior
constitutional cases.
121 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 52
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988))), the criminal counterpart to § 1983,
as requiring proof of scienter, but noting that "bad purpose or evil intent alone may
not be sufficient"). The "requisite bad purpose" of Screws has been held satisfied if
the evidence shows that the criminal defendant had the purpose to deprive the citizen
of the "interests protected" by the violated federal right, even absent any conscious-
ness of the unlawfulness of his conduct. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d
910, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The § 1983 plaintiff, therefore, must demonstrate little
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Anderson majority, the "settled" category may virtually evaporate for
want of sufficiently apposite prior cases. At the extreme advocated
by Anderson's dissenters, on the other hand, a right is clearly estab-
lished if it fits within any of the generic descriptions that compose
the Constitution's catalogue of rights. The upshot is that the
settledness concept, as viewed by the several justices in Anderson, is
zero-sum, scarcely ever satisfied or so easily satisfied as to be
meaningless. A majority adopted the strict view and as a conse-
quence qualified immunity is now routinely invoked and almost as
routinely upheld.1
22
Ironically, given the justifications for its creation, the new
qualified immunity has proven difficult to administer; an increasing-
ly complex jurisprudence of appellate jurisdiction consumes much
of the same time and funds of officials that the doctrine sought to
spare. In a number of contexts, circuit courts are unsure whether
to accept jurisdiction over immediate appeals of pretrial orders
denying qualified immunity.123 If an individual defendant must
less against an individual immunity-claiming government official than the government
must show in a criminal prosecution for a violation of the same rights.
12 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Moore, No. 89-35867, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 23244, at *5
(9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1991) (holding qualified immunity applies when the right alleged to
have been violated is not sufficiently clear to the state official concerned); Johnson
v. Boreani, 946 F.2d 67,71 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that, under the facts, summary
judgment is appropriate and necessary to achieve purposes of qualified immunity
defense established in Anderson); Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir.
1988) (entitling defendant to summary judgment and granting him qualified
immunity if he can establish that it was reasonable to believe his act comported with
the Constitution).
125 Compare Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
inhospitality [Harlow] evidenced towards groundless suits against officials, would best
be effected by making denials of [qualified] immunity immediately appealable... .")
and McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[A]ppellate review
of a denial of a motion for summary disposition must be available to ensure that
government officials are fully protected against unnecessary trials under qualified
immunity on the same basis as for absolute immunity.") with Peppers v. Coates, 887
F.2d 1493, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing prior Eleventh Circuit authority and
stating that the denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity "is
reviewable after final adjudication of the case, and the collateral order doctrine
cannot be invoked prematurely to confer immediate jurisdiction upon this court").
But see Hudgins v. City of Ashburn, 890 F.2d 396,402-03 (11th Cir. 1989) (describing
the "clearly established" test as an issue of law eligible for interlocutory decision). A
recent panel decision of the Eleventh Circuit reviews in detail the contradictory
holdings of its prior panels. The panel concluded that immediate appeal is available
from the denial of summaryjudgment on the qualified immunity defense regardless
of whether the decision below turns on the "legal" determination that the right at
issue is clearly established or on the "factual" determination that a reasonable person
in the defendant official's position should have understood that her conduct would
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go to trial on a separate constitutional claim that he concedes does
implicate a clearly established right,124 or on a claim for equitable
relief, which is not barred by immunity, 125 the lower appellate
courts are understandably perplexed about whether the incremental
burden of defending the damage claim warrants exceptional
immediate review.
In the end, the test for individual immunity in § 1983 actions
rests on an unnecessary fiction. The test is unnecessary because
there are ways to determine immunity that are more faithful to the
statute's purpose. It is fictional because the purportedly "objective"
standard for determining qualified immunity rests on the fragile
belief that the relatively low-level employee most likely to have
actual citizen contact, the cop on the beat,126 for example, appre-
ciates the current state of constitutional law. The delicacy of that
premise is self-evident.1 27 In any event, after Anderson, Monroe's
violate that right. See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 716-18 (11th Cir.), vacated on
grant of reh'g, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1991).
124 See Green v. Brantley, 895 F.2d 1387, 1394 (lth Cir.) (holding that the denial
of a motion for partial summaryjudgment on the grounds of qualified immunity was
not appealable if defendants would still be subject to trial on the issue of damages),
reh'ggranted and opinion vacated, 921 F.2d 1124 (11th Cir. 1990).
12 5 Most circuit courts permit the defendant's immediate appeal of theimmunity
denial notwithstanding pendency of trial on an equitable claim. See e.g., DiMartini
v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing cases), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2796 (1991); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 787-88 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that
"a defendant may immediately appeal a denial of official immunity"). The Third
Circuit, however, has departed from this trend. See Prisco v. United States, 851 F.2d
93,96 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a defendant may not appeal the denial of summary
judgment on immunity if there are prospective relief claims pending), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1089 (1989). That qualified immunity sometimes does not insulate the official
from discovery or trial if equitable relief is sought demonstrates that even the Court's
extreme solicitude for the defense has not fully achieved the asserted goals behind
its expansion. See infra note 242.
12 ChiefJustice Burger compared the discretionary decision-making of executive
officials with that of cops on the beat. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-47
(1974).
127 Ironically, Justice Powell, dissenting in Wood, which first articulated the
"settled" standard, gave as one of his reasons for opposing that decision the very
delicacy he later helped enshrine. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. An
acute recent example of the problems related to the counterfactual premise of
"settledness" is furnished by V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990). A state environmental official conducted a warrantless
search of a gas station under circumstances which, the Court acknowledged, violated
a "clearly established" right of the station owner. See id. at 1488. Nevertheless, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant deserved immunity under an "extraordi-
nary circumstances" exception mentioned in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-
19 (1982), available to defendants who "neither knew nor should have known of the
relevant legal standard." V-1 Oil Co., 902 F.2d at 1488. The Court of Appeals-
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broad sphere of individual defendant liability is now largely offset
by a highly solicitous definition of official immunity.
III. THE CASE AGAINST ENTITY DEFENDANTS
Monroe approved a wide variety of claims against individual
defendants for federal law violations their entity principals had not
authorized. At the same time, however, it declared that local
government entities lie wholly outside the ambit of § 1983.
Although from a plain-meaning perspective everything such an
entity does is surely "under color of" state law, 128 the Court
concluded that it simply was not a "person" civilly liable for that
conduct. This conclusion was premised upon the significance the
Court attached to the rejection of an amendment to the original
statute, proposed by Senator Sherman, that would have made
government entities liable to citizens injured by specific acts of
violence committed by private citizens.1 29 The federal compul-
sion to monitor citizen conduct that would have been imposed on
state entities under the amendment seemed to offend the prevailing
theory of dual sovereignty, which forbade the national government
from imposing duties or obligations on officers of the state or state
instrumentalities.
130
explained that the defendant's reliance on the contemporaneous advice of a fully
briefed senior state assistant attorney general made the circumstances "extraordinary"
even though, as a general rule, there is nothing "inherently extraordinary" about
reliance on the advice of counsel. See id.
There is of course a long tradition of assuming, for purposes of civil as well as
criminal liability, that litigants are aware of the requirements of prior decisions. See,
e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (holding that defendants will
be subject to a constitutionally adequate basis of personal jurisdiction if they are
served with process in any state in which they are even transiently present).
According to the Supreme Court, knowledge of the transient service rule was fairly
imputable to potential civil defendants by virtue of a "continuing tradition," see id. at
2118 (plurality opinion by ScaliaJ.), or a "century ofjudicial practice," see id. at 2124
(Brennan, J., concurring). Even granting that assumption, however, it may be a far
greater stretch to assume that a low-level government official can identify which prior
constitutional law decisions are sufficiently analogous to a real-life event to furnish
"clearly established" precedent within the meaning of Anderson.
128 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("No conduct of government comes more clearly within the 'under
color of' state law language of § 1983.").
129 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-92 (1961), overruled in part by Monell,
436 U.S. 658.
130 See id. at 190; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 669-83 (surveying the drafting
Congress's debate over potential dual sovereignty limitations on their authority).
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Seventeen years later, the Court gave a very different reading to
that same history. Justice Brennan's opinion in Monell v. Department
of Social Services131 agreed that the 1871 Congress, in rejecting the
Sherman Amendment, doubted its "'constitutional power to impose
... [civil liability] upon county and town organizations.'"13 2 But
the real vice of the Amendment, according to the revisionist view,
was that the duty imposed on state polities was new; it was the
federal imposition on the states of a fresh obligation that aroused
the ire of the Amendment's victorious opponents. Section 1983, the
Monell Court observed, imposed no such new obligation on any
state or local government. It merely subjected local government to
civil liability for violating federal constitutional obligations already
a part of the organic law of the land.133 This explains why several
opponents of the Amendment nevertheless voted to enact § 1983
into law.
134
Having cleared away the constitutional objection stemming from
the significance Monroe had ascribed to the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment, the Monell majority was free to inquire whether the
1871 Congress intended to include local government entities as a
species of "person" suable under* § 1983. The Court relied
principally on the Dictionary Act of 1871, passed only two months
before the law that became § 1983. The Dictionary Act provided
that "'in all acts hereafter passed... the word "person" may extend
... to bodies politic and corporate.'" 135 The majority concluded
131 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
132 Id. at 664 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190).
133 See id. at 669-83. The Monell majority relied on history that illustrated how
such preexisting constitutional duties were enforced civilly against municipalities
during the reign of dual sovereignty. In effect, then, it drew a distinction between
the legislative imposition of new obligations and the judicial declaration of rights
discovered in extant text, with only the former offending dual sovereignty. The
Court's attempt to reconcile opposition to the Sherman Amendment based on dual
sovereignty with its application of § 1983 to local government entities encounters an
additional difficulty after passage of§ 1983. The statute's framers might well regard
expansive constitutional constructions first announced after the statute's enactment,
as well as the federal statutory obligations that now may be enforced against local
government through § 1983 actions, see infra notes 258-70, as fresh obligations
offensive to dual sovereignty. Mitigating this difficulty is the fairly rapid waning of
dual sovereignty after enactment of§ 1983, and the use of§ 1983 to impose liability
for violations of federal statutory rights is a fairly recent development. See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980) (defining the "and laws" language of § 1983 to
apply to the deprivation of statutory benefits).
134 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 260.
135 Monell, 436 U.S. at 688 (quoting Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat.
431, 431 (1871)).
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in summary fashion that corporations, including municipal corpora-
tions, were customarily treated identically with natural persons for
purposes of constitutional and statutory construction
1 3 6
The Monell retrospective on the 1871 Congress's doubt about its
power to subject local governments to civil liability is not controver-
sial on its merits. Even Justice Rehnquist in dissent acknowledged
the probable correctness of the majority's conclusion on that
point.13 7 What is remarkable is that the Court would tackle the
issue only seventeen years after Monroe's excursion through the
same history, and in the same year the Senate held hearings on a
bill that would have overturned the Monroe exclusion of municipal
governments from the reach of § 1983.138 The majority itself
recognized the awkwardness of the rapid return visit. 1
9
Still, it is not surprising that the Court would strain so hard to
sweep government entities within § 1983. The extant qualified
immunity doctrine, while not yet overwhelmingly tilted in favor of
the defendant, was tied to the concept of reasonableness and
therefore made recovery against individual officers uncertain.
Further, even if the plaintiff prevailed the officer was likely to be
judgment-proof, and the practice of indemnification, although
widespread, was equally uncertain and uneven. Some governments
would not indemnify at all, and others only for conduct comporting
with varying definitions of scope of authority.140 Indemnification
16 See id. at 688-89.
157 See id. at 723 (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (stating that "it may well be that on the
basis of this closer analysis ... a conclusion contrary to ... Monroe... could have
been reached ... 17 years ago"); see also id. at 722 (granting that the Court was
"probably correct" in its analysis of the Sherman Amendment debates).
138 See id. at 719.
139 The majority labored to explain why stare decisis should not preclude it from
overruling this portion of Monroe. The Monell overruling of the'Monroe entity
immunity holding in such a short time span is a striking early instance of the demise
of statutory stare decisis, so decisively reaffirmed as late as 1938 inJustice Brandeis's
celebrated opinion in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,79-80 (1938). That demise
is catalogued, almost defiantly, in the per curiam opinion of the Court that sua sponte
called for rebriefing and reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S.
617, 618 (1988) (citing cases).
140 The availability of indemnification then, as today, is not entirely clear. The
Yale Project, sampling Connecticut district court filings from 1970-77, found that no
costs were borne by police officers sued under federal statutes. See Project, Suing the
Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-11 (1979) (noting that Connecticut
required indemnification under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465 (1977)). By the same
token, one commentator writes that other municipalities were experiencing difficulty
purchasing comprehensive liability insurance for employees and elected officials. See
Martin J.Jaron, Jr., The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act:
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thus did not assure the satisfaction of judgments in many cases
embraced by Monroe's broad "under color of" umbrella.
Finally, the Court was influenced by the fundamental structural
consideration that § 1983, itself constitutionally dependent upon
state action, was specifically aimed at state-sponsored conduct. If
local government officials and low-level employees could be reached
precisely because they carried the badge of government authority,
is it reasonable to suppose that the 1871 Congress intended to
absolve the very governments who handed out the badges?141
The Court in Monell, however, having stretched jurisprudential
convention to arrive at a result consonant with constitutional history
and pre-Monroe precedent, strained equally far, without any
compulsion to do so from the facts or posture of the case, to narrow
the terms of local government liability. This limitation is contained
in a separate discussion discounted by Justice Stevens as "merely
advisory" and "not necessary to explain the Court's decision."
142
The Court wrote that local government entities face § 1983 liability
only if the conduct causing the constitutional violation is carried out
"pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature."143s
HowJustice Brennan derived the-"policy" limitation is a source
of wonder. He began the journey with the statute's text, noting that
the defendant, to be liable, must "'subject[], or cause[ a plaintiff] to
be subjected'" to the deprivation of federally secured rights.
144
That sparse language, he concluded, "cannot be easily read to
impose liability vicariously on governing bodies .... [T]he fact that
Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW. 1
(1981), reprinted in SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 309,327-29 (Robert H. Freilich
& Richard G. Carlisle eds., 1983); see also SCHiUCK, supra note 89, at 85 (discussing
self-insurance and the purchase ofinsurance by states, localities, and public officials).
Most observers seem to agree that some form of indemnification was and is available,
although the scope varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See e.g., id. at 86
(explaining that "[miost states provide some form of indemnification or other
protection against adversejudgments or settlements, but some apparently provide it
only in narrowly circumscribed situations" (citation omitted)); LOW &JEFFRIES, supra
note 27, at 924 (pointing out that although most government employers choose to
protect their employees against damage liability, the availability of such protection
often depends on statutes, ordinances, and practices in each jurisdiction).
141 Indeed,Justice Powell noted the "oddness" of imposing liability on the agent
but not the principal for whom the agent worked. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 705 (Powell,
J., concurring). We deal subsequently with the oddness in our own proposal of
imposing liability on the entity principal in circumstances where we would absolve its
agent. See infra note 316.
14 2 Monell, 436 U.S. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
143 Id. at 691.
144 Id. at 691-92 (quoting § 1983).
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Congress did specifically provide that A's tort became B's liability if
B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did
not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was
absent." 145 In the absence of custom, only some deliberate act
labelled "official policy" would' show causation and thus create
municipal liability.
Ascribing such independent, greater-than-boilerplate signifi-
cance to causation language in a statute remediating constitutional
torts is somewhat surprising, since causation is an invariable
prerequisite of liability for civil harms. Additionally, the language
Justice Brennan construed is susceptible to equally plausible
alternative interpretations. One way an entity may "cause" a person
to be subjected to a constitutional injury, for example, is simply to
charge its agents to meet specified objectives without taking
reasonable steps to prevent them from trampling on federally
protected rights. No deliberative act on the part of the employer is
required to "cause" deprivations in this fashion. Although this
interpretation is perhaps dubious as applied to those predicate
violations dependent upon an element of wrongful intent,146 no
textual imperative extends such a limitation to the deprivation of
other constitutional or statutory rights, or to the interpretation of
§ 1983 itself. In any case, if causation is really the issue, it is not
apparent why the Court deems an injury to be caused by the entity
when its agent acts pursuant to official policy, but not other-
wise. 147 Rather, it seems equally likely that "subjects, or causes to
be subjected" refers not to the authorization inherent in a require-
ment of official policy but simply to differing degrees of proximity
between the depriver and the deprived.
148
145 Id. at 692 (emphasis added)..
146 See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979) (holding that the
"intent" necessary to state a claim for denial of equal protection of the laws requires
plaintiff to show that the decision was made "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of' its
adverse effects"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding that "deliberate
indifference" is demanded to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of
medical attention); see also infra note 362.
147 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 256.
148 Virtually the same phrase first appears in § 2 of the Act of April 9, 1866, ch.
31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Section 1 of that
Act declared rights to contract and dispose of property free from racial discrimi-
nation. Section 2, described by Senator Trumbull, a sponsor, as "the valuable section
of the bill so far as protecting the rights of freedmen is concerned," prescribes
criminal punishments for any person who, under color of state law, "shall subject or
cause to be subjected" any "inhabitant" to the deprivation of§ I rights. 1 STATUTORY
HISTORY OFTHE UNITED STATES 112 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). Senator Trumbull
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No serious question of proximate causation can be resolved
without recourse to extrinsic materials. Justice Brennan garnered
support for his interpretation with an overinclusive argument
resting on the premise that failure to require action pursuant to
government "policy" would create a federal law of respondeat
superior that "would have raised all the constitutional problems"
implicated by the rejection of the Sherman Amendment.1 49 He
reasoned that encumbering local governments with civil liability
whenever their agents violate constitutional norms would be
tantamount to federal imposition of an "obligation to keep the
peace, an obligation Congress chose not to impose because it
thought imposition of such an obligation unconstitutional."1
50
Many federal constitutional and statutory duties, however, are
not tantamount to a "new" obligation to keep the peace. In this
sense, Justice Brennan's argument proves too much. For example,
the challenged requirement in Monell-that pregnant city employees
take unpaid leaves of absence while still medically able to
work151-violated equal protection or the then current "irrebutta-
ble presumption" variation of due process. 152 Even if an individu-
explains that ensuring the freedom of newly freed slaves requires criminal sanctions
for "any person who [under color of law] shall deprive another of any right or subject
him to any punishment in consequence of his ... race." Id. Provided he acts under
color of law, therefore, a putative defendant could himself immediately "subject" an
inhabitant to the deprivation of a § 1 right, or could accomplish the same end by
"causing" another to "subject" the inhabitant to the deprivation. Thus, a deputy
sheriff could deny a § I right directly or prevail upon a fellow deputy or a private
citizen to do so. Significantly, in none of these examples would the initiator-
defendant be implementing any "policy" in the sense of a deliberative decision of his
entity.
149 Monell, 436 U.S. at 693.
'5 0 Id. The Court has continued to eschew efforts that would, in effect, obligate
local governments or governmental units to keep the peace among civilians. Cf
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-203 (1989)
(holding that the failure of a county department of social services to provide a minor
with adequate protection against his father's violence did notviolate that minor's due
process rights). For an unusual and provocative discussion of the interface between
"private action" and the requirement of state action, see Laurence H. Tribe, The
Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-13 (1989) (discussing DeShaney).
151 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
152 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643-48 (1974) (stating
that a school board's presumption that a woman five or more months pregnant is
physically unfit to teach in a classroom is an "irrebuttable presumption" and thus
suspect under the Due Process Clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972)
(ruling that an Illinois statute containing an irrebuttable presumption that unmarried
fathers are incompetent to raise their children violated the Due Process Clause).
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al supervisor had imposed this requirement in an ad hoc manner
that fell short of city policy or custom, imposing liability on the city
would certainly not have burdened it with an obligation to keep the
peace or any other "new" obligation not already mandated by the
Constitution.
153
Particularly unfortunate, given the mischievous consequences
the "policy" requirement would soon deliver, is that the entire
discussion of entity attribution in Monell was unnecessary to the
decision. The city's pregnancy leave requirement was adopted "as
a matter of official policy," and the majority admitted that "this case
unquestionably involve[d] official policy as a moving force of the
constitutional violation."154 Monell, therefore, furnished no occa-
sion to consider when unauthorized federal violations are sanc-
tioned or tolerated by entity officials to the degree that § 1983
liability should extend beyond the agent to the entity.
Why would the Court blithely take away, with its policy require-
ment, so much of what it had labored mightily to give by overruling
the restrictive Monroe definition of "person"? Despite authoring
Monell's majority opinion, Justice Brennan's own enthusiasm for the
dictum is in serious doubt. Seeking to limit the policy argument,
Justice Brennan later described the requirement as intended merely
to distinguish the municipality's acts from those of its employ-
ees. 155 Eventually he would take sharp issue with decisions that
found policy only in positive local legislation or a pattern amounting
to "custom." 156  Only two years after Monell, in the course of
rejecting any form of entity immunity, he endorsed the very "loss-
spreading" principle that Monell had found inadequate to justify
153 The obligation of state officials to obey the Constitution was not a "new" one
offensive to the dual sovereignty conception of the Sherman Amendment opponents,
who recognized as much in enacting § 1983. See supra text accompanying notes 130-
33. In principle, vicarious municipal liability for the constitutional torts of a
municipality's agents simply holds the municipality to the same preexisting
constitutional standards incumbent on state officers. The distinction that the
individual state officer need only answer for his own behavior, while the municipality
must answer for that of its employee, is irrelevant to the "new obligation" objection
that animated opposition to the Sherman Amendment. See Kramer & Sykes, supra
note 24, at 259-60. Indeed respondeat superior was a well-established common law
rule at the time. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-39 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
154 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
155 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-81 (1986).
156 See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 142-47 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 831-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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subjecting entities to respondeat superior.157 The policy dictum
may be the price that some Justices paid for their brethren's
acquiescence in the overriding of stare decisis-the volte face from
Monroe-that made it possible to reach entities at all.
Since first introduced in Monell, "policy" now embraces not only
conduct formally adopted by the entity or enshrined in settled
custom but also decisions of a final policy-making official who
commits the federal law violation herself or ratifies the unlawful act
of a delegate. The "policy" barrier thus echoes dissenting Justice
Frankfurter's argument in Monroe that an agent's actions must have
state authorization to occur "under color of" state law.158 In fact,
"policy" circumscribes the scope of entity liability even more sharply
than Justice Frankfurter would have curbed the liability of individual
defendants in Monroe. Not only do entities, like their agents under
Justice Frankfurter's view, escape liability for conduct undertaken
without "authority"; under Monell and its progeny, the agents'
authorized acts cannot be attributed to the entity unless the
authorization stems from sources sufficiently high or formal to
qualify as an aspect of official policy.
The requirement of a "final" p6licymaker emerged, again as
dictum, in a plurality opinion in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati.
159
A county prosecutor and subordinate law enforcement officials
authorized and executed, respectively, the service of capiases by
breaking down the door of a private physician's office. All of the
Justices agreed that the conduct that gave rise to the action violated
the Constitution only if a Fourth Amendment precedent, Steagald v.
United States,160 were to apply retroactively. The plurality allowed
the action to proceed against the county because a state statute
specifically authorized the county prosecutor to advise the local
police on such matters as the lawfulness of entry.
161
The "final policymaker" requirement appears in response to
dissenting Justice Powell's charge in Pembaur that the plurality had
re-opened the door to respondeat superior. 162 Justice Powell
157 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980).
158 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 257 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
part and dissentingin part), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
159 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
160 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
161 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484-85.
162 See id. at 499 (Powell,J., dissenting). Within two years, Brennan attempted to
disown, at least in part, the same requirement of finality. See City of St. Louis v.
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argues convincingly that the off-hand, hasty decision of a harried
assistant prosecutor, made during a telephone conversation while a
horde of municipal police officers, axes poised, awaited his
direction, does not amount to policy, 163 if, as the plurality insist-
ed, "policy" requires "a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action ... made from among various alternatives. " 164 Generally
speaking, Justice Powell would have found "policy" only when a
legislative body adopts a rule of universal applicability.
16 5
The underlying normative question, though, is whether absent
formally or deliberately adopted "policy" the entity should be
exonerated. In this regard we might speculate about the result on
Pembaur's facts if Powell's analysis had carried the day. Exoneration
of the municipal defendant would have left no one liable to the
plaintiff for what the Court agreed was a constitutional violation.
The individual defendants were absolved by Harlow's version of
"clearly established" qualified immunity.166 Because their liability
was premised on applying Steagald retroactively, the legal question
was not resolved at the time the capias was served. These defen-
dants did not, therefore, act in violation of clearly established law.
Consider a modification of the facts. Suppose the precedent on
which the individual defendants' liability turned had been decided
before the Pembaur events and was deemed sufficiently clearly
established to satisfy Harlow and Anderson. Further suppose that
there could still be no actionable entity policy as defined by Justice
Powell, because no positive legislation or government pronounce-
ment gave the prosecutor final authority to make policy respecting
the service on Dr. Pembaur. In such a case, the Court would likely
visit liability not upon the entity but upon the police officers
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 144-46 (1988) (Brennan,J., concurring).
163 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 501 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 483 (plurality opinion).
165 See id. at 499-500 (Powell,J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 475 (plurality opinion). Whether the prosecutor, in contrast to the
subordinate officers, would have been eligible for absolute immunity per Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), turns on whether his advice concerning the capias
service would be classified as intimately related to the prosecutor's role in thejudicial
system. Absolute immunity does not pertain to all conduct of judges, or, by
extension, prosecutors, but depends on a functional characterization of the
challenged conduct. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988). As a recent
decision of the Court illustrates, however, problems exist with a functional
characterization process. See Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1942-45 (1991) (holding
that the prosecutor's advice to police that they could interview a suspect under
hypnosis relates more to the prosecutor's investigative role and is not sufficiently
connected to the judicial process to warrant absolute immunity).
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alone, 167 even though they had followed standard departmental
operating procedure by calling the assistant prosecutor for instruc-
tions. The result works at cross-purposes with one of the traditional
rationales for individual immunity, fairness.
The finality requirement extends the floodgates rationale to an
unacceptable extreme, virtually foreclosing the accountability of a
solvent entity. In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,168 the Court
tightened the finality qualification by demanding ratification of
delegates' decisions and rationales.1 69 After reiterating that "the
authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to
make final policy,"170 the Court explained that the act of an
individual that departs from the final policymaker's instructions is
not the act of the municipality. Accordingly, when a policymaker
delegates policymaking responsibility, entity liability attaches only
if "the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision
and the basis for it."
17 1
This demand, articulated without accompanying justification,
creates a prima facie burden of Herculean proportions. First, it
promises to have widespread application. Few citizens deal with
"final policymakers" on a day-to-day basis; they deal more common-
ly with subordinates whose decisions require clearance. Second, the
injury is seldom related to the "basis" of, or intent behind, the
subordinate's policy choice, but more often results from the
implementation of an earlier choice. Finally, the requirement
ignores the reality that policy is made as policy is required, often
with little thought about its broader implications.
. The facts of Praprotnik illustrate the problem. Plaintiff com-
plained that he was laid off from city employment in violation of the
First Amendment because he was a whistle-blower. He was
subjected to retaliation, the jury found, for appealing an adverse
167 The Court expressed no opinion on the availability of qualified immunity for
the Pembaur prosecutor. See 475 U.S. at 474 n.2. It is now apparent that the
prosecutor, if not eligible for absolute immunity with respect to the giving of advice
concerning service of the capias would be eligible for qualified immunity under
Harlow. See Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 1944.
168 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
169 Only a plurality reached this conclusion, but their views commanded a majority
inJett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 (1989).
170 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84).
171 Id. The Court hastened to distinguish the case where "a particular decision by
a subordinate was cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by
the supervising policymaker." Id. at 130. One wonders how often that really
happens.
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personnel decision that, in turn, was the result of his public
opposition to a controversial decision to purchase an expensive
piece of sculpture. 172 A majority of the Court agreed that the
supervisor who discharged plaintiff lacked final personnel policy-
making authority.173  A plurality offered several interrelated
reasons for its conclusion: the superior who made the decision to
lay off the plaintiff possessed only discretionary implementation
authority under the policymaking aegis of the city's civil service
commission; the superior's control fell short of full-fledged
delegated authority with respect to personnel policy; and, the
possibility that an official could make a personnel decision based on
a retaliatory motive was at odds with the city charter provision that
specified "merit and fitness" as- the sole criteria. 174 The Court
concluded that the city had "enacted no ordinance designed to
retaliate against respondent"175 and that the only "final" decisions
were those of the Civil Service Commission.
176
Praprotnik's requirements pay excessive respect to federalism
and raise a substantial question about fairness to individual
defendants. Federalism concerns were actually implicated only
tangentially, since imposing liability on the entity would not have
intruded on the legitimate exercise of discretionary government
authority. Prohibiting retaliation for exercising First Amendment
rights is not meddlesome interference and requires no wholesale
reordering of personnel decisionmaking. From the fairness
perspective, Praprotnik sacrifices the subordinate who in good faith
inadvertently violates a clearly established constitutional right. The
Court would now fasten liability on the underling alone, despite the
superior's approval of the injurious decision, so long as the superior
does not also approve its basis.
The Court's general insistence on entity "policy," and the finality
and ratification refinements in particular, are theoretically and
practically flawed. At the theoretical level, any liability imposed
upon government is necessarily vicarious because governments
cannot operate except through human agency. Thus the Court's
search for entity advertence in the form of deliberative policy, or,
172 See id. at 150-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 See id. at 131 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 137 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment, writing for three Justices).
174 See id. at 124-30.
175 Id. at 128.
176 See id. at 129 (quoting ST. Louis CITY CHARTER, art. XVIII, § 2(a)).
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if the injury is caused by omission, in the form of the "deliberate
indifference" demanded by City of Canton v. Harris,'177 is wholly
quixotic. At the practical level, from the viewpoints of both the
state actor who commits and the person who suffers the violation,
the actor's authority appears complete. Pembaur's prosecutor and
Praprotnik's perpetrator both assumed they had authority to do what
they did, their relevant subordinates assumed the same, and the
victims suffered as a result. If the goal is establishing a reasonable
causal nexus between the entity's liability and its subordinates'
conduct at a cost that does not overvalue the Court's concerns
about fairness, federalism, and floodgates, the Court has gone too
far.
Governmental liability now lingers only in the rare case where
the entity broadcasts the unconstitutionality of its practice in a
formal pronouncement, 178  acts pursuant to its legislative
body179 or positive state legislation,18 0  manifestly endorses
subordinates' discrete decisions through delegation or ratification
at the highest administrative level,181 or inflicts the federal injury
through an omission characterized by "deliberate indifference."
8 2
Further, in all but the last situation, the question will be one of state
law ripe for pretrial decision by the trial judge.1
8 3
177 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (remanding the question whether a city's failure
adequately to train police officers to assess a detainee's need for medical assistance
stemmed from "deliberate indifference"). See infra note 183 and accompanying text
(discussing City of Canton).
178 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
179 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
180 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
181 See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
182 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
183 It is an irony of City of Canton that "deliberate indifference," the Court's
surrogate test for "policy" in a case of constitutional violation by omission, is at once
the most substantively difficult for the plaintiff to survive and yet appears to be
determinable at trial by ajury. In contrast to the other entity-defendant opinions that
refined the Monell notion of "policy," Justice White's opinion in City of Canton does
not assert that the "deliberate indifference" issue is a preliminary question of law for
the court. Indeed, the very description of the test-whether the need for entity action
was "so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitution-
al rights, that the policymakers... can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent," id. at 390-reveals that its satisfaction is a question of degree and the
ultimate question inherently one of fact. See infra note 200.
Justice White alludes to thejury function respecting a related aspect of the prima
facie omissions case, causation. Decidingwhether more or better training would have
avoided the particular plaintiff's injury "may not be an easy task," he writes, but
"judge and jury, doing their respective jobs, will be adequate to the task." City of
Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (adopting a strict causation standard to avoid the possibility
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The debate is over the increment to respondeat superior that
suffices for entity liability: What should be required beyond
challengeable conduct occurring within the scope of an entity
agent's employment? Justice Powell, writing separately in Pembaur,
would apparently have limited the actionable sphere to decisions
made under rules of general applicability, much like the pregnancy
policy at issue in Monell.18 4  Justice Brennan, for the Pembaur
plurality, pushed the liability potential somewhat further, so that
even particularized decisions may represent the entity's policy if
"the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish policy with
respect to the action ordered." 18 5
The Court continues to recognize this latter version of "policy,"
though in somewhat more grudging terms that relegate the question
of policymaking authority to the vagaries of local positive law.
186
As a result, Justice Brennan's "final policymaker" approach relieves
the entity of liability for a wide range of its employees' conduct;
Justice Powell's approach restricts entity liability even further to
conduct commanded by sweeping entity proclamations. The
important point, as Professors Kramer and Sykes have observed, is
of the city realizing "unprecedented liability"). Justice O'Connor dissented from this
point, stating that "[a]llowing an inadequate training claim such as this one to go to
the jury based upon a single incident would only invite jury nullification of Monell."
Id. at 399 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Plaintiffs' lawyers might, therefore, be tempted to frame their complaints against
entities, when possible, as omission rather than action cases. Although complaints of
omission are substantively more difficult to prove, requiring as they do a showing of
deliberate indifference, see, e.g., Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, Mo., 924 F.2d
794, 797 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a prison guard's actions, including letting a
suicidal prisoner out of his sight, did not amount to deliberate indifference); Mateyko
v. Felix, 913 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1990), amended, 924 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.)
(stating that municipality's failure to train long enough for use of tazer gun at best
establishes mere negligence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 65 (1991), the prospect of having
ajury determine the "policy" issue may entice some plaintiffs' lawyers to brave the
risks of an omissions theory. Nevertheless, a parallel procedural development may
drain this theoretical prospect of practical importance. Under the Supreme Court's
recent solicitous treatment of summaryjudgment, entities can still achieve dismissal
before trial by convincing the judge that no reasonable jury could find each of the
distinct, demanding elements of deliberate indifference by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (noting in
a First Amendment action that, in ruling on summaryjudgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56, a trialjudge should consider "whether a reasonable factfinder
could conclude ... the plaintiff bad shown actual malice with convincing clarity").
184 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 499-502 (Powell, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 481.
186 See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124-25; supra text accompanying notes 172-76; infra
note 226.
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that each of these principal paths to "policy," and hence to an
actionable prima facie claim, is strewn with obstacles not presented
by respondeat superior.
18 7
At the same time, the Court has denied entity defendants any
affirmative defense comparable to the immunity enjoyed by
defendant individuals. In Owen v. City of Independence,188 the
Court denied municipalities a good faith immunity from suit under
§ 1983, discounting the likelihood that entity liability would chill the
vigorous execution of government function. The majority ques-
tioned whether "the hazard of municipal loss will deter a public
officer from the conscientious exercise of his duties." 189 Denying
entities immunity appears to recognize the protection they enjoy
from the restrictions that Monell places upon the prima facie claim;
seldom will an isolated entity act meet the rigors of "policy."
190
The Court has since further protected public funds by precluding
punitive damages even when an entity action lies.
191
Given the gratuitous origin of Monell's policy requirement and
its more recent rigorous fortification, it is tempting to conclude that
the Court's decision in Owen to eschew developing a common law
of immunity for entity defendants is largely an empty gesture. But
there is operative and symbolic significance in the Court's refusal to
confer on government entity defendants an immunity parallel to the
one that it would soon confer unrestrainedly on their agents.
First, of course, plaintiffs who surmount the "policy" hurdles
erected by Monell and its progeny may proceed to trial, notwith-
standing the possibility that the entity's policy may have been
reasonable under the circumstances. These plaintiffs include those
who can point to positive local law as the source of the federally
violative conduct, to a pattern of entity behavior amounting to
"custom," to a decision by someone having authority to make final
187 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 254.
188 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
189 Id. at 656.
190 Compare Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484-85 (noting that the assistant prosecutor's
advice to deputies to break down door to serve capiases constituted policy in violation
of Fourth Amendment when state law specifically sanctioned the advice-giving
function) and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)
(recognizing that a vote by the City Council itself to cancel contract, based on content
of group's music, violated First Amendment) with Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (holding
that a plaintiff's allegation that he was fired because he was a whistle-blower did riot
constitute policy if, inter alia, city employee who discharged plaintiff did not have
final policy-making authority).
191 See infra text accompanying note 325.
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policy with respect to the challenged conduct, or to circumstances
so obviously posing a substantial threat to federal rights that the
failure to act amounts to "deliberate indifference." Second,
plaintiffs suing government entities may proceed even if the
particular federal right allegedly invaded by that policy lacked prior
judicial recognition, a condition that would establish immunity for
an individual defendant.
1 92
The Owen dissenters may have overstated their case by asserting
that the majority's rejection of immunity imposes "strict liability" on
local government entities. 193 It is clear hyperbole, for example,
to suggest that strict liability operates in a "failure to act" case like
City of Canton, in which entity liability attaches only upon a showing
of "deliberate indifference." The Owen dissenters, however, might
accurately lament that the method used to deny entity immunity
facilitates the imposition of civil liability for constitutional violations
newly announced in the course of § 1983 litigation.
Entity liability under § 1983 for newly declared constitutional
rights, recently reaffirmed in dictum by a plurality of the Court in
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith,194 was realized in
Owen itself. The plaintiff, a former police chief, was discharged
under stigmatizing circumstances and denied an opportunity
publicly to clear his name. The majority agreed that a due process
hearing was required and held that local governments enjoyed no
§ 1983 immunity. 195 The dissenters argued vehemently that the
Court had not previously accorded employees at will a "name
clearing" hearing after their discharge. Consequently, no protect-
able species of property or liberty existed, at least if there was no
public disclosure of the reasons for discharge; the majority's denial
192 With respect to entity omissions, and thus the "deliberate indifference"
standard, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to show that the need for entity action
was "obvious" in the absence of settled law. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 390 n.10 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)); Brown, supra
note 24, at 656; infra note 200.
193 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting).
194 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2334 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting
retroactive application of American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266
(1987), against a state as a matter ofjudicial policy, while adhering to the view that
§ 1983 confers no general immunity on municipalities). Notwithstanding its apparent
endorsement of Owen, the Smith decision, in tandem with recently decided Dennis v.
Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 873 (1991) (allowing suits for violation of the Commerce
Clause to proceed under § 1983), contains some potential for stimulating a limited,
partial entity immunity, a prospect discussed infra note 233.
195 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 635-38.
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of immunity thus cleared the way for the Court to declare a thereto-
fore unsettled constitutional right.
196
This same willingness of the Court to use entity liability under
§ 1983 as a vehicle for the creation of new procedural rights has
since been visible several times. In Pembaur, for example, three
circuits, including the one in which the defendants' conduct took
place, had reached conclusions contrary to Steagald as of the time
of the events in question.1 97 Although the individual defendant
prevailed on her immunity defense for want of clearly settled
applicable precedent, the possibility of entity liability was affirmed,
subject to the severe prima facie stricture of "policy."
This dynamic was also at work in Praprotnik, in which the
plaintiff lost not because the entity was relieved of the duty to
anticipate developments in constitutional law but because the Court
found the alleged retaliatory conduct not fairly attributable to the
entity.198 A suit against individual defendants, by contrast, might
have been barred at the threshold because the Court had not
unambiguously recognized the right of a public employee to be free
from retaliation for using a state-created grievance mechanism.
1 99
And in City of Canton, the dissenters, explaining why they would
have denied the plaintiff a remand to establish "deliberate indiffer-
ence," noted disapprovingly that the predicate right of a pretrial
196 See id. at 661-64 (Powell, J., dissenting). The durability of expanded
constitutional rights declared in § 1983 actions is another matter. For example, the
Owen dissenters' position on the predicate "name-clearing" claim now apparently
commands a majority of the Court. See Siegert v. Gilley, Ill S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991)
(holding insufficient to state a claim plaintiff's allegation that his former supervisor's
defamatory statements violated due process by causing the loss of current and future
government employment); see also infra notes 214 & 240. But Siegert's negative reprise
on the type of liberty interest in reputation that Owen recognized does not alter the
fact that the § 1983 entity action brought in Owen did generate new doctrine at the
time.
197 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 486 (White, J., concurring); id. at 492-93 (Powell, J.
dissenting); supra text accompanying note 166. The new law on which the liability of
all Pembaur defendants turned was declared by Steagald, not Pembaur. Since that law
had not been established when the defendants acted, the individual defendants would
have been exonerated by qualified immunity even if Steagald were ultimately given
retroactive effect. The Court in Pembaur nevertheless exposed the entity to liability.
198 See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 128-30.
199 In Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 283-84 (1977), the Court recognized that an untenured teacher, though
dismissable for any reason, could not be dismissed for exercising his First Amend-
ment rights. The plurality in Praprotnik, without mentioningMount Healthy, expressed
no opinion on "whether the First Amendment forbade the city to retaliate... for
having taken advantage of the [available] grievance mechanism in 1980." Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 127.
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detainee to medical attention for emotional injury had not been
established earlier.
200
200 In her dissent,Justice O'Connor confronted the majority with what appeared
to be a legal requirement implicit in the "deliberate indifference" formulation-a
reasonably well-settled constitutional right. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 396-97 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). By the
majority's own reckoning, to show that the failure to train amounts to advertent
'policy" fairly attributable to the entity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the need
for such training was "obvious" from "usual and recurring situations." Id. at 391.
Only such obviousness could illustrate that "the inadequacy [of training was] so likely
to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers ... can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Id. at 390.
Necessarily embedded in this standard, asJustice O'Connor seemed to perceive,
are two issues, one factual and one legal. The factual issue is whether the situation
confronting the entity was sufficiently recurrent that a constitutional harm resulting
from inaction was "obvious." Knowledge or reasonably imputable knowledge that a
failure to act would obviously violate a constitutional right necessarily also assumes
that the right in question had been previously determined, a distinct legal question.
Justice O'Connor concluded that this legal component "ha[d] not and could not" be
met in City of Canton. Id. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This, she argued, followed from the fact that the Court had "not yet addressed
the precise nature of the obligations that... Due Process... places upon the police
to seek medical care for pretrial detainees who have been physically injured." Id. at
397. A fortiori, she seemed to argue, there was no clear legal obligation with respect
to the duty to prevent emotional or mental harms. There were, consequently, "no
clear constitutional guideposts for the municipalities." Id. Absent such guideposts,
the need for training could not, as a matter of simple logic, be obvious.
The majority did not confront the issue directly, noting only that "we must
assume that [plaintiff's] constitutional right ... was denied by city employees-
whatever the nature of that right might be." Id. at 389 n.8. We are thus left to
speculate whether the Court's opinion authorized the appellate court on remand to
recognize a new constitutional duty on the part of municipalities to provide adequate
training for the treatment of mentally disabled pretrial detainees. The majority's
failure to dispelJustice O'Connor's suspicions on this point permits the inference that
the city would face potential liability for what was at best a dimly sketched right.
Some support for this conclusion may be drawn from Justice White's repeated
generalized references to the denial of "medical attention" or "care," shorn ofJustice
O'Connor's distinction between care for physical and psychiatric conditions. See id.
at 381-82, 389 n.8. If this is the case, liability may be fastened on a municipality for
a violation of rights that, at the very least, would not meet the highly particularized
version of the "clearly established" requirement adumbrated in Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), for the liability of individual defendants. See supra
text accompanying notes 113-21.
We hasten to acknowledge that neither the disposition nor the discussion in City
of Canton compels this interpretation. First, the Court did not purport to highlight
the contours of the right. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 n.8. It might well be an
open question on remand whether there was circuit authority supporting a right of
pretrial detainees to psychiatric care and, if so, whether itwas sufficiently settled that
failure to furnish such care would "obviously" violate a constitutional right. Second,
it is possible that the substantive rights issue is simply open. The Court's "whatever
the nature of the right" statement can be read to suggest that it was simply dealing
with the § 1983 issue (whether the Monell "policy" requirement could ever be satisfied
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IV. POLICIES, TECHNIQUES, AND ACCOUNTS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL-ENTITY ASYMMETRY
A. Policies and Techniques
The divergence of the prima facie elements and defenses in
§ 1983 actions against individuals and entities may be viewed as
responses by the Court to three perceived 20 1 problems: unfair-
ness to individual defendants, the opening of litigation floodgates,
and threats to federalism resulting from intrusive interference with
vigorous state administration of public functions. Iff this Part, we
explore the varying techniques the Court has employed to address
these issues, the resulting differentiation of the individual and entity
cases, and the consequences for dynamic lawmaking.
In suits against individual defendants, the Court has responded
to these concerns not only by fortifying the qualified immunity.
defense, but also by redefining certain predicate constitutional
violations. The early common law immunity doctrine typified by
cases such as Scheuer v. Rhodes20 2 demanded a fact-based inquiry
that sought to unfetter discretionary administration of the law. This
qualified immunity insulated individual public officials, ineligible for
absolute immunity, from liability without fault through the general
defense of good faith and probable cause. 203 Scheuer identified
two bases for this qualified immunity: the injustice of punishing the
officer who, in good faith, exercises discretion as a requirement of
his job, and the fear that the threat of liability would chill the
by entity omission) and that it did not undertake to decide whether the particular
predicate right alleged was constitutionally cognizable.
Accordingly, should a reconstituted Court (Justices Souter and Thomas having
replacedJustices Brennan and Marshall) address the issue squarely, it may agree with
Justice O'Connor that the § 1983 predicate right must to some degree be settled
before an entity may be held liable on the basis of an agent's omission. If so, the
entity in such cases would enjoy an escape from liability prima facie that in substance
mirrors the immunity from damages enjoyed by individual officials via an affirmative
defense. See supra notes 89-127. In this context, then, an implicit settledness
requirement would render irrelevant the Owen Court's refusal to accord entities a
formal immunity. Indeed, where .the predicate right is unsettled and plaintiff
accordingly fails to state any claim, the entity in an omission case would be spared
liability not only from damages but also from attorneys' fees incidental to injunctive
or declaratory relief. The Court in Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446
U.S. 719 (1980), authorized attorney's fees even where injunctive relief only is
obtained.
201 The perception may be somewhat discordant with reality. See supra note 16.
202 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
203 See supra note 93; supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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officer's execution of his duties "with the decisiveness and judgment
required by the public good."
20 4
Yet in Harlow v. Fitzgerald20 5 and again in Anderson v. Creigh-
ton, 206 the Court jettisoned this heavily fact-laden version of
common law immunity. It substituted a two-part inquiry that
begins-and usually ends-with the legal question of the settledness
of the specific right at issue. More rarely, if the right is deemed
well-settled, the test of immunity unfolds into a factual inquiry
about the reasonableness of official conduct in light of that highly
particularized precedent. These decisions were avowedly designed
to enable defendants to obtain early dismissals before extensive (and
preferably, before any) discovery. Substantively, they broaden
immunity so that it is generally no longer defeasible by evidence of
subjective bad faith. 207 What had traditionally been a jury ques-
tion aimed at determining the justice of excusing the officer in light
of all the circumstances she confronted in the course of discretion-
ary decision-making is now usually a question of law for the trial
judge.
At the same time, the Court was closing the floodgates 208 on
these individual actions by narrowing certain predicate constitution-
al protections. In Paul v. Davis,20 9 the Court announced its
determination to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from
becoming "a font of tort law,,210 through the medium of actions
under § 1983. Justice Rehnquist, following a course laid out in
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,2 11 constricted the circum-
stances under which any process was due to avoid "'alter[ing] the
basic relations between the States and the national govern-
204 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
205 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
206 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
207 In at least one circuit, however, specifically pleaded and proven malice may
sometimes defeat the immunity. See supra note 101.
208 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 16, at 646-47 (arguing that the Paul and
Parratt lines of authority had their impetus in a desire to control the flood of
litigation).
209 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
210 Id. at 701.
211 408 U.S. 564, 569-79 (1972) (holding that untenured teacher had no property
right and was not deprived of liberty upon nonrenewal of his contract). The
significance of Roth in the development of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
occupies a central role in Henry P. Monaghan, Of"Liberty"and 'Property, "62 CORNELL
L. REv. 405, 409 (1977) (concluding that after Roth, "life, liberty and property" no
longer "embrace the full range of state conduct having serious impact upon individual
interests").
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ment.' "212 The police "posted" Davis's name as an "active shop-
lifter" before any adjudication on the charge. Distinguishing recent
precedent, 213 the Court explained why there is no free-floating
liberty interest in freedom from state-perpetrated defamation: "no
specific constitutional guarantee" safeguards reputation, and the
plaintiff could cite no source of a liberty interest in state law.
214
Concurrently, in the Parratt215 line of cases that reached its
apogee in Davidson v. Cannon,216 the Court pared down the
category of liberty or property deprivations protected by due
process and afforded state actors an escape from liability for
otherwise actionable deprivations. In Davidson the Court found no
liberty deprivation, and therefore no violation of due process, when
prison officials negligently failed to protect an inmate from a
beating at the hands of another inmate, despite evidence that the
officials had some foreknowledge of the possibility.217 In a com-
panion case, the Court explained that some degree of fault greater
than negligence is prerequisite to an actionable "deprivation."
218
Also, Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer219 dilute the process that is due
for cognizable liberty or property deprivations whenever defendants'
conduct is "random and unauthorized." 220 In striking counter-
212 Paul, 424 U.S. at 700 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945)
(plurality opinion)). For a blistering critique of Paul that remains as convincing today
as when it was written, see Monaghan, supra note 211. On Justice Rehnquist's
federalism concerns see Durchslag, supra note 77, at 739-41. See generally Sheldon H.
Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 KAN. L. REV. 217, 217-18
(1985) (discussing the several policies that drove the Burger Court's § 1983
jurisprudence).
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971) (stating that "[w]here
a person's good name... is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential").
214 Paul, 424 U.S. at 700; see Monaghan, supra note 211, at 408 (noting that the
Court was using § 1983 to define liberty and property "to place limits on the level of
federal superintendence of the operations of state and local law"). The residual
reputation interest that appeared to survive Paul and Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980), see supra text accompanying notes 188-96, was in substance
repudiated in Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides no redress for defamation that accompanies
permanent termination from government employment). See supra note 196; infra
note 240.
211 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-42 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
216 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
217 See id. at 347-48.
218 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31 (noting that "mere lack of care" is not sufficient
to state a claim for a state-caused "deprivation" and overrulingParratt in this respect).
219 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
220 The Court first articulated the "random and unauthorized" rationale in Parratt,
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point to Justice Harlan's observation in Monroe that Congress
apparently contemplated fuller relief under § 1983 than states might
afford for the same misconduct,221 the Court held in Parratt and
Hudson that a state remedy made available after the deprivation in
such a case satisfies the obligation to provide "process." This holds
even if the state remedy is more restrictive and affords lesser
redress than § 1983. Thus, in this procedural due process
sphere,222 the source of the greatest concern about floodgates,
§ 1983 is no longer the fully supplementary remedy that the Court
contemplated in Monroe.
For present purposes, the salient point about these familiar
developments is the technique employed by the Court to implement
its stingy approach to due process in cases against individual
defendants. Neither the newly shrunken circumference of proce-
dural due process nor the "clearly established rights" approach to
immunity represents a broad-spectrum restriction on the scope of
§ 1983 itself. Rather, each doctrinal definition reduces the
plaintiff's likely success in actions asserting the violation of a
particular right, such as procedural due process, or of a federal
guarantee not previously articulated with clarity. This selective
redefinition process has a distinct consequence for the role of
§ 1983 in the development of constitutional law.223 Not only has
the statute become, in the particular realm of due process, the
Court's chosen instrument for crimping constitutional guarantees;
more generally, the "clearly established" limitation significantly
disables § 1983 ihdividual-defendant litigation from pushing the
frontiers of any protected constitutional or statutory right.
224
451 U.S. at 541. In Hudson, the Court extended the rationale to intentional property
deprivations. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
221 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
222 See infra note 239.
225 We have little to add to the fifteen years of criticism asserting that the Court's
stingy approach to due process does not accord with the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Soifer, supra note 112, at 1519, 1525-26 (decrying the Court's
narrow interpretation of due process requirements in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). We focus instead on § 1983, if
only because the changes proposed could be achieved by Congress should the Court
adhere to its current course.
224 There are more ominous predictions. The "clearly established" barrier may
affirmatively encourage constitutionally questionable conduct. Officials know their
conduct is largely free from constitutional scrutiny to the extent that no specific
precedent unequivocally prohibits the conduct. See Rudovsky, supra note 34, at 54.
For example, Professor Rudovsky foresees the possibility that Anderson's double bite
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By contrast, in actions against entity defendants the Court has
addressed the same problems of fairness, federalism, and floodgates
by altering the scope of § 1983 itself. In Monell, the Court appeared
to conclude that it would be unfair to encumber entities with
liability on the same terms as it had exposed individual defendants
under Monroe-liability for any conduct carried out under the
emblem of government authority, whether or not authorized in fact
or enshrined in official policy. The Monell court addressed this
issue by constricting generically the scope of § 1983 prima facie
claims.
2 25
In one respect only has the Court employed a common
technique-early disposition by the court-to dampen the flow of
entity and individual litigation. On the entity side, it has delegated
to trial judges the function of deciding whether an entity's official
has final policymaking authority, characterizing this as a question of
state law.226 Similarly, an individual official's assertion of quali-
fied immunity turns initially and usually ultimately on the legal
question whether plaintiff's claimed right is clearly established as a
matter of federal law. In both instances liability is determinable in
a way that protects the entity official's calendar by offering a quick
escape from the litigation.
The Court's policy-impelled changes on the entity side reflect
more than modest tinkering with particular species of claims such
as due process. Rather, in § 1983 entity litigation the Court has
placed wholesale limitations on the nature of claims assertable
against the government. The original architect of these restrictions,
Justice Brennan, would only two years later consider it "'uniquely
at reasonableness might transform the Fourth Amendment's own probable cause
requirement into a subconstitutional inquiry into the reasonableness of the officer's
belief, despite the absence in fact of probable cause. See id. at 52-53. This result
would freeze the state of constitutional law. See id. at 53.
225 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
226 This was a major point of contention in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112 (1988). Justice O'Connor, for the plurality, opined that federal courts are
"not.. .justified in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere
other than where the applicable [state or local] law purports to put it." Id. at 126.
In contrast, Justice Brennan would have treated the issue as a question of fact; he
argued unsuccessfully that denominating the issue as one of state law permitted the
municipalities to escape liability "for the acts of all but a small minority of actual city
policymakers" named in a statute. Id. at 132 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor's position has carried the day. SeeJett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701,737-38 (1989) (remanding for a determination whether a school superintendent,
who approved an allegedly racially motivated reassignment, had "final policymaking
authority" over employee transfers under state law).
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amiss'" if the government entity, "'to which all in our society look
for the... setting of worthy norms and goals for social conduct,'"
was to enjoy a qualified immunity to backstop the stringent prima
facie case set out in Monell.12 7 In effect, the majority he spoke for
in Owen found that Monell already provided an adequate response
to fears about fairness. "Policy" ensures that the government can
be held responsible only for conduct unequivocally attributable to
its advertent decisions.
Nevertheless, the decision in Owen to deny entities an immunity
defense parallel to that enjoyed by their agents preserves the
theoretical possibility that § 1983 entity cases may continue to serve
as a crucible for the development of federal constitutional law,
provided the plaintiff can thread the policy needle of Monell and its
progeny.228 The significance of this decision was appreciated at
227 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (quoting Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
228 This statement may be somewhat overbroad. Two situations come to mind in
which the entity, like the individual defendant, may enjoy some protection when the
predicate right it allegedly violated is not well settled. First, the entity may enjoy
immunity from damages when the decision declaring its liability breaks sharply with
past precedent. See infra note 233 (discussing the potential impact of American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990), and Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S.
Ct. 865 (1991), on entity immunity). Second, when the plaintiff asserts that entity
"policy" takes the form of an omission, plaintiff is required to demonstrate that it
should have been obvious to the entity's agent that failure to act would violate a
constitutional right. That, in turn, implies that the right in question must have been
somewhat settled before the events at issue in the action. See supra note 200
(discussing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). If the Court comes to
recognize this legal requirement explicitly, see supra note 200, entities in these
omission cases would escape all liability for newly declared rights. They would be
better off than similarly situated individual defendants, who are shielded only from
damages liability under the "dearly established" version of qualified immunity.
Nevertheless, in other contexts the entity action remains the primary vehicle for
creating new constitutional rights. An instructive example of this progenerative
potential is glimpsed by comparing Owen, an entity action, with Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), an action against an individual. In Owen, the majority strained the record
to find that the defamatory statements about the plaintiff police chief were made in
the course of his discharge from public employment and thus implicated a liberty
interest protected by due process under the decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433 (1971), see supra note 213, and Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), see supra text accompanying note 211. See Owen, 445 U.S.
at 633-34 n.13. In Paul, by contrast, the Court labored to avoid finding a predicate
liberty interest by conjuring up the thinnest imaginable distinctions to distinguish
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433. See Monaghan, supra note 211, at 423-29; David L.
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293, 324-28
(1976). It may not be a coincidence that in Owen, unlike Paul, the defendant was an
entity. Cf. infra note 245 (comparing City of Canton with Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d
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the time. Inveighing against what they foresaw as "strict liability on
municipalities for constitutional violations," the dissenters accused
the majority of ignoring "the vast weight of common-law precedent
as well as the current state law of municipal immunity."229 The
result, according to the dissent, was that the government entity,
unlike its agent, would be liable if it "incorrectly-though reasonably
and in good faith-forecasts the course of constitutional law."
230
Justice Brennan, for the majority, acknowledged this con-
sequence directly. First, he foresaw the possibility that by com-
pounding the qualified immunity for individuals with a "good faith"
municipal immunity the Court might "freez[e]" constitutional
development.2 31  Second, he declared that if officials prove
unable to forecast some doctrinal development, "it is fairer to
allocate any resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of
government borne by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to
be felt solely .by those whose rights, albeit newly recognized, have
been violated."23 2 A plurality of the Court, in dictum, recently
reiterated its understanding that Owen allows for doctrinal develop-
ment in actions against entities.
233
1239 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990)).
229 Owen, 445 U.S. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting). As we have pointed out,
beginning only two years later with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the
Court superseded the common law approach to individual immunity with its more
expansive version driven by concerns for calendar congestion and effective
government administration. See supra text accompanying notes 107-21.
230 Owen, 445 U.S. at 668 (Powell, J., dissenting).
231 See id. at 651 n.33.
232 Id. at 655.
233 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2334 (1990)
(O'Connor,J., plurality opinion). Smith and Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991),
brought nominally against individuals, should be regarded functionally as actions
against entities, as we explain later in this footnote. As such these decisions warrant
some ink.
Although the Smith Court expressly endorsed Owen and its understanding that
suits against municipalities will continue to stage the recognition of at least some new
constitutional guarantees, skeptics might see Smith and Dennis as spade work for
overruling or qualifying Owen's rejection of entity immunity. On balance, we believe
that some cutting back has already occurred but that the extent of the cut back will
vary depending upon whether the entity sued is a state or one of its political
subdivisions.
Smith reviewed a dormant commerce clause challenge to Arkansas's flat rate
highway equalization tax. The Arkansas Supreme Court initially affirmed the trial
court's ruling upholding application of the tax to nonresident motorists. During the
pendency of the petitioner's appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
struck down a similar statute in American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S.
266 (1987), in a decision that the Smith Court described as "a clear break from"
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established precedent. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2334. The Smith Court thereafter vacated
the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court and remanded. The Arkansas Supreme
Court subsequently held the state act unconstitutional, but concluded that, under
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), Scheiner could not be applied
retroactively. Accordingly, petitioners were denied a full refund. They appealed
again to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld the Arkansas high court in pertinent part. First, the
Court held that, in light of the pre-Scheiner precedent that reasonably supported the
state's belief that its tax was permissible, "the purpose of the Commerce Clause does
not dictate retroactive application of Scheiner," since retroactive application would not
deter future state efforts to erect trade barriers. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2332. The Court
also found that equitable considerations, which constitute one prong of the
retroactivity analysis required by Chevron Oil, supported the decision to forego
retroactive application. The state legislature had relied in good faith on past
precedent in passing the tax and "had good reason" to believe it was constitutional.
Id. at 2333.
In discussing whether the equities favored retroactive application, the Court
addressed petitioner's analogy to Ownen, namely, that an entity could not "'disavow
liability for the injury it has begotten.'" Id. at 2334 (quoting Owen, 445 U.S. at 651).
Petitioner argued that the state was not entitled to what was in effect a good faith
immunity. The Court, however, distinguished Owen. Unlike the constitutional issue
at bar, Justice O'Connor stated, Owen involved a determination of congressional
intent, and thus "provide[d] little guidance for determining the fairest way to apply
our own decisions." Id. The Court then suggested that the policy issues underlying
Owen were distinct. Owen determined that a "special [municipal] immunity for
violations of constitutional rights would not best serve the goals of § 1983, even if
those rights had not been clearly established when the violation occurred." Id. Owen,
the plurality explained, rested in some measure on a deterrence rationale; entity
liability would cause the municipal official to "'consider whether his decision
comports with constitutional mandates and... weigh the risk that a violation might
result in an award of damages from the public treasury.'" Id. (quoting Owen, 445 U.S.
at 656). By contrast, Justice O'Connor wrote, when Supreme Court constitutional
determinations "clearly break[] with precedent... which... public officials could not
anticipate," a different analysis applies. Id. The Court's refusal to require the state
to provide a full refund had the effect of conferring a partial, one-time immunity
from damages only, and then only in a "dearly breaks" context.
It cannot be doubted that Smith's express rhetorical support for Owen is offset
in some measure by the questionable nature of the plurality's distinctions. See PETER
W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 6-7 (Supp. 1991) (asking
whether the plurality is sub silentio creating an exception to Owen, and if so, how
such an exception differs from affording municipal government a good faith
immunity). The claim that Owen-generated damages might deter a government
official from violating the law, whereas the prospect of a state tax refund would not,
is highly debatable. A break with clear precedent would a priori be no more
foreseeable in one case than in the other. The Court's distinction between sources
of violation-statutory versus constitutional-is not wholly convincing either. Section
1983 individual defendant immunity doctrine, after all, has sometimes been
transported as a formal matter from the realm of actions arising directly under the
Constitution. See supra note 107.
Smith could therefore be viewed as providing an opening for subsequent
reappraisal of Owen on the good faith immunity issue. One could contend that the
Court is preparing Owen for reversal on the good faith immunity issue, and will do
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so by citing to Smith as a basis for reconsideration. For example, since Owen itself was
a § 1983 case that did not "clearly break" with, but merely took a step beyond,
existing precedent, see supra note 228, the Court has left itself room to invoke a de
facto Smith immunity in another § 1983 entity case where the decisional rule
contended for by the plaintiff does chart virgin territory. That this possibility is not
far-fetched is suggested by the Court's adoption of standards friendly to non-
retroactive application of new rules in a cognate civil rights context, federal habeas
corpus law. There the Court precludes retroactive application of "new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure," with new rules broadly defined to include those that
merely break new ground. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301,310 (1989). The Court
has since applied this approach to validate state court interpretations that failed to
forecast constitutional developments, provided that they represented "reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents." Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct.
1212, 1217 (1990) (refusing to apply a "new rule" barring certain police-initiated
interrogations to the defendant's murder conviction).
The general trend in Supreme Court decisions thus supports the conclusion that
under certain circumstances a partial exception to Owen is in the offing. Indeed, the
Court's even more recent decision in Dennis, by finding alleged state tax violations of
the Commerce Clause actionable under § 1983, suggests that in practical effect an
even broader immunity than Smith affords is already accomplished by a distinct
§ 1983 doctrinal development. Before Dennis, such actions were sui generis; it was
unclear what source of law spawned them. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2257 n.34 (1990) (suggesting that
authority for the action arose because Florida had waived sovereign immunity in its
own courts); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920) (explaining
that "'the law, independent of any statute,'" provided the substantive grounds for the
litigation (quoting Marsh v. Fulton County, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 676, 684 (1870))).
After Dennis, § 1983 limitations may apply and § 1983 of its own force may turn out
to absolve states of all liability for damages.
Complete absolution is a potential consequence of Will v. Michigan Department
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), which held that the state is not a "person" for
purposes of § 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 301-05. As applied to states
eo nomine, Smith's limited, partial immunity pales by comparison to Will; the latter
shields the state as a named defendant from all § 1983 liability, even where there is
no clear break with existing precedent. By analogy to Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, however, Will continued the fiction that permits prospective relief in
suits against individual state officials sued in their official capacities for violations
otherwise chargeable to their employers. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. See generally
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 125 (1908); infra notes 292 & 304. Thus in cases like Smith,
brought against state officials in their official capacities, Will (now made applicable
to such cases via § 1983 and Dennis) would preclude precisely what Smith precluded:
retroactive relief alone. But it would do so even where the state officials could not
reasonably have anticipated the unconstitutionality of their tax.
In principle, tax refund claims brought against state officials are functionally
equivalent to actions against the state, regardless of the party formally named,
because recovery could ultimately come from state coffers. Cf Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (noting that "even though a State is not named a party .... the suit
may [if the state pays] nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). (Of
some potential import is the fact that Edelman relied on Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); there the Court held that a non-
resident's challenge to a state income tax could not be maintained in federal court,
regardless of the identity of the party formally named.) Thus Will-with its analogy
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Ironically, it is in a procedural due process case after Parratt,
Hudson, and Davidson,234 the least fruitful category of predicate
constitutional claim, that the Court appears to hold out the
possibility that the individual action, too, may facilitate substantive
to Eleventh Amendment learning like Edelman-would limit the § 1983 plaintiff, in
state or federal court, to injunctive relief if refunds are deemed a "retroactive"
remedy.
Whether tax refunds are always precluded as "retroactive" is undecided. But cf.
Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. 459. In Edelman, the Court had refused to permit federal
welfare beneficiaries, suing in federal court, to recover benefits wrongfully withheld
by state officials. The Court held that under the aegis of the Eleventh Amendment
and Exparte Young, a federal court could award only prospective relief against a state
employee sued in her official capacity, and that the relief sought-"equitable
restitution" of benefits-partook of non-recoverable, "retroactive damages." Edelman,
415 U.S. 666-69.
To avoid the retroactive label, one could perhaps distinguish the payment
coerced from taxpayers' pockets, as in Smith, from the statutory benefits withheld
through wrongful computation in Edelman. But it is not altogether clear why
taxpayers injured by state laws are more deserving of full recovery than impecunious
plaintiffs for whom Congress has created an entitlement. The equities are especially
obscure because the underlying substantive constitutional law gives states special
options to remedy Commerce Clause taxing violations. Subject to very niggardly due
process protections, they may decline to refund entirely and instead eliminate the
discriminatory trade barrier by increasing the taxes of those who benefitted under the
invalid act. See McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2252. Thus the ultimate violation in the
Commerce Clause context is not reflected in taxes wrongfully levied, but simply in the
inequality of the taxing mechanism. By contrast, the problem in the entitlement
context is the loss of funds that can never be recovered. The taxpayer, in short, may
stand on shakier equitable footing than the welfare recipient.
The situation is somewhat different with respect to a tax refund (or other) claim
against a state political subdivision, provided it does not look to state funds to
bankroll an adversejudgment. Unlike the State itself, the subdivision is a "person"
suable under § 1983. But where a decision against the subdivision sharply breaks
with existing precedent, Smith may accord that entity a remedial exception to the
Owen holding that entities lack immunity grounded in good faith. Still, there is
substantial reason to conclude that Owen is not being set up for wholesale overruling
outside the clear break context. The Smith plurality opinion falls in line with a
conservative Court's traditional deference to state choices. An about-face,
comprehensive overruling of Owen in an opinion that would also necessarily be
supported by conservative justices and premised on Smith, itself partly justified by
features that distinguished it from a reaffirmed Owen, is probably too unseemly
jurisprudentially for the Court to contemplate.
In any event, the dear break limitation of Smith is unlikely to portend an end to
incremental, as distinct from dramatic, doctrinal development in actions against state
subdivisions. In the tax context, Scheiner and Smith generated new constitutional law,
a limitation on state taxing authority. Moreover, the one-time immunity created by
Smith was, on its facts, limited to state (and not municipal) taxes received before the
announcement of Scheiner. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2335-36. Because the tax
continues to toll even if full refunds are unavailable under § 1983, ample incentive
remains for local taxpayers to bring suit for injunctive relief and attorneys' fees.
234 See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal evolution. Nevertheless, a closer look at this decision,
Zinermon v. Burch,2 5 reveals the likelihood to be minimal.
Burch attempted to have himself "voluntarily" admitted to a
state mental hospital at a time he claimed he was disoriented and
psychologically incompetent to give informed consent. He alleged
that the staff knew or should have known that he was incompetent
and, by admitting him nevertheless, wilfully or recklessly disregard-
ed his rights to due process. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling that because the staff's conduct was random
and unauthorized Burch had failed to state a claim under Parratt
and Hudson. As framed by the Supreme Court majority, the issue
was whether Florida, in delegating to mid-level state hospital
employees the voluntary admission decision, owed admittees some
pre-admission process to determine whether consent was in fact
informed.5 6
A five-member Supreme Court majority affirmed, distinguishing
Parratt and Hudson on the ground that the defendants' conduct was
something other than "random and unauthorized." For one thing,
the .Court found that because the moment of deprivation and the
fact that some prospective patients might lack capacity were
predictable, the State, before taking Burch's liberty, could have
accorded him a pre-deprivation hearing that would have guarded
against an admission in violation of the statute.2 7 Moreover, the
conduct could not be considered "unauthorized" in the Parratt/
Hudson sense because the state had delegated authority to the
hospital staff to make admissions decisions, without prescribing any
particular procedure to determine the competence to consent
requisite to a voluntary admission.
28
235 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
236 See id. at 977-78, 987. Florida had a complex series of procedures for use in
determining the propriety of involuntary psychiatric admissions. See id. at 981-82.
Those procedures, however, did not cover the case in which a person attempted to
admit himself as a voluntary patient when there was reason to doubt his capacity to
give informed consent. The statute governingvoluntary admissions required "express
and informed consent" to be given "voluntarily [and] in writing," but provided no
process for determining voluntariness. Id. at 982 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch.
394.465(1)(a), 394.455(22) (1990)).
237 See id. at 987-88. Among the important aspects of the decision was the
majority's statement that liberty as well as property interests are subject to the
Parratt/Hudson doctrine. See id. at 986-87.
238 See id. at 990. Justice Blackmun articulated the distinction somewhat
differently and perhaps less dearly. He stated that Parratt does not apply because (a)
the state could foresee that mental patients might lack capacity, (b) providing pre-
deprivation process was not literally impossible in view of the established procedure
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Zinermon thus renders Parratt and Hudson inapplicable when
identified government personnel with evident statutory discretion
to provide appropriate process can feasibly provide a pre-depriva-
tion hearing that will reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
liberty. 239 By declaring new doctrine, Zinermon appears to refute
the argument that the state of constitutional law is frozen in § 1983
damage actions against individual defendants. On remand, Burch
himself may well lose out to a qualified immunity defense, for a
newly defined right to process will not likely be deemed "settled."
But in any subsequent action, that law will indeed be settled, and
local governments are now on notice that in this context they must
adopt appropriate procedures to determine voluntariness.
On examination, however, Zinermon's law-evolution potential
looks chimerical. The practical lesson of the case may simply be
that defendants should press for a decision on the affirmative
defense of immunity rather than move to dismiss the complaint for
legal insufficiency under Parratt.240  Had defense counsel in
for determining involuntary admissions, and (c) the conduct was not "unauthorized,"
since the State had delegated admissions decisions to the hospital staff. See id. at 989-
90. Points (a) and (c) seem to be reasons that support point (b), rather than
independent criteria that distinguish Parratt and Hudson.
2" The case has cleared up several questions concerning the reach of the Parratt
doctrine. We can now conclude with confidence that the holdings of Parratt and
Hudson regarding "random and unauthorized" avoidance of liability are limited to
procedural due process claims involving situations in which pre-deprivation process
is literally impossible. The Court has assuaged the fear, identified by Henry P.
Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1986), that Parratt also restricted substantive due
process claims. The Zinermon condition that the process plaintiff demands must have
"value," see Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 988, would not even be an issue if the subject were
fundamental, substantive rights. This conclusion is fortified by the lengths to which
the majority and dissent went to place Parratt squarely within the procedural due
process context created by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Zinermon,
110 S. Ct. at 984-86; id. at 995-96 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). The Court thus folded
Parratt into a line of cases bracketed by Zinermon and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Parratt does not control when, as in Zinermon, the state fails
to provide pre-deprivation process that it readily could have provided or, as in Logan,
when the state formally creates an established procedure but as a practical matter
makes it unavailable. See generally Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v.
Burch, Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY
LJ. 1, 67 (1991) (concluding that Parratt is now a narrow doctrine).
240 See Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1240 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1473 (1990). The plaintiffin Danese might well have succeeded with a procedural
due process claim that could have skirted Parratt via Zinermon had not the defendant
successfully pressed the qualified immunity defense first. See id. at 1242-44.
As a purely procedural matter, defendants are entitled to move separately on the
defenses of legal insufficiency and qualified immunity, provided both defenses are
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properly preserved in the responsive pleading. See FED. R. CIr. P. 12(b), 8(c), 7(b).
The former defense attacks the legal adequacy of the plaintiff's claim and is resolved
solely by reference to the allegations of the complaint, while the latter asserts an
affirmative defense, which, if legally sufficient and factually supported, avoids liability
for damages even if the elements of the claim are adequately pleaded and proven.
Given the ease of deciding the legal insufficiency issue, and its ripeness at the
threshold of a lawsuit, a defendant would ordinarily make that motion first.
Substantively, however, the current version of qualified immunity subsumes the
question of legal sufficiency that is normally raised by a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. While it remains unclear how settled a right must be to meet the
Court's requirements, a determination that a particular right is well settled must
mean at a minimum that the right has been recognized by a court of some dignity
and does state a legally sufficient claim. Rejection of the qualified immunity defense
on its first, legal prong would thus doom a follow-up motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. By the same token, however, a plaintiff's claim, although adequate to
survive a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency, inay not implicate a right that is
settled to the degree necessary to avoid the defense of qualified immunity. From an
efficiency standpoint the individual defendant is therefore better advised to move on
qualified immunity at the outset, even though the ultimate denial of that motion
should spell the defeat of the legal insufficiency defense as well.
Efficiency aside, the tactical approach Zinenron counsels was made problematic
by the Court in Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991). Plaintiff, a former
government psychiatrist, brought a defamation action, presumably under what he
perceived to be the residue of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia assumed, without deciding, that plaintiffstated
a claim under Paul, but remanded the case with instructions to dismiss because,
among other things, the right was not clearly established. See Siegert v. Gilley, 895
F.2d 797, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1990), afTd, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
The Supreme Court majority affirmed, but rejected the circuit court's analysis.
Concluding that "[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted... is 'clearly established' ... is the determination of
whether [there is] ... a constitutional right at all," Siegert, 111 S. Ct. at 1793, the
Court found no such right, despite Paul. See supra note 228. It also instructed lower
courts to decide the "rights" or legal sufficiency challenge before turning to the
defense of immunity. See Siegert, 111 S. Ct. at 1794. This approach, by scrutinizing
a component of the defense that is identical to the "rights" element of a § 1983
plaintiff's prima facie claim, has the potential to absolve the defendant from any
liability, including prospective relief and attorneys' fees; by contrast, the qualified
immunity defense as such relieves the individual defendant from liability for damages
alone. In this way the Siegert prescription for sequencing these issues promises some
government officials even greater freedom from the expense and time demands of
litigation than they enjoyed when trial courts turned immediately to the question
whether an assumed right was clearly established. See id. at 1793.
The approach suggested by the Court creates some doubt about our assertion
that § 1983 damage actions against individuals are dead-ends for the development of
new constitutional rights. A trial court, directed to decide whether there is a right
before determiningwhether that right is clearly established, may generate precedent
declaring new rights. In many cases, of course, the trial court will find for the
defendant and no new rights will arise. There is a possibility, however, that by
resolving the legal insufficiency claim first, the trial court will find for the plaintiff.
In that event, the Siegert marching orders for trial courts-do not decide whether a
right was well settled at the time the defendant acted until you have first decided that
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Zinermon followed that tack, the Parratt question would probably
never have been presented. The right to newly declared procedural
protections could not have been settled at the time Burch was
admitted. 241 If this is correct, damage actions against entities re-
main the only sure vehicle for the creation of new constitutional
protections, assuming that counsel for individual defendants are
alert to litigate the qualified immunity defense initially.242 This
conclusion is buttressed by the extreme latitude appellate courts
such a right is currently cognizable-may work to the disadvantage of future
defendants. That is, even if, in the rights-deciding case (Case 1), the qualified
immunity defense ultimately prevails, the right may have been sufficiently declared
there to be deemed clearly established, and thus defeat a claim of immunity in a
subsequent action (Case 2).
Still, the post-Siegert use of§ 1983 individual damage actions to create such rights
may prove limited. First, if Case 1 fails to move beyond the district court, Case 2 may
not accord a great deal of weight to the part of the Case 1 opinion that declares a
right. Cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 (1984) (citing circuit authority as
evidencing precedent that is "clearly established"). Second, even an appellate opinion
in Case 1 may have little precedential value if, after declaring a right, it nevertheless
finds the defendant qualifiedly immune because the right was not well established.
A court in Case 2 may reason that the Case 1 court did not need to consider the
"rights" issue carefully because declaration of the right had no effect on the Case 1
result. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 17(3), 27,28 (1982) (stating that
issue preclusion is appropriate only when determination of the common issue was
essential to the earlier judgment).
241 See P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039-41 (2d Cir. 1990) (determining
that the issue of whether officials complied with federally incorporated state statutory
requirements for admitting plaintiff to residential school for retarded individuals, and
thus with requirements of the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401, 1415(b)(1)(C), (b)(2) (1988), was pretermitted by a grant of qualified
immunity through the application of Harlow).
242 A defendant's attorney, after Siegert, may no longer be able (or want) to follow
our post-Zinermon advice that they press for qualified immunity before moving to
dismiss for failure to allege the violation of a federal right. See supra note 240.
Instructed bySiegert, trial courts may refuse to acquiesce in this tactic. See supra note
240. Moreover, counsel may conclude that the instant defendant (unlike potential
future defendants, see supra note 240) is better served by litigating the "rights" issue
first. After all, a determination that there is no predicate right avoids all liability, not
just liability for damages. In this way a threshold determination of the rights issue,
if it is favorable to defendant, fully implements the Supreme Court's recent resolve
to provide a complete immunity from suit, not just from liability. See Siegert, 111 S.
Ct. at 1793-94 (concluding that qualified immunity creates "an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability" (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526
(1985))). Under previous practice, trial courts usually ruled first on the "clearly
established" question: A defendant who prevailed on that question, and hence on
qualified immunity, would be relieved of liability for damages only. Cf. Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that even absolute judicial immunity bars only
damages, not injunctive relief or attorney's fees incident thereto). On the possibilities
and perils of using suits for injunctive relief against individuals as a vehicle for
creating new procedural rights, see supra note 18.
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have granted the Harlow/Anderson immunity defense, by insisting on
its resolution before discovery,243 by permitting immediate ap-
peals from the denial of qualified immunity motions,244 and by
applying zealously the "clearly established" concept.245 In any
event, even assuming that it has some claim-expansion potential,
Zinermon may ultimately be limited to situations where the discre-
tion of the entity's actors to design pre-deprivation procedures is
"uncircumscribed" and results from "statutory oversight."246
B. Flawed Accounts of the Doctrinal Divergence
Attempts to explain the rigorous new prima facie entity case and
the capacious affirmative defense enjoyed by individual defendants
have been notably unsatisfactory. Perhaps only a generalized
hostility to the underlying constitutional claims unifies the Court's
recent decisions;
Low and Jeffries have suggested, for example, that the latest
formulations of Monell "policy" in cases such as Praprotnik and City
of Canton confer a de facto qualified immunity on entities, and
hence wreak the revenge of the Owen dissenters. 247 If this were
correct, the current asymmetry in form would effect a symmetry in
substance, with the common feature of immunity constituting the
bridge between the two types of actions. The suggestion fails,
however, because the Monell "policy" stricture, even as rigidly
applied, is still only an effort to identify liability-conducive conduct
that the factfinder can fairly impute to the entity; it does not
243 See supra note 119 (citing cases).
244 See supra notes 117, 119 & 123.
245 See Auriemma v. Rice, 895 F.2d 338, 340, 344 (7th Cir.), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991) (holding
that police superintendent qualifies for immunity when prior decisions failed to
establish clearly that he could not reasonably have relied on race as a factor in
reorganizing his department, even though he did not purport to be implementing an
affirmative action plan when he promoted black officers and demoted only white
officers); Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1473 (1990) (stating that a pretrial detainee's generalized right to medical care
does not clearly establish a correlative right to be screened to determine if such care
is needed). The divergence of approaches to § 1983 entity and individual actions
becomes evident upon comparison of Danese and City of Canton. Danese provides
immunity although the right is arguably clearly established, but in City of Canton, an
entity action, a majority refused to foreclose an almost identical claim despite its
novelty. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
246 See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1401 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 783 (1991).
247 See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 233, at 39.
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categorically preclude novel federal claims. If the plaintiff demon-
strates "policy" or its "deliberate indifference" surrogate, 248 the
entity may face liability for unsettled federal constitutional or
statutory violations, despite its agents' reasonable behavior. For
individual defendants, either of these characteristics-the settled
nature of the predicate right or the objective reasonableness of the
state actor's conduct-would provide immunity. There is no
symmetry in substance.
Nor can one explain the Parratt doctrine as the individual
defendant's counterpart to the Monell requirement of a policy or
custom. 249 The casuistic logic of Parratt, in which the state provi-
sion of remedial process after the deprivation of constitutionally
protected liberty or property transforms a denial of due process
into a denial with due process,250 pertains only to constitutional
violations that turn on the denial of some sort of process.
25 1
Indeed, the Parratt opinion itself stressed that the reason certain
forms of post-deprivation process sanitized apparently unlawful
conduct was to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
amendment only, from becoming the dreaded "'font of tort
law."
2 52
In support of its rationale, the Court relied on Paul v. Da-
vis,25 3 in which the same fear had driven it to limit the scope of
constitutionally protected liberty to deprivations that included the
loss of a state-defined right. Justice Rehnquist, also the author of
Parratt, stated explicitly that the holding did not affect enforcement
of interests that have their origin directly in the Bill of Rights. On
the authority of Monroe, Rehnquist wrote that those interests may be
redressed under § 1983 "independently of state law."254 Conse-
quently, and especially in light of Zinermon,255 it is apparent that
Parratt leaves unaffected the Monroe holding that individual
248 See supra text accompanying note 192.
249 See Susan Bandes, Monel4 Parrat Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a
Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101 (1986).
250 See Monaghan, supra note 239, at 985-86.
251 Seesupra text accompanying notes 235-39 (discussing Zinermon v. Burch, 110
S. Ct. 975 (1990), which strongly suggests that Parratt now will be confined to
procedural due process claims alone, as a special application of the formulation of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976)).
252 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 701 (1976)), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
253 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
254 Id. at 711 n.5.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 235-39.
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defendants may be liable under § 1983 for violations of constitution-
al rights other than procedural due process. This holds even
though their conduct is entirely unauthorized by their governing
principal, or, even if authorized, unassimilated into the kind of
entity policy that Monell requires for liability. In brief, Parratt is
simply not the comprehensive barrier to claims against individuals
that the evolved version of "policy" raises to claims against entities.
Expediency does not account for these developments either.
The Court has, of course, noted and apparently acted upon
concerns about calendar congestion. Its responses include
broadening the immunities available to individual defendants,
paring down the scope of constitutionally protected "property" and
"liberty," restrictively redefining "deprivations," hinging the
obligation to provide process on the subsequent availability of
doubtfully efficacious state remedies, and, more recently, inviting
early dispositions of entity suits.256  Yet if stanching the dikes
motivates the Court's restrictions on § 1983 as a tool for vindicating
constitutional rights, what explains the Court's permissive approach
to the statute as a remedy for violations of federal legislation?
257
In Maine v. Thiboutot,258 the Court, fully cognizant of the enor-
mous resulting potential increase of § 1983 "filings in our already
overburdened courts," 259 nevertheless charted a course conspicu-
ously hospitable to the assertion of these historically tangential
claims.
Consider, for instance, the fate ofJustice Rehnquist's attempt to
limit the utility of § 1983 as a remedy for federal statutory viola-
tions. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,260 he
articulated a substantive rights restriction corresponding to the Paul
or Parratt restrictions in due process cases, as well as a more general
limitation that would oust § 1983 whenever the underlying federal
statutory entitlement provided "'an exclusive remedy for violations
256 This appears to be a natural outcome of the decision to classify "final policy.
making authority" as a question of positive state law. See supra note 226 and
accompanying text.
257 This trend is most recently evidenced by Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110
S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1990), Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
103, 105 (1989), and Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479
U.S. 418 (1987). See Monaghan, supra note 21, at 247 (concluding that "section
1983's availability turns only on whether federal statutory law creates a 'primary'
right, even though the federal law does not otherwise establish a 'remedial' right").
258 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
259 Id. at 23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
260 451 U.S. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Pennhurst I].
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of its terms.'" 26 1 Justice White, dissenting, argued that the Court
should read Thiboutot as erecting the "presumption that a federal
statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a § 1983 action,"
rebuttable only by an express indication in the underlying statute
that Congress considered its stated remedies to be exclusive.
262
In three recent decisions that presumption has apparently
carried the day.263  The Court has found § 1983 available if the
predicate statute provides either no remedy, as in Golden State
Transit Corp., or only an administrative remedy, as in Wilder and
Wright, for the kind of violation alleged. Only twice, when the
entitlement statutes created their own judicial remedy,2 4 or a
"carefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism," 265 was
§ 1983 held displaced as a matter of congressional intent. The case
law may therefore be read to hold that § 1983 is supplanted only
when Congress has provided a carefully considered federal
266
judicial remedy for the predicate statutory violation. Justice
Rehnquist's second attempted limitation, a narrow definition of the
"rights secured by" a federal statute, has likewise apparently
failed.26 7
261 Id. at 28 (quoting Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22 n.11 (Powell,J., dissenting)). Justice
Powell found this standard met in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (finding that Congress had provided
"unusually elaborate [judicial] enforcement provisions" in lieu of § 1983).
262 Pennhurst 1, 451 U.S. at 51 (White,J., dissenting in part); cf. Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in unanimous decision) (precluding
Bivens recovery for a government employee if Congress provided a comprehensive
administrative and judicial remedy that was "substantially as effective as a damages
action").
216 See supra note 257 (citing cases).
264 See Middlesex, 453 U.S. 1.
265 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984). ButseeHandicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988) (overruling Smith and authorizing
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in connection with successful constitu-
tional or federal statutory claims even when the same relief, with an express fee
authorization, is available under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1485 (1988)).
266 Wilder provided support for this qualification by rejecting the argument that
the availability of state judicial review of Virginia's implementation of the Medicaid
amendment was relevant to the availability of relief under § 1983. See Wilder v.
Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 n.20 (1990).
,6 Justice Kennedy made the argument in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), but was joined only by Chief'Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor. See id. at 114-19 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). The Court rejected the
argument again in its 1990 term. See Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2517-23 (determining that
the statute imposed a "binding obligation" on the state that would be rendered
"essentially meaningless" withoutjudicial enforcement); cf. Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S.
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Why would the Court assiduously nick away at § 1983 jurisdic-
tion in its primary sphere, the vindication of constitutional rights,
yet open the doors to a perceived onslaught of litigation whenever
any federal statute, not just a civil rights statute, is violated under
color of state law? Particularly inexplicable is this embrace of
federal statutory claims under § 1983 after the Court had just
announced a notably more restrictive approach to implying judicial
rights of action directly under federal statutes. 268 The Court's
open-ended receptiveness to § 1983 statutory claims is even more
baffling because this result is not compelled. The historical
argument is certainly respectable that the addition in 1874 of the
words "and laws" to § 1983 was intended merely to parallel the
subject matterjurisdiction conferred by the forerunner of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3), a section limited to claims arising under "any law
providing for equal rights."
269
We are not suggesting that the use of § 1983 to vindicate
statutory entitlements is normatively undesirable or inconsistent
with the Court's policy-driven changes in entity or individual
actions.270 We do note, however, that whatever the logic of the
Court's decision to entertain all manner of federal statutory claims
Ct. 865 (1991) (giving same broad meaning to the constitutional "rights" enforceable
through § 1983).
268 Se4 e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979)
(holding that there is "a limited private remedy under the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940" despite no express provision for a private cause of action); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576-77 (1979) (refusing to find a private cause of
action under § 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a)
(1988), despite having previously found one under § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988)).
This curiosity is elaborated by Monaghan, supra note 21.
269 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(reviewing the historical argument); cf. John C.Jeffries,Jr., Damages for Constitutional
Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injuy in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461,
1485 n.60 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's efforts to except particular statutes
from its general rule that § 1983 provides a private damages action for all federal
statutes).270 The point is that the terms under which individual and entity actions are
brought in the constitutional sphere are significantly different from those in the
statutory entitlement sphere. For example, because of Will v. Michigan Department
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), and the vapors of the Eleventh Amendment, see
infra text accompanying notes 301-06, although the entitlement suit must take the
form of an action against an individual state official, in substance it is generally a suit
against a state entity charged with a violation in the implementation of a federal
statute or regulation. Thus, no question of "settled law" exists for purposes of an
individual defense; its settled nature exists a priori in the federal enactment.
Additionally, the existence ofstate policy for purposes of entity liabilityis not aviable
issue, because the policy resides in the challenged regulation.
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while excluding so many based on the Constitution, it is not a logic
of expediency. Why the Court defers to Congress when legislating
new entitlements but defers to the states when enforcing constitu-
tional rights is not readily apparent. It may reflect the Court's
perception of itself as ajealous guardian of the values of federalism,
or perhaps it is nothing more than a contingent fact of the Court's
historiography.
V. SHAPING A NEW ASYMMETRY FOR ENTITY AND
INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
A. The Drawbacks of Deterrence- and Compensation-Based Redesigns
Section 1983's dynamic history reminds us that redefining the
prima facie cases and defenses for individual and entity defendants
cannot be undertaken sensibly without first identifying the statute's
paramount objectives. 27 1 Professors Kramer and Sykes, for exam-
ple, design a liability rule intended to "maximize the net economic
value of municipal activity," and their sole yardstick for measuring
the efficiency of alternative liability rules is deterrence. 272 They
acknowledge that "economic analysis makes no allowance for purely
distributional objectives." 273  Contending that "the pursuit of
compensation for its own sake should not play an important role in
the common-law jurisprudence of § 1983, " 274 they note that the
legislative history contains "no talk of enacting this statute to
provide needed compensation to victims of constitutional
torts."
275
This pure deterrence premise is doubtful. The Court has
identified compensation together with deterrence as the chief
remedial goals of § 1983.276 Moreover, compensation need not
be "for its own sake." The express congressional authorization of
damages through a private right of action may well be a more
effective means to the ultimate end of deterrence than injunctive
relief alone.
277
271 See infra part V.B.
272 Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 267.
27- Id. at 268.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 See infra text accompanying notes 335-37.
277 See infra note 365 and accompanying text.
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From their premise that the exclusive remedial aim of the
statute is deterrence, Kramer and Sykes urge a "direct correlation"
between an individual defendant's qualified immunity and the
liability of the entity: either both are liable, or neither is. 278 This
"double or nothing" stance adopts respondeat superior as the basis
of entity liability, although only for "bad faith torts." Using this
approach would expand the scope of entity liability well beyond the
bounds of the Court's current insistence on 'policy." 279 Kramer
and Sykes reason that fastening liability on the individual wrongdoer
alone directly affects only his incentives, not those of his superi-
ors.280 They note that because individual wrongdoers like munici-
pal employees "are often unable to pay adverse judgments in
full"281 the ultimate task is to create incentives for supervisory
personnel to take steps to prevent constitutional violations by their
subordinates.
Kramer and Sykes share the Supreme Court's premise that
although the prospect of liability may not deter individual officials
from committing "good faith torts," that same prospect might
unduly chill the vigorous execution of their duties.282 They state
that a "rule of individual immunity is ... efficient for such cases
278 See Brown, supra note 24, at 680 n.351 (discussing Kramer and Sykes's
treatment of the connection between official liability and municipal liability).
279 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 284. More precisely, Kramer and Sykes
believe that either of two approaches to entity liability would achieve more deterrence
than the Monell "policy" rule. One is classic respondeat superior-the entity is liable
whenever the federally violative conduct of the agent is carried out in the course and
scope of his employment. The other imposes liability only when the agent's "bad
faith" conduct was the result of negligence on the part of a superior in the
administrative hierarchy. See id. at 283-85. Neither standard reaches the entity if the
agent acted in good faith. In contrast, Monell reaches an entity whenever the agent
implements formal policy or acts through a final policymaking official. Comparesupra
text accompanying note 154 (stating that Monell did not decide when official's
toleration or sanctioning of agent's unauthorized federally unlawful conduct would
justify extending liability beyond the agent to the entity) with supra text accompanying
notes 170-71 (explaining the Court's later rulingin Praprotnik that liability extends to
the entity only when the agent's conduct is approved by and carried out according to
the instructions of final policymaking officials).
280 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 284. The imposition of individual
liability might, however, have an indirect effect on supervisors' incentives. Kramer
and Sykes explain that because "the imposition of personal liability on an employee
may lead to an exercise of caution that is excessive from the employer's perspective,"
the employer may have an incentive to alter the employees' incentives so as to
encourage them to act ess cautiously. See id. at 275.
281 Id. at 276.,
282 See id. at 297 & n.125.
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[only] if the municipality is also immune from suit."28 3 Allowing
the entity to escape liability for good faith torts is necessary to
protect low-level employees from entity-imposed penalties respect-
ing career advancement or tenure that might produce undesirable
"chilling."284 They contend in the alternative that even if liability
were imposed upon municipal entities, it would have "little impact
on the ex ante behavior of municipal employees and their supervi-
sors" because good faith torts "involve actions which, ex ante,
appear almost certainly to be legal."
28 5
Consequently, an exclusive focus on deterrence suggests that
entities should enjoy immunity on the same terms as their agents,
and vice versa. Kramer and Sykes do acknowledge the risk-sharing
benefits of liability if governments are "better risk bearers than
injured parties. But risk sharing benefits alone rarely suffice to
justify the imposition of civil liability, since civil litigation is
ordinarily far more costly than alternative mechanisms for the
redistribution of risks, such as social insurance schemes."
28 6
Congress, which created a damage remedy for constitutional
injuries under color of state law but chose not to require social
insurance, may have had just such risk distribution in mind. More
significantly, if government entity liability is limited, even on the
broad plane of respondeat superior, to constitutional violations
committed under circumstances that would divest its agents of
Harlow/Anderson immunity,28 7 the entity will have little incentive
to steer clear of questionable conduct. The entity need only avoid
"clearly established" violations, a realm which after Anderson may be
practically nonexistent.
288
At the other end of the spectrum, compensation is the chief
value of § 1983 for Professors Whitman and Brown; they condemn
any liability matrix that could leave a plaintiff without remedy.289
283 Id. at 299.
284 See id. at 290-91. In this way Kramer and Sykes's "double or nothing"
approach does recognize, albeit indirectly, that damages may deter. Their suggestion
that entities enjoy the same immunity as their agents rests, in part, on the fear that
an agent, facing career-threatening penalties if her principal incurs damage liability
for her good faith torts, would seek refuge in inertia or other defensive postures.
285 Id. at 299.
286 Id.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 107-21.
288 See supra notes 116, 119-21 and accompanying text.
289 See Brown, supra note 24, at 674 (criticizing the liability matrix suggested by
Justice White in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1985), because it led to the
possibility that "[t]he victim would be deprived of a remedy because the law was both
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This assumption impels Professor Brown to saddle individual
government employees with liability whenever the entity can avoid
it under the Monell/Praprotnik conception of "policy." In many
circumstances, neither the culpability of the individual nor that of
the entity will resemble common law fault; thus, liability may simply
dispense compensation "for its own sake," even if it does not
significantly serve to deter. Furthermore, and somewhat ironically
given his premise, Brown's suggestion gives scant assurance of
meeting its purely compensatory goal, because it is indifferent to
whether a usually solvent entity or an often insolvent individual
defendant will satisfy a judgment.
Professor Brown argues for an "inverse relation" between
municipal liability and the liability of individual officials.
290
Under this view, individual officials are liable, or unprotected by
qualified immunity, when the entity is not liable and vice versa. The
virtue of this relationship is that "the remedial purpose of section
1983 is served because liability is always present."291  Brown
derives this result from an analysis of Justice White's Pembaur
concurrence. Justice White reasoned that if a municipality was
limited by either federal or state law, its agent's act contrary to
those limits could not constitute "policy." The entity could
therefore not be liable, because local governments lack the authority
to make policy contrary to superior law.292 The entity, in other
clear and confused: clear enough to relieve the municipality of liability, but still
confused enough to vindicate the official"); Christina B. Whitman, Government
Responsibilityfor Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225,246 n.90 (1986) (criticizing
the approach of Justices White and O'Connor in Pembaur, because were it to be
.accepted by a majority of the Court, it could mean that certain cases... would be
difficult to bring in a federal court... [or that] a damage action against an individual
official defendant would be barred").
290 See Brown, supra note 24, at 680 n.351 (contrasting the "inverse relation"
approach with Kramer and Sykes's approach).
291 Id. at 680.
292 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485-86 (WhiteJ, concurring).Justice White's position is
an echo of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in a different context. In Pembaur,
he concludes that "[w]here the controlling law"-federal, state, or local-limits the
authority of government entity agents, "they cannot be said to have the authority to
make contrary policy." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 486 (WhiteJ, concurring). Unless such
policy is set forth in a legislative enactment, formal statement, or settled custom, its
existence, forJustice White, depends on whether the federal violation is defined by
priorjudicial decision. Thus he concluded that Pembaurwould have been a different
case-the entity's agents would have violated a clear limit on their authority and
therefore could not have been executing entity "policy'-if Steagald v. United States,
451 U.S. 204 (1981), had been decided before the events at issue. See id. at 486-87;
supra note 197; supra text accompanying notes 160-67. By comparison, Exparte Young
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words, is absolved precisely when its agent is stripped of immunity
because he could not reasonably believe that he had authority to act.
To assure that liability is always present, Brown reverses the
equation: officials who are immune from individual liability because
the law is not reasonably clear should be treated as having authority
to act on behalf of the entity; the entity should, therefore, be.
accountable.
293
Apart from the merits of Justice White's foundational observa-
tions,294 Brown's insistence that some defendant must compen-
sate the plaintiff creates two serious problems. First, it is not
obviously fair to hold an individual liable simply because "the law is
reasonably clear"295 that his actions are prohibited when he acts
holds that when prospective relief is sought individual state officers cannot be acting
as agents of the State (and are thereby suable in federal court despite the Eleventh
Amendment) whenever it is merely "alleged" that they are acting unconstitutionally,
apparently without regard to whether decisional law supports the allegation. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
Curiously, in another context,Justice White was willing to abandon the Exparte
Young fiction entirely. Hejoined the majority in Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) [hereinafter Pennhurst II], which held that the
Eleventh Amendment acts as a jurisdictional bar to a federal court's authority to
award injunctive relief against state officials found to have violated state law. See id.
at 100. What is curious is that Justice Powell's majority opinion in Pennhurst II
rationalized the Ex parte Young fiction not by recourse to traditional common law
understandings of an agent's authority, but by positing that the fiction plays an
essential role in fulfilling the vindication of federal rights, a role not demanded by the
facts of the case. See id. at 102-03. By contrast, Justice White's Pembaur opinion
seems to rest wholly on the premise rejected in Pennhurst II: the common law's
fictional formalism of authority. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485-87 (White, J.,
concurring).
293 See Brown, supra note 24, at 680.
294 The conclusion that there can be no municipal liability because municipalities
are incapable of making policy contrary to law creates conceptual tension with Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), and Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part ly Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which held that individual state actors could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983, respectively, although their conduct also violated
state law. Seesupra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. Furthermore, this conclusion
seems unacceptably formalistic and unrealistic. Municipalities routinely make spur-of-
the-moment, sweeping decisions that even justice Powell would classify as "policy,"
but these policies bear few of the teethmarks of debate or deliberation. Moreover,
policy may be reflected in simple custom. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)
(treating a state magistrate's practice of routinely requiring bond for nonjailable
offenses as a form of policy). In any event, Brown's double liability category subjects
both the individual and the municipality to liability for facially unconstitutional
policies such as the one in Monell. See Brown, supra note 24, at 683. Brown's
position sharply diverges from the stance of Justice White, who would hold a
municipality powerless to create plainly unconstitutional policy. See supra note 292.
295 Brown, supra note 24, at 680.
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in complete good faith. Brown's contrary proposition unrealistically
assumes that the employee is knowledgeable about the nuances of
local or federal law; it is therefore blind to the received wisdom that
the obligations defined by adjudicatory rules are ambiguous.
Second, Brown's regime would remit the plaintiff to an often
judgment-proof individual defendant in the nontrivial number of
cases in which the law governing the injury-producing act is well-
established and the entity, in Brown's scheme, is therefore immune.
B. An Alternative Dominant Premise: Restraint of Federally
Unlawful Conduct
To posit a priori one of two remedial goals as exclusive and
redesign liability standards around the preferred goal overlooks the
intimate link between victim compensation and deterrence. Our
own principal guidepost for a dynamic federal common law of
§ 1983 is the congressional purpose implicit in affording a private
right of action against any "person" to redress federal injuries
inflicted "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory."29 6 The implicit purpose of
§ 1983 is the restraint of governmental conduct violative of any
federal right, not just conduct that is the subject of distinct,
unexceptionable judicial articulation. All such conduct should be
restrained independent of the value of private compensation.
297
At the same time, to exalt government restraint as the dominant
concern of the enacting Reconstruction Congress does not deni-
grate victim compensation, which remains an important supplemen-
tary mechanism for achieving deterrence. An emphasis on restraint
need not ignore either the common law's concern for fairness in
subjecting individual defendants to damages or the new federalists'
concern that local government be permitted to function free of
needless national intrusion. These related values are accommodat-
ed, to varying degrees, in the proposal set forth in the following
subsection.
Each of the historical reasons offered by Justice Douglas for the
enactment of § 1983 touches issues of governmental structure: the
296 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
297 The Court has recognized the overriding public nature of the interests served
by civil rights legislation: the "public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of
the rights conferred by the statutes enumerated in § 1988, over and above the value
of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
444 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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need to "override certain kinds of state laws," to "provide[] a
remedy where state law was inadequate," and to "provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice." 298 Justice Harlan's separate views similarly
point to the paramount importance of government restraint,
whether directly through deterrence or indirectly through victim
compensation. 299 The culpability requirement embedded in both
the Court's qualified immunity and "policy" doctrines, however, is
calculated to confound fulfillment of that end.
The government restraint thesis should make us skeptical of
wide-ranging judicially crafted exceptions to the liability of entities.
Entity liability impacts most immediately on executive-level
government officials, and it is they, not line employees, who are in
a position to balance liability avoidance measures against the
requirements of governing. For the statute to have significant
prophylactic effect, it must enforce all constitutional norms, notjust
those fortuitously enmeshed in government policy.
The Court has tacitly recognized the signal importance of the
entity by denying local governments the immunity it conferred on
individual defendants charged with transgressing emerging
constitutional rights. Indeed, the particular defendant in the action
in which the Court first explicitly extended § 1983 to federal
statutory violations was an entity.3 0 0 Consequently, a local gov-
ernment is now liable for federal statutory violations, which by their
nature implicate policy, as soon as federal law is declared; an
individual is liable for a constitutional violation only after some
uncertain hiatus during which the judiciary establishes a right with
clarity.
Our central premise that government entity defendants should
be the chief and ultimate target of § 1983's proscriptions is virtually
irreconcilable with the holding of Will v. Michigan Department of
State Police30 1 that the statute does not authorize a claim for
298 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74; see supra part II.A; see also Shapo, supra note 13,
at 280 (stating that the enacting Congress was concerned about "a widespread
outbreak of violence" exacerbated by "the relative inaction of state and local
governments ... [creating a situation] which bordered on anarchy").
299 See supra notes 81 & 88.
300 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 2 (1980).
so' 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The Court has extended the Will holding to exclude
territories from § 1983's coverage. See Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737, 1743
(1990).
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damages against the state. 02 The Will result is both counter-
textual and counterintuitive; the statute mentions states (and
territories) alone and was enacted to implement Fourteenth Amend-
ment restrictions on state action. Will stands in stark contrast to
Justice Powell's lament in Owen that the Court imposed strict
damage liability on a level of government, a municipality, "least able
to bear it,"303 for Will provides comprehensive damage immunity
in all courts, state and federal, to the entity best able to offer relief,
the state.
30 4
Yet within Will there is indirect support for the government
restraint thesis. By reaffirming that an individual state agent named
in her official capacity remains a § 1983 "person" for purposes of
prospective relief,305 the Court continues to nurture the root
concept of the statute. Conduct fairly attributable to government
that causes the deprivation of federally secured rights should be
subject to judicial oversight and a federal remedy in a proceeding
under federal law, and generally in a forum of the plaintiffs
choice.3
0 6
302 See Will, 491 U.S. at 64, 71; supra note 233.
303 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 670 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell's lament increases in poignancy after City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), restricted ad hoc "policy" to decisions by final
policymakers. See id. at 127. Because of Praproinik, the lowest levels of state
government and the smallest government entities are most vulnerable to § 1983
liability. In a county or town with a one- or two-member constabulary or executive
department, virtually every decision affecting a citizen may be made by a final policy-
making official.
3" Although we are not in accord with the Court's conclusion in Will, and a full
discussion of its soundness is beyond the bounds of this Article, we cannot resist one
note. In Will the Court elided another interpretive difficulty foreseen by Justice
Powell. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Justice
Powell described the awkwardness of importing the Eleventh Amendment fiction of
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), into § 1983. The consequence is that a public
official sued in his official capacity is a "person" only to the extent the plaintiff prays
for prospective relief. SeeMonell, 436 U.S. at 712 (Powell,J., concurring). AsJustice
Powell observed, the decision in Monell to subject local government entities to liability
as § 1983 "persons" avoided this bifurcation, which had no support in the text of the
statute. See id. at 711-12. Will resurrects the bifurcation at the level of state
government on the authority of Ex parte Young, making no mention of the problem
Justice Powell had identified. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 & n.10.
305 See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10; supra note 233. When the plaintiff takes pains
to indicate that he intends to sue the public official in her individual capacity, the
official remains a full-fledged § 1983 "person" subject to damages as well as
prospective relief. See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991). Whether this bifurcated
reading of the word "person" as applied to a state official sued in her official and
individual capacities makes sense doctrinally is another matter entirely. Seesupra note
304.
306 A variety of special situations exist in which the plaintiff's federal claims must
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C. A New Asymmetry Facilitating Government Restraint, Fairness to
Individual Government Agents, and Dynamic Lawmaking
Identifying the statute's objectives in these terms leads to several
related prescriptive tenets. First, although a government acts
through individuals,307 it is ultimately the government's conduct
with which we are concerned. Moreover, for the compensatory goal
to be met, limitations on the liability of the agent, driven by
concerns about fairness and untoward stifling of initiative, demand
correlative enlargement of the liability of the entity.308 Conse-
quently, if the plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of her federal
rights, the only remaining question we should ask before attaching
liability to the entity is whether it can fairly be charged with the
conduct. This conclusion is bolstered by the widespread availability
of government employee indemnification. 30 9 In the common
situation in which the employee meets the entity's indemnification
requirements, we ignore reality if we forget that the entity pays for
the liability even if the individual defendant formally suffers the
adverse judgment.
The overriding need for restraint of government misconduct,
the concern for fairness to individual defendants, and the need to
avoid undue chilling of government initiative counsel a dual course.
Entity accountability should be enhanced by discarding the Monell
"policy" limitation; and the scope of individual liability under
Monroe requires both widening and narrowing, with local govern-
ment agents responsible for federal law violations whether settled
or unsettled, but only if they intended to harm their victims.
first be presented to statejudicial systems even against the plaintiff's wishes. See, e.g.,
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (banning federal declaratory relief that
would impede prior pending state civil proceedings); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973) (requiring prisoners invoking § 1983, alleging deprivation of good-
behavior-time credits, to pursue exclusive remedy of federal habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and, hence, to resort first to state court); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (banning federal injunctive relief that would impede prior
pending state criminal proceedings).
3
07 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 24, at 654 (stating that the problem with applying
a fault standard to determine entity liability "is simple: [the entity] cannot think");
Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 253 ("The problem is that municipal action is
always--can only be-carried out by persons employed by the municipality.").
s See Oren, supra note 24, at 1000-03 (supporting municipal liability based on
respondeat superior, the inclusion of state and federal governments in the scope of
the money damages remedy, and the exclusion of an action against an individual
official in light of the available governmental remedy).
309 See supra note 140.
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1. Entity Liability: Respondeat Superior Redux
The "policy" dictum in Monell reflected the concern, prompted
by one of several available interpretations of statutory text, that an
entity's liability should be limited to conduct fairly attributable to
it. As we have argued, 10 however, the "policy" stricture, especial-
ly as elaborated through Pembaur and Praprotnik, goes beyond what
is necessary to attribute fairly the actor's conduct to the entity. In
fact, the Court's stated concern could be largely satisfied under
respondeat superior.31 1 We would allow common law respondeat
superior in imposing liability on the principal for the conduct of an
agent who acts with the principal's authority, either express or
implied 1 2 or, at the edge, apparent. 13 . Asking if the injury-
producing decision or conduct occurred within the actual, implied,
or apparent scope of the state actor's duties314 should assure fair
310 See supra text accompanying notes 169-87.
311 We recognize that the Supreme Court has resisted similar calls for respondeat
superior. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 392 (1989); City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124, 125 nn.1-2 (1988); Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-95 (1978).
312 We envision employing the definition of authority contained in the Restatement
of Agency: "Authority is the power of the agent to affect the lega] relations of the
principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent
to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1957). This manifestation of
consent can be either express or implied. See id. cmt. c.
The Restatement ' drafters include "implied" authority as simply a subspecies of
express authority, recognizing that no principal can describe all the details of the
tasks she wants performed. The scope of consent, therefore, rests on the familiar
notion of "reasonable inference." See id. cmt. b. As that comment indicates, "[t]he
agent's conduct is authorized if he is reasonable in drawing an inference that the
principal intended him so to act although that was not the principal's intent." Id.
313 Again our prescription rests on noncontroversial, routinely applied principles
in agency law. When "it is reasonable for the third person," or by extension, an
injtired plaintiff in a § 1983 action, "to believe that the agent is authorized" to
undertake a certain act, such conduct has the trappings of apparent authority. See id.
§ 8 cmt. c. Under these circumstances vicarious liability is premised on conduct of
the principal that permits the third party reasonably to believe that the authority
exists, such as giving the agent a badge. See id. cmt. b (stating that manifestations of
the principal sufficient to create apparent authority include those made "directly to
a third person, or... to the community, by signs .... by authorizing the agent to
state that he is authorized"); see also id. § 27 cmt. a (stating that the creation of
apparent authority occurs through the "indicia of authority given by the principal to
the agent"). A latent lesson of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled inpart
by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), is that apparent
authority is a sufficient condition for liability, although Monroe involved an individual
defendant, not an entity. The individual actors in Monroe, carrying and no doubt
displaying badges or other indicators of entity approval, were liable even though their
conduct violated state law.
314 No entity liability exists when an official acts wholly outside any colorable
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attribution. At a minimum, a positive answer to the question means
that the entity is responsible for a representation to a third person,
the plaintiff, that the state actor had authority to act.3 15
Assuming that the 1871 Congress sought to restrain unconstitu-
tional government behavior, we should attend to the reality that in
most cases an effective remedy lies against the entity and not its
agents. Respondeat superior generally provides a remedy against
entities even if the challenged act does not rise to the level of
"policy" as defined by state law. Our proposed version of responde-
at superior would modify the common law by reaching the entity
principal under some circumstances in which its agent would be
absolved.3 16 Respondeat superior has the added virtue of afford-
actual, implied, or apparent authority. First, if the defendant is not clothed with
government authority, it is hard to see how his acts can be "under color of" state law.
Second, consider Professor Brown's observation, derived fromJustice White's position
in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), that entities may not properly
be held responsible for conduct that their officials could not reasonably believe to
have been authorized. Brown explains that courts define respondeat superior broadly
so that "persons who act beyond their authority are necessarily acting unreasonably."
Brown, supra note 24, at 683 & n.365.
315 Liability for intentional torts undertaken with apparent authority is covered
generally in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 245, 254, 257, 266 (1957)
(describing conditions of liability for use of force, defamation, misrepresentation, and
physical harms, respectively).
316 The version of respondeat superior advocated here is "modified" because,
under familiar principles ofrespondeat superior, both the agent who originally causes
the harm and his principal are liable, the latter vicariously. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 499 (5th ed. 1984). Moreover, the
principal is liable for the agent's ordinary negligence, see infra nte 318 (citing cases),
and for intentional torts committed in furtherance of the employer's business, see
KEETON ET AL., supra, at 505. The proposals we make for individuals, however, would
free individuals from liability unless they act with intent to harm. See infra text
accompanying notes 353-91. This leads to the result, jarring from a traditional
perspective, of "vicarious" liability for a principal predicated on acts for which the
agent is absolved.
We offer two justifications for this departure from standard doctrine. First,
retaining entity liability even under circumstances that in fairness should relieve
agents from liability is essential for fulfilling § 1983's fundamental purpose of
restraining governmental misconduct. Second, there may be only negligible
differences in practice between the operation of ordinary principles of respondeat
superior and our suggested modification. The need for vicarious liability stems from
the judgment-proof status of many employees. See, e.g., CLARENCE MORRIS & C.
ROBERT MORRIS,JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 252 (2d ed. 1980); see also SCHUCK, supra note
89, at 33 (noting that the doctrine was originally conceived as a surety device that was
called upon if the employee was unable to pay). For satisfaction of a judgment the
injured plaintiff looks to the employer, the deep pocket to whom the risk is allocated.
See KEETON ET AL., supra, at 500; MORRIS & MORRIS, supra, at 252. In theory, the
employer then has a claim for subrogation against the employee. The fact that the
latter is judgment-proof, added to the potential problems an employer would face in
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ing whatever meaningful restraint is possible against "good faith"
torts by compelling higher-level officials to weigh the risk that their
agents' conduct could result in an award of damages from the
public treasury.317  At the same time, if reasonably enforced,
respondeat superior should serve to ensure that entities are held
responsible only for conduct they actually or apparently autho-
rize.
18
By relaxing the § 1983 notion of "policy," the proposed standard
would lead to a different result in a case like Praprotnik, in which
the supervisor who effected the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge had
apparent authority to make that personnel decision. Yet it would
not alter the results of cases in which the Court has circumscribed
§ 1983 by redefining predicate constitutional violations. For
example, our approach would not disturb the result in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,3 19 because the
predicate "liberty" interest would still be wanting.320 Similarly,
the floodgates concern would continue to be substantially ameliorat-
ed even if respondeat superior were recognized as the appropriate
recruiting and retaining employees so threatened, however, has meant that the
employer generally forgoes prosecution of this claim and instead seeks to deter
employee misconduct indirectly, through discipline and discharge. See id. at 252;
SCHUCK, supra note 89, at 105.
The modifications proposed are designed in part to encourage precisely such
deterrence. See infra text accompanying notes 358-59. At the same time, to the
extent they deprive government entities of their common law subrogation rights as
principals, the forfeiture is not grievous in practice and maybe necessary to stimulate
internal checks on employee misconduct.
317 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,656 (1980) (making the same
observation on the narrower assumption that entity liability would attach only for acts
of policy).
"' The doctrine of respondeat superior has, at times, known no apparent limita-
tions, see, e.g., Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 142 (Alaska 1972) (holding employer
liable where employee at a convention was involved in an automobile accident en
route to a tavern in the early morning), a fact attributable in part to the absence of
a uniform rationale. See Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (N.Y. 1979)
(discussing the evolution of the rationales underlying respondeat superior).
In the § 1983 context, Monell discussed two justifications, deterrence and loss-
spreading. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94. Owen accepted the equitable "loss-
spreading" purpose. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 655 & n.39. We would tie liability to
scope of authority-what conduct did the agent have the actual, apparent, or implied
authority to undertake? Seesupra notes 312-15. On the interface between deterrence
and the suggestions we are aboutvto make, see infra text accompanying notes 355-65.
319 489 U.S. 189 (1989). This is by no means an endorsement of the DeShaney
decision on its merits. We have no occasion to inveigh against the Court's state
action doctrine.
320 See id. at 195-96.
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standard for entity liability. The Roth/Pau1
321 and Parratt322
lines of authority, involving individual defendants, have eliminated
the greatest potential "font" of tort law by redefining restrictively
the property or liberty protected by procedural due process and the
nature of actionable deprivations.3 23 These limitations on liability
should accrue to entities even if, as we propose, they were held
generally accountable via respondeat superior for "random and
unauthorized" federal law violations of their agents.3 24 Further,
except in highly unusual circumstances pointing to direct taxpayer
involvement in a violation, entities would continue to be exempt
from punitive damages.325  Proof requirements surrounding
causation and damages would furnish further protection of entity
coffers.
326
321 See supra text accompanying notes 209-14.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 215-22.
323 "Parratt cases" involve individual defendants because the Parratt predicate for
absolution from conduct that would otherwise violate procedural due process is that
the conduct be "random and unauthorized." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541
(1981), overruled inpart by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also supra text
accompanying notes 215-22 (discussing "Parratt cases"). To conclude that a
defendant's conduct is random and unauthorized is to define a situation in which the
defendant is an individual. An entity defendant would escape liability today in the
same circumstances on the independent ground that such conduct could not
represent an implementation of Monell "policy."
324 In our proposed redesign, actions against entities arising from "random and
unauthorized" conduct would no longer be flatly precluded, since liability would no
longer hinge on the existence of formal "policy." Nevertheless, if a particular
challenge to such conduct were brought on procedural due process grounds the
plaintiff would likely still encounter the restrictions raised by Parratt. Parratt
reconceptualizes when process is due, as Paul and Roth reconceptualize whether it is
due at all. Although Paul was an individual defendant action, Roth was brought
against an entity. Thus, the doctrinal origins of the "random and unauthorized"
restriction on procedural due process claims suggest that it should be available to
entity defendants.
Our suggestion removes the "policy" barrier that applies to all § 1983 entity
actions regardless of the nature of the predicate right. Parratt, by contrast, narrows
the scope of a particular federal right, procedural due process. Thus, even though
§ 1983 would reach an entity despite the absence of entity policy, a plaintiff who sues
an entity complaining that the agent's "random and unauthorized" conduct violated
her procedural due process rights could still lose by virtue of Parratt. In the end, the
plaintiff would fail to state a sufficient § 1983 claim, because no recognized predicate
constitutional violation occurred.
325 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
126 The courts do not simply give away an entity's funds. Recent decisions
indicate that entities may avoid liability for conduct that clearly constitutes "policy"
if the plaintiff is unable to bear the burden of proving that her federal injury was
proximately caused by the implementation of that policy. See Liggins v. Morris, 749
F. Supp. 967, 972 (D. Minn. 1990); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F. Supp. 446,
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Respondeat superior does impose a species of liability without
fault. Application of the doctrine assumes that compensation to
victims of unconstitutional conduct is not only an important
objective of § 1983, but an invariable consequence of ajudgment of
entity liability. That assumption was recently challenged by
Professor Jeffries, who argues that the Aristotelian notion of
"corrective justice" is the sole justification for money damages to
victims of constitutional violations; corrective justice, in the form of
a damage award, "at once annuls the wrongful gain and rectifies the
wrongful loss. "327 Wrongdoing, and not just the normal require-
ment of causation, is an indispensable prerequisite of the concep-
tion.
328
Using this premise, Jeffries contends that constitutional
violations that do not depend on a showing of culpability, such as
a reasonably conducted search carried out in good faith under an
invalid warrant, should not result in damage sanctions against the
entity. He therefore takes issue with the Owen holding that entities
enjoy no immunity corresponding to that accorded individuals
under the principles set forth in Harlow and Anderson.3 29 The
implication of Owen, he observes, is that "corrective justice requires
restorative transfers for all violations of constitutional rights,
without regard to fault." 30 As a critical illustration of the point,
Jeffries cites the situation in Owen itself: the only constitutional
violation alleged had not been definitively declared, and so "the
[city's] only apparent fault is a failure of prescience."
38 1
Further condemning the discontinuity between the Owen holding
and the immunity conferred on individual defendants, Professor
Jeffries observes that "the defense of qualified immunity precludes
457 (S.D. Ohio 1990), afrd, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26044 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 1991); see
also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (rejecting
a jury instruction that permitted the jury to assess the significance of the right
violated in measuring damages); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,266 (1978) (rejecting
an award of substantial damages without proof of injury).
327 jeffries, supra note 101, at 94.
-28 See id. Although just what "corrective justice" entails is the subject of some
dispute, the common elements of the doctrine are described by Professor Schroeder.
See Christopher H. Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38
UCLA L. Rlv. 143, 147 (1990) (concluding that the common threads of corrective
justice include liability based on moral principles of individual responsibility and
noninstrumental, or nonmonetary, values).
329 See supra text accompanying notes 107-21.
30 Jeffries, supra note 101, at 99.
331 Id. at 101.
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compensation for many unconstitutional acts."332 To argue for
extending the Harlow/Anderson version of qualified immunity to
entities is, therefore, simply to acknowledge, as the Owen Court
wrote, that "'many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left
remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith
defense.' " 333  That outcome is correct, Jeffries writes, because
only fault-based constitutional injuries warrant damages. Thus, the
syllogism is complete: only those acts to which we ascribe fault
warrant damages; even if the acts in Owen were the acts of the city,
the city was not at fault; damages were accordingly unwarrant-
e334ed.
3s
Jeffries's unstated premise that entities may, for purposes of
fault, be equated with individual defendants overlooks or trivializes
important reasons for distinguishing the cases. First, because
entities do not think or act the search for entity "fault" is literally
futile. Equally futile, then, is the search for an interface between
moral condemnation of the entity and compensation. Second, the
statute's textual authorization of damages as a customary remedy
that does not vary by genre of defendant "person" supports the
Court's pronouncements that compensation and deterrence are
more prominent aims of the statute than punishment,3 35 that
compensatory damages are the "traditional" personal injury
332 Id. at 86.
333 Id. at 88 (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980)).
334 Jeffries approaches the problem from a slightly different angle when he argues
that compensation is proper if the injury alleged is within the risk created. See
Jeffries, supra note 269, at 1471. Only if the creation of risk is wrongful and the
injury lies within that risk is compensation warranted. Conversely, if the injury is not
within the risk, merely finding "but for" causation "lacks moral significance." Id. at
1470. As a result, compensation serves an attenuated deterrence function under
traditional negligence principles. See infra text accompanying note 358.
For our response to this argument, see infra text accompanying notes 335-49.
Additionally, ProfessorJeffries is flogging a dead horse. Questions addressed to the
relationship between risk and injury converge with principles of negligence liability.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (concluding that the
risk of injury to be perceived by the defendant defines the duty with which courts are
concerned when finding negligence). Notions of "policy," requiring a deliberate
choice or its "deliberate indifference" counterpart in an omission case, move far
beyond negligence: both demand advertent behavior committed with knowledge or
anticipation of certain consequences. ProfessorJeffries's universal fault requirement
also departs radically from an apparent congressional purpose of compensation. See
infra text accompanying notes 335-37. Moreover, he fails to address thejusticiability
barriers to injunctive relief in suits against entities. See infra text accompanying notes
343-52.
335 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981).
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remedy,33 6 and that a "damages remedy ... is a vital component
of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guaran-
tees."
337
Individuals surely are among the "persons" subject to the
statute's prohibitions. But jury sympathy, as Professor Jeffries
understands, may absolve individual actors from liability concerning
the same conduct for which the jury would mulct a "deep pocket"
entity in damages.33 8 If plaintiffs cannot fairly obtain compensa-
tion from a local government official-either, as we propose, because
he lacked intent to harm or, as the Court ordains, because he could
reasonably believe he was not violating clearly established law-then
it will be available, if at all, from the entity.
One need not resort to the Owen loss-spreading rationale,
condemned by Professor Jeffries, to see why the fundamental
purposes of the statute are served by assessing damages against the
entity under circumstances that would preclude such relief from the
entity's agent. His conclusion that fault is a prerequisite for
individual liability is consonant with an appropriate regard for the
statute's deterrence rationale and the general common law princi-
ples on which the statute draws. But insistence on fault, a concept
of marginal pertinence to artificial creatures, understates the
importance of § 1983 actions against the government itself, the
actions that lie at the heart of congressional concern.3 39 After all,
336 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Unnamed Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971).
S337 Owen, 445 U.S. at 651; see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)
(explaining that our constitutional rights "protect persons for injuries to particular
interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they protect"); see also
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) (stating that two of the policies
underlying § 1983 are compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal
rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under the color of state
law).
338 See Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 27, at 919.
339 Professor Jeffries might respond that the state, as opposed to municipal or
other local government, has escaped § 1983 sanctions by virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment,see Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,343 (1979) (stating that congressional
silence on the sovereign immunity matter indicates a desire not to abrogate sovereign
immunity through § 1983) or, more broadly, by a narrow construction of the § 1983
defendant "person," see Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(holding that in light of common usage, ordinary rules of statutory construction, and
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute, a state is not a "person" for purposes of
§ 1983). It is therefore not surprising, he argues, that citizens injured by the
unconstitutional acts of local government should also go without remedy. SeeJeffries,
supra note 101, at 88. Will, however, tells us only that no conduct of a state itself is
within the liability sphere of§ 1983; it does not suggest that compensatory damages
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§ 1983 liability, as distinct from liability under § 1981,34 was
predicated originally on constitutional violations alone. These
violations (with rare exceptions, such as the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's affirmative ban on any slavery, public or private) target
conduct of the government entity rather than its agents. In sum, a
fault requirement is troublesome both because it sometimes places
the loss on either a fault-free, state-authorized actor or on an
innocent victim, and because it ignores the statute's special concern
with the conduct of government.
Above all, asJeffries recognizes, his willingness to equate entity
and individual defendants puts the "focus on individual
responsibility [and thereby] tends to divert attention from problems
of government structure and organization, as distinct from the
specific acts of individual officials." 34 1 The importance of this
point is reflected in the asymmetric shape of the prima facie and
defensive cases of individual and entity defendants. The Court has
chosen to preserve the entity action, but not the action against
individuals, as a stage for dialogue over the definition of constitu-
tional rights. Emerging issues stemming from "government
structure and organization," such as property taxation to finance
public education, across-the-board practices respecting zoning and
public employment, and police department decisions on the use of
force, are often best contested in the entity suit.3 42 Neither the
text nor history of § 1983 suggests that judges who decide these
vital constitutional questions should restrict compensation to those
violations that, in some uncertain way, reflect entity "fault."
This view of government structure and organization reveals a
deeper, more troubling aspect of Professor Jeffries's project. He
assumes that we can meaningfully discuss noninstrumental or
nondeterrent rationales for § 1983's remedial scheme without
are inappropriate for conduct that does violate the statute, which includes the
practices of municipal and other local government entities. See Will, 491 U.S. at 64;
supra text accompanying notes 301-05.
340 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976)
(stating that § 1981 reaches purely private acts of discrimination), afTd in relvantpart,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
341 Jeffries, supra note 101, at 85.
342 See Oren, supra note 24, at 1005 (remarking with irony that the Court's recent
decisions allowing landowners to challenge takings in § 1983 actions, coupled with
Harlow immunity for the individual zoning board members, means that "only in the
land use area is responsibility likely to be allocated to the government rather than to
the official").
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considering deterrence or restructuring. Jeffries's theoretical
assumption, however, must confront a practical problem.
Jeffries's proposal undermines efforts to challenge systemically
caused constitutional harms, perhaps the most important and least
accessible area of government conduct. 43 Implicit in his propos-
al is the assumption that injunctive relief will be available and will
deter sufficiently. Unfortunately, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 44
critically subverts that assumption with its standing requirement that
a plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief demonstrate "a sufficient
likelihood" that he will suffer the same injury in the future.
3 45
One year before Lyons was decided, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,346 the
Court explicitly assumed that the plaintiff would obtain recompense
in the form of damages from the individual government defen-
dants. 47 That assumption was soon dashed because the "clearly
established" wrinkle of the qualified immunity defense barred such
claims at the threshold. 48 The Jeffries approach would thus
foreclose the only remaining form of compensation, damages from
the entity. Even if, as in Lyons, the challenged practice amounts to
Monell policy, Jeffries would not find a compensable injury unless
the practice reflects municipal fault in the sense that it violated well-
settled law; in Lyons, use of the chokehold did not.3
49
s45 Justice Douglas's historical exegesis in Monroe on the factors animating the
enactment of § 1983 highlights systemic governing problems in the Reconstruction
South. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), overruled in part by Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Shapo, supra note 13, at
280 (noting that, in the eyes of the legislators who proposed § 1983, the relative
inaction of state and local governments exacerbated the widespread outbreak of
violence the statute was meant to address). Professor Jeffries would preclude a
damage remedy for systemic harms because, he argues, they fall outside the risk that
ordinarily makes such injuries compensable in tort. SeeJeffries, supra note 269, at
1480.
344 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983) (denying injunctive relief to the victim of an
unlawfil police chokehold because the victim could not show that he personally was
likely to be subject to a future chokehold).
345 See id. at 111.
346 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
347 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.
348Justice Marshall pointed out in his Lyons dissent that there had been no
occasion to test the contours of Los Angeles's chokehold practice. See id. at 118
(Marshall,J., dissenting). The violation, if any, was thus not "clearly established" in
the terms Harlow would lay down; individual police defendants would therefore be
qualifiedly immune.
349 See id. at 111 ("The legality of the violence to which Lyons claims he was once
subjected is at issue in his suit for damages and can be determined there."); see also
supra note 348.
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Since Lyons, the Court has demonstrated its awareness that
damages against an entity can play a critical role in eradicating
institutional government misconduct. In City of Riverside v.
Rivera,3 50 a damage action against thirty members of the Riverside
Police Department, the Court quoted approvingly from the trial
judge's opinion that the "'institutional behavior involved here ...
[harassing Chicanos because of their national origin] had to be
stopped.' 3 5 1 Alluding to Lyons-like limitations, the Court wrote
that damage relief was critical to deterrence because "injunctive
relief generally is unavailable."
3 52
2. Individual Liability and the Controlling Role of Fault
This critique should not be interpreted as an assertion that
notions of fault are irrelevant to § 1983. We part company with
Professor Jeffries only on the application of fault concepts to
government entity defendants. Because entities act through their
agents3 53 and are therefore liable only vicariously, deterrence has
its most immediate impact in relation to the conduct of individu-
als.3 54 Thus, despite our disagreement with Jeffries on the liabili-
ty of entities, we generally concur with and even expand upon his
fault-based prescription for the liability of individual defendants.
Specifically, we propose that the individual face liability when,
but only when, her conduct was committed with the intent to harm,
or a state of mind approaching a desire to produce harmful
consequences.3 5 5 This standard assures direct deterrence under
50 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
351 Id. at 574.
352 Id. at 575.
353 See Brown, supra note 24, at 653-54; see also supra note 307 and accompanying
text.
354 Cf Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655-66 (1980) (arguing that
the risk of inhibiting an agent's decisiveness, a symptom of overdeterrence, is reduced
when threat of personal liability is removed).
s55 Throughout this Article we use the terms "intentional" and "intent" as if they
represented a unitary, determinate conception. In fact, in the ordinary parlance of
tort law, the conclusion that an actor's conduct was "intentional" may reflect relatively
distinct levels of culpability. See, e.g, Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Wash.
1955) (holding actor liable for the tort of battery if he intended to bring about
contact with the plaintiff, even if he did not intend the contact to cause the ensuing
harm). Provisionally, as it is used in this Article, "intent" conforms with two routinely
used criteria: one is stated by the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)
(describing "intent" as either "[(a)] the actor desires to cause [the] consequences of
his act, or [(b)]... believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it"); the other is used in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) (attaching
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the most egregious and hence necessitous circumstances: when the
state actor decides to inflict harm that amounts to a constitutional
injury or tort. Absent an intent to harm, this suggestion would
relieve the individual of liability for all acts that the entity directed
or authorized 56 (a situation in which liability seems unfair3 57)
as well as for conduct that is entirely unauthorized and as such is
not under color of state law.
We appreciate that under traditional tort law conduct as low on
the culpability scale as mere negligence implicates deterrence and
warrants damages. The "reasonable person" fiction presupposes
that the defendant did not act as a reasonable person ought to have
acted under the same or similar circumstances.35 8 But transplant-
ing a negligence standard to § 1983 would engender liability with
little appreciable deterrence and with large potential for chilling
officials in the execution of their duties. It is difficult to achieve a
substantial incremental deterrent effect when a government official
causes an unintended constitutional harm. The reasonable person
standard of general tort law may be justified on the basis of wealth
transfer, but it is unlikely that personal liability will significantly
deter the individual defendant who acts in good faith. By contrast,
if the entity would bear liability for all federal rights deprivations
attributable to its agents' acts within the scope of their agency, one
may predict renewed internal checks and constraints on reckless or
negligent conduct by government employees.
3 59
Additionally, negligence-based § 1983 liability carries with it
special costs. In common law negligence actions few noncompensa-
tory policies compete for judicial attention; costs to the defendant
and compensation for the plaintiff usually comprise the universe of
policy rationales.3 60  Exposing a § 1983 individual defendant to
liability for a conspiracy depriving persons of rights or privileges). See, e.g., Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.10 (1971) ("The motivation aspect of § 1985(3)
focuses not on scienter in relation to deprivation of rights but on invidiously
discriminatory animus.").
356 See infra note 367.
357 See supra text following note 176.
358 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) ("[T]he standard of
conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable
man under like circumstances."). The classic description of the interface between the
negligence standard and deterrence remains that ofJustice Holmes. See OLIvER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76-78 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
359 See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 290-91.
31 We acknowledge that our characterization is overbroad. In certain areas, such
as drug manufacturers' liability and the development of orphan drugs, patient
dumping, and dram shop liability, monetary costs alone can create significant
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liability for inadvertent harms may cause an important nonmonetary
consequence: chilling a government officer's inclination to act.
Inertia becomes safer than action. 361 Even the Court's expansive
version of individual immunity, manifested in the "clearly estab-
lished" rule as refined by Anderson, does not fully avoid chilling. An
employee engaged unintentionally in an actually or apparently
authorized function cannot know whether the federal right he might
have negligently3 62 or recklessly3 65 violated will be deemed "clear-
additional policy considerations.
361 See ScHUcK, supra note 89, at 68-69; Mashaw, supra note 95, at 26-27.
Moreover, it is more difficult to find state action when the harm is alleged to have
occurred through omission rather than commission. See DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); id. at 204-05 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 183, 192 & 200.
362 Although the Court has rendered mere negligence largely obsolete for
constitutional torts, we assume for the sake of discussion that simple negligence may
serve as a basis for some § 1983 liability outside the procedural due process arena
from which it was excluded by Daniels v. Williams, 474 US. 327 (1986). See supra
notes 146, 217-18 and accompanying text. The Parratt Court, citingMonroe, asserted
that neither the language nor legislative history of § 1983 has "been found by this
Court to contain a state-of-mind requirement." See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
534 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In Daniels,
an action predicated on an alleged due process violation, the Court held that "the
Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act,4 " since a negligent loss
does not amount to a "deprivation" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. Accordingly, the Court overruled Parratt but only "to
the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state official may 'deprive' an
individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 330-31
(emphasis added). It is true that the predecessor to § 1983 was enacted to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, seesupra note 2, by contemporaries of the amendment's
drafters, and both statute and amendment include the similar requirement of a
"deprivation." One might therefore conclude that § 1983, like the due process clause,
is violated only when the defendant acts with more than a negligent state of mind.
But see infra note 391 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Court was at some pains in Daniels not to
overturn the more general conclusion of Monroe and Parratt that § 1983, as distinct
from certain predicate constitutional rights that might be vindicated in § 1983 actions
(such as procedural due process), contains no general state of mind requirement. See
supra note 15; see, e.g., the following cases all decided under § 1983: Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (holding that claims of excessive force in
connection with arrest by police should be assessed under objective Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1986) (stating that even unintentional
interference with property rights can constitute an unconstitutional taking); Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (determining an ordinance to be violative of the First
Amendment when it is 'objectively" vague).
565 With greater confidence than we express about simple negligence, we also
assume that reckless conduct continues to be a staple source of § 1983 liability, even
in the procedural due process realm. See Zinermon v. Birch, 494 U.S. 113, 137 (1990)
(holding that a claim of"'willful, wanton and reckless disregard of.... constitutional
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ly established." The resultant chilling potential disappears only if
liability is limited to deliberately caused harms, those rooted in
intentional misconduct.
3 64
Tightening the occasions for individual liability is tolerable in
compensatory terms only if coupled with our companion proposal
on entity liability. Vicarious entity liability relieves the action
against individual officers from doing double duty as a gap-filler in
the lacuna erected by Monell's conception of "policy." Put bluntly,
emphasis on entity liability for damages will more often assure a
solvent defendant and will serve more than compensation "for its
own sake." It fosters deterrence, too, if, as is widely believed,
damages deter more effectively than injunctive relief alone.
3 65
One might object, along with Professor Jack Beermann,
66
that permitting the individual to escape liability for most entity
authorized misbehavior367 runs counter to the Nuremberg princi-
rights" is sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 (quoting appendix to petition for
certiorari)); supra text accompanying notes 235-46; see also Redman v. County of San
Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991) (gross negligence or recklessness sufficient
for due process liability under Daniels); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220
(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (recklessness sufficient for liability), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1065 (1989); Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988) (wanton or
obdurate disregard or deliberate indifference sufficient for liability); Morales v. New
York State Dep't of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (1988) (deliberate indifference
sufficient for liability); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir.
1988) (reckless indifference sufficient for liability), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989);
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (deliberate
indifference sufficient for liability), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Lopez v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351,355-56 (5th Cir. 1987) (callous indifference
sufficient for liability); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277,281-83 (6th Cir.
1987) (en banc) (reckless indifference sufficient for liability). But see Washington v.
District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reckless failure to act
insufficient to create § 1983 liability).
364 "Because the [individual] employee need only refrain from deliberate
misconduct to avoid liability, he or she has no incentive to become over cautious."
Kramer & Sykes, supra note 24, at 275 n.92.
365 When an injunction is not obeyed, the courts customarily resort to a monetary
sanction for civil contempt. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251, 1260
(1988) (mem.) (rejecting City of Yonkers's request to stay imposition of monetary
sanctions for contempt in refusing to carry out district court's housing desegregation
mandate). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 96-98
(1973).
566 We refer to comments he kindly offered us on an earlier draft.
-67 Under our proposal, the nonintentional authorized conduct for which the
individual would not be liable would include (1) gross negligence or reckless
disregard, see DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 31 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 500 (1965), (2) simple negligence, and (3) "deliberate indifference."
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ple, because we allow low-level officials to avoid liability by
professing obedience to higher authority. The ordinary § 1983
action, however, contemplates not war crimes but relatively routine
tortious conduct that violates federal rights in the process.
3 68
Our proposals do not affect the potential for criminal liability.
3 69
Second, the regime we advocate reintroduces the subjective element
into the immunity calculation. The officer will not escape damages
if she acts in bad faith. Third, our suggestion sketches a reasonably
bright line for the submission of issues to the jury. Most important,
enhanced entity liability will work its own deterrence, albeit less
directly than liability on the officer. The indirectness seems a small,
or even nonexistent, 370 price for alleviating the legitimate concern
of chilling.
37 1
The suggested framework for individual defendant cases renders
irrelevant for liability purposes the degree to which the allegedly
violated right was "settled" on the eve of injury.3 72 Consequently,
the framework obviates the nettlesome and subjective analogizing
to prior cases that in the currentjudicial climate reveals a "settled"
36 Professor Beermann anticipated this response. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan,J., concurring) ("[D]eprivation of a constitutional right
is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right."),
overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But
see infra note 392.
9 See supra note 71.
370 Deterring law violations of agents indirectly through their entities mayinspire
the same desirable measure of caution as today's direct deterrence of the agents
themselves, who are often judgment-proof and enjoy an exceedingly generous form
of immunity. See supra notes 359 & 364 and accompanying text.
571 These proposals will in all likelihood increase filings against entities, a situation
for which we offer no apology but some explanation. The recommendations make
no inroads into the narrowly defined due process sphere: the Roth/Paul/Siegert,
Davidson/Daniels and Parratt/Hudson lines remain unchanged. See supra text
accompanying notes 321-24. Additionally, the proposals are interrelated and
inseparable. Thus, we anticipate a substantial reduction in the number of filings
against individuals. As suggested in the text, this accommodates fairness concerns as
far as its logic will bear. Finally, we recur to the major thesis here that it is the
government whose conduct the statute seeks to change. If voters find their local
government units frequently sued, it may be because the conduct of those units is
questionable. As a result, voters or supervising officials have the option of removing
chronic or egregious constitutional tortfeasors from office. See City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981) (suggesting that municipal liability for
compensatory damage against municipalities "may... induce the public to vote the
wrongdoers out of office").
s7' The "settledness" of a right may help the factfinder assess the degree of
wrongful intent and, therefore, may bear on the appropriateness and measure of
punitive damages. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 908(2), 501 cmt. b
(1965).
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right as a highly prized rarity. Whether trammeling a settled or
unsettled federal right, intentional conduct is deterrable and
accordingly should be subject to the penalties of the statute.
373
In this respect the proposal squares partially with Monroe. It
conforms fully with the general proposition for which Monroe is best
known-that individuals may be liable for "unauthorized" conduct,
defined as conduct that violates or is not affirmatively warranted
under state law. For several reasons, though, we would cabin the
individual liability realm to intentionally harmful acts, authorized in
373 One permutation of"settledness" requires additional explanation. When an
agent with apparent, but neither express nor implied authority, see supra notes 312-13,
acts without wrongful intent, see supra note 355, we would impose liability on the
entity alone. The argument for holding the officer liable as well is that under such
circumstances the imposition of individual liability serves a deterrence function,
especially if the violated right is settled. Liability may discourage state actors from
disregarding their government principal's actual or reasonably inferable instructions
even if they believe, although unreasonably, that they serve its interest by violating
the principal's instructions. The fear of chilling is minimal because the assumption
that the government does not wish to encourage such conduct is probably accurate.
Further, employees on a frolic and detour would not be eligible for qualified
immunity as it is currently conceived, because conduct wholly outside the scope of
one's actual or implied authority would be neither ministerial nor discretionary. See
infra text accompanying note 380.
We nevertheless conclude that this individual defendant should not be subject
to liability when she acts with no more than apparent authority, regardless of the
status of the violated right. If the right is not well settled, the deterrent effect of
liability is simply too attenuated. First, it taxes the imagination to hypothesize many
contexts in which an agent, acting without intent to harm, will violate newly declared
rights while working with only apparent authority. More importantly, it strains
credulity to assume that an agent, unreasonably departing from what she herself
understands her duties to be, will be deterred by the threat of liability that may arise
if a judge, acting after the conduct in question, comes to one but not another
subjective conclusion about the status of the legal right. Alternatively, a government
employee who acts outside the bounds of any reasonable description of her job will
probably not fear a potential judgment for damages contingent on the creation of
later-declared rights.
Given the apparently marginal deterrence achieved by imposing liability in this
situation, coupled with the fact that the compensation goal could be fulfilled by an
action against the entity, it is doubtful whether liability should be recognized for this
conduct at the farthest frontiers of state action. One might respond that damages
may be an appropriate remedy for dealing with such a loose cannon. The context,
however, is still unintentionally harmful conduct, for which a punishment rationale
is usually out of place.
A more difficult case is when this apparently authorized agent violates a settled
right. The case for liability is arguably stronger, but so is the reason for rejecting it.
First, deterrence is unlikely for all the reasons advanced above. Second, and more
important, in light of the very few contexts in which such an injury may occur, the
costs of applying the clearly established test are excessive. See supra text accompany.
ing notes 123-25.
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this sense or not. First, in light of Monell, it is no longer necessary
for individual defendants to carry the weight of the entity on their
shoulders; compensation-and its accompanying deterrence-are now
assured directly from and through the entity. Second, in all but
intentional harm situations, 374 'the modest or negligible gain to
deterrence won at the expense of individual liability will often be
outweighed by the unfairness visited upon an individual whose only
shortcoming was in following instructions or failing to predict
nascent rights. Finally, the troublesome aspects of the "clearly
established" version of qualified immunity, 75 not least of which
is its potential for pinching off § 1983's potential as a conduit for
the emergence of evolving constitutional standards, make the game
worth far less than the candle. Monroe goes awry, we conclude, in
continuing to subscribe to the assumption that individuals may be
liable for all unintentional harms that the entity "authorizes" simply
by conferring express, implied, or apparent authority on its agent.
With the significantly expanded basis of entity liability proposed, it
would no longer be necessary to impose liability on individuals for
unintended harms.
Although we would eliminate the "settled right" aspect of
immunity, we effectively reintroduce, by way of the prima facie
element of intent to harm, a subjective aspect that the Court in
Wood once treated as defeating the affirmative defense.3 76  By
scotching the subjective element, the Court in Harlow discounted its
potential for deterring constitutional torts by individual defendants
who otherwise might act with intent to harm.3 77 Fairness con-
cerns would dictate imposing liability on the individual defendants
in Praprotnik37 8 who intentionally retaliated against plaintiff for
appealing his suspension, even if they were unaware that in doing
so they deprived him of a particular federal right.
With the scope of potential claims against individual defendants
substantially reduced both by the Court's contractions in the
predicate constitutional law and by our exclusion of liability for
374 See supra note 373.
375 See supra text accompanying notes 116-27.
376 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), overruled by Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982): Distinguishing between intentional and
nonintentional conduct for purposes of individual liability, and thereby reintroducing
the subjective prong of the qualified immunity defense, makes § 1983 something
more than a mere jurisdictional allocation provision. See supra note 78.
377 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19; supra text accompanying note 107.
378 See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 116 (1988).
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most authorized acts, the cost of taking a limited number of
individual suits to trial seems worth the concomitant potential for
deterrence. The latter-day, policy-driven version of qualified
immunity announced by Harlow and expanded in Anderson
3 79
becomes unnecessary when the primary factor that drove it, the fear
of chill, is met through an intent-based formula for individual
liability.
Drawing a crisp line at intent for the liability of individuals
should have other salutary consequences as well. Because the
prevalent version of qualified immunity is chiefly concerned with
ensuring that the threat'of liability will not unduly chill government
agents from vigorously exercising their government functions, the
immunity now attaches only to their "discretionary," as opposed to
"ministerial," acts.380 Accordingly, courts must characterize the
components of government functions as one or the other and
determine what mixture of discretionary and nondiscretionary
duties warrants which characterization of the entire function.
3 8 1
Our rationale respecting individual defendants is broader; to be
mulcted in damages, they must have had a clearly deterrable,
wrongful state of mind. This rationale applies equally to nondiscre-
tionary as well as to discretionary functions, thus eliminating the
characterization problem.
Excising the qualified immunity defense from § 1983's calculus
by making intent to harm an element of the plaintiff's case-in-chief
against an individual defendant will have variable effects on the
policies the Court has cited in crafting that defense. The primary
underlying consideration, easing a potential damper on government
administration, would be substantially fortified. Government
officials would no longer have to guess, at their own potential risk,
379 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987);seesupra text accompanying notes
113-16.
380 Qualified immunity for government officials under § 1983 protects the
defendant's discharge of only those functions that entail a degree of discretion. See
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 n.14 (1984); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816; Courson v.
McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991).
381 See, e.g., F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)
(determining that a naval study of the environment was a discretionary act, despite
its ministerial components); Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding that a police officer booking a prisoner was a discretionary act, despite
the violation of a nondiscretionary regulation), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); see
also Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (defining conduct as
discretionary so long as it is pursuant to the official's performance of assigned duties
and within her scope of authority).
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whether a contemplated act would be deemed within their discre-
tion or whether the constitutional right the act might violate would
be deemed well settled. Officials could instead work within the
scope of their authority without fear of § 1983 damage liability so
long as they refrain from inflicting injury intentionally. Coinciden-
tally, this would bring § 1983 in line with Congress's recently
revised rules respecting the liability of federal employees for
common law torts. 8 2
At first blush these proposals do not meet the Court's concern
about saving officials' time.3 8 3 Enhancing the likelihood of entity
liability would occupy officials as witnesses; and individuals named
as defendants would forfeit the possibility of early dismissal held out
by Harlow/Anderson immunity. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases
brought against individuals the official would have to submit to trial,
because the key question of intent to harm is for the jury.
In the aggregate, however, the Court's time-sparing policy would
be advanced. It may be anticipated that far fewer cases would be
82 Language injustice Harlan's opinion for a plurality in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959), would have conferred immunity on federal officials from common law
tort liability whenever the challenged act took place "within the outer perimeter" of
their duties, or within the scope of their employment. Id. at 575. The Court later
retreated from that stark position. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 298 n.4 (1988)
(holding that the conduct must also represent an exercise ofdiscretion to qualify for
the immunity). Westfall itself has in pertinent part been legislatively overruled. See
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1988));
Lunsford v. Price, 885 F.2d 236, 237 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that law "in essence"
overrules Westfall);Jordan v. Hudson, 879 F.2d 98,99 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that law
"expressly displaces Westfall'); Newman v. Saballe, 871 F.2d 969, 971 (11 th Cir. 1989)
(stating that law was "enacted to negate ... WestfalV').
This statute, while preserving tort claims against the United States, precludes any
damages action against the individual federal employee for any "negligent or wrongful
act or omission' undertaken "while acting within the scope of his office or
employment." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1988). 'Wrongful" act as used in the federal
employee context has long been understood to refer to conduct more egregious than
simple negligence but not rising to the level of intentional harms. See Hatahley v.
United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956) (stating that "'wrongful'.. . [is] intended to
include situations.., which might not be considered strictly negligent"); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45 (1953) (same); In re Bomb Disaster at Roseville, Cal.,
on Apr. 28, 1973, 438 F. Supp. 769, 778 & n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1977) ("Congress intended
to include more than negligence and trespass in the word 'wrongful.'"). This
approach appears similar to the one proposed for state actors under § 1983: the
entity is accountable under modified.respondeat superior, the individual agent only
for intentionally harmful acts.
383 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985) (concluding that early
resolution of the qualified immunity defense may permit the official to avoid
discovery).
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brought against individual government officials. In potential
liability situations, the entity, with its usually deeper pocket, would
be liable as well. In our intentional harm regime, punitive damages
would be potentially available in all remaining cases of individual
liability.3 84 Nevertheless, the number of actions brought against
individual officials should sharply decline. To avoid Rule 11
sanctions, plaintiffs' allegations must be fairly well founded,38 5
and their lawyers can receive statutory attorney's fees only if the
allegations are so well founded that the client prevails.38 6 The
difficulty of satisfying our intent to harm standard should give
considerable pause to counsel who contemplate naming individual
defendants, even apart from the tactical issue of jury sympathy for
an individual sued with an entity co-defendant. For the plaintiff,
securing the individual official as a less hostile witness will often be
worth sacrificing the doubtful possibility of punitive damages.
Saddling the entity with liability for all federal law violations its
agents commit within the scope of their authority, while relieving
agents of liability for all but egregious harms, admittedly takes an
asymmetrical approach to state of mind. The Court's own frame-
work suffers from the same flaw, but in reverse. The Court reaches
individuals regardless of state of mind and entities if they are acting
with the degree of advertence reflected in the several variations of
384 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), authorized punitive damages for conduct
that "involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others." Id. at 56. Presumably, that standard would be exceeded in each case
meeting our proposed "intent" standard. See supra note 355.
We acknowledge an incongruity: our intent to harm standard requisite for any
individual liability demands a somewhat greater showing of fault than Smith does for
punitive damages. We offer an explanation. The additional chilling of initiative
entailed by the relative lenity of Smith is a disadvantage that more than offsets its
potential for an incremental gain in deterrence. After all, in our proposal the entity
would be liable for actual damages whenever the individual would be liable, thus
assuring compensation and hence indirect deterrence. Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine deterring an individual defendant who was unaware of a risk that an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person should recognize.
We doubt, moreover, that the current Court would retain the Smith standard if
the issue were revisited. Of the five member majority,Justices Brennan and Marshall
have departed. They have been replaced by Justices far less favorably disposed
towards plaintiffs' claims, particularly to the claims of civil rights plaintiffs. Our high
standard of fault for individual liability, therefore, may prove to be no higher than
the standard for punitive damages that an increasingly conservative majority may
declare.
385 See FED. R. CiV. P. 11; EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & THEODORE Y. BLUMOFF,
PRETRIAL DIscovERY: STRATEGY & TAcTIcS § 13:10 n.26 (Supp. 1991).
316 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
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official policy.38 7 Our proposal's aesthetic flaw, however, is of no
real consequence. Redesigning § 1983 liability standards to achieve
a uniform approach to state of mind strikes us as little more than
Emersonian foolish consistency. If satisfying this formal qualm were
to foreclose entity liability without fault, the redesign would fail, as
does the Court's current formulation of "policy," to serve the
statute's paramount purpose of restraining governmental miscon-
duct.3
88
The flaw would be worse than aesthetic if the "deprivation"
about which any § 1983 plaintiff must complain38 9 is the same as
the more-than-negligent state of mind required by the term
"deprive" in the Due Process Clause.390 Were that the case, the
Court departs from the statutory scheme by enabling recovery
against individual defendants whose only sin is ignorance of well-
settled precedent. Similarly, we would depart from the statutory
scheme by urging recovery against entities whose only sin is
engaging agents who violate federal rights. But the Court itself has
held that not every § 1983 "deprivation" need entail the same
wrongful state of mind required to "deprive" a person of due
process.3 91 We are therefore sanguine about the prospect of
holding liable an entity (which is mindless is any event) based solely
on the unlawfulness of its agents' conduct.
11
7 See supra paragraph following note 176 (stating that individual defendants
remain liable for conduct their entity authorized); supra paragraphs preceding notes
183 & 192 (discussing the Court's several formulations of "official policy" as the
prerequisite for entity liability). Of these official policy formulations, the "deliberate
indifference" element of City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), applicable in
cases where the plaintiff seeks to hold the entity liable for an omission, most clearly
reflects the requirement of advertence. Some degree of advertence is also evinced
in the Court's other approved variations: the official policy statement (Monell),
legislation (Pembaur), settled custom (Praprotnik and Jett), or delegation of final
policymaking authority to an individual official (Praprotnik and Jett).
388 See supra part V.B.
389 See supra notes 2 & 66.
390 See supra text accompanying notes 217-18 & 362-63.
391 Seesupra notes 15 & 362. Additional support for this conclusion maybe found
in the fact that the Ku Klux Klan Act from which § 1983 is derived was enacted not
only to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but also "for other purposes." See supra
note 2. That § 1983 ranges beyond Fourteenth Amendment enforcement goals is also
evident from its provision of a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by "the
laws," now understood to refer to federal statutes. See supra text accompanying notes
257-69.
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tional law. Within the sphere of intent, individual defendants would
incur liability even for newly declared federal violations so that the
individual case would recapture some of its lawmaking potential. In
the end, redirection of the statute's enforcement efforts away from
the individual defendant and toward the government entity is
informed by justice Harlan's central notion that the "deprivation of
a constitutional right is significantly different from and more
serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a
different remedy."3
92
392 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan,J., concurring), overruled in
part by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In light of the
guidance we take from Justice Harlan's language, one might ask why we would limit
the liability of individuals to cases in which the actor's conduct is intentional. Recall
that when Justice Harlan wrote in Monroe, the only "person" liable for violations was
the individual. By holding government entities amenable under § 1983, Monel
recognized an alternative conduit for deterrence. As a result, new questions are
presented in striking the right balance between, on one hand, the statutory goals of
government restraint, compensation, and deterrence and, on the other, the fairness
and chilling concerns identified by the Court. These suggestions address those
questions.
